

## Weak Barbarism

Radu Vasile CHIALDA

Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences  
University Al. I. Cuza, Iasi, Blvd Carol I, No. 11, 700506, Romania  
chialdabyvass@yahoo.com

Abstract. In order to redefine barbarism, a hermeneutical framework is needed. The contemporary socio-cultural context and the transformations that have occurred during the last decades represent the premises for a new barbarism. In redefining barbarism, its relationship with civilization and culture should be first considered. Cultural mutations, together with the historical and political phenomena involved in contemporary civilizations' reorganization as set forth in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Samuel P. Huntington), offer the theoretical background for the discourse wherein barbarism could revive and take an appearance other than the common one. The necessity of reinterpreting barbarism is backed up by other variables such as its structural inconsistency and weakness, which most definitely diminish its impact on individuals. Following the 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophical tendency of harshly critical thinking, all these point to the current weak character of barbarism. Thus so-called "weak barbarism" is reinterpreted evolutionally for a better reception among contemporary cultural philosophy, axiological and ethical studies.

Keywords: cultural background, weak barbarism, axiological mutation, contemporary society

### CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS FOR AN ACCURATE INTERPRETATION OF BARBARISM

First of all, we should limit our field of discourse starting from a historic error.<sup>1</sup> Studies on the barbarian character of societies determined that it always evolved around a term used for the first time in Ancient Greece. Barbarism valences derive from the conflict between the two terms of the expression "we and others". These terms generated successive barbarism aspects, which superposed each other, switched roles and shifted places during ancient times, the Middle Ages and imperial colonialist times until today. It is worth mentioning that the parameters described by the terms

of this expression<sup>2</sup> make a first major distinction regarding the perception of barbarism in its generality. Because “others” were always considered barbarians for the reason of being placed outside the civilization of the one responsible for the stigma of inferiority, the barbarism characterizing “others” as opposed to “us” was an exterior one. The error previously mentioned refers to the tendency of misinterpreting barbarism, generated by the expression “we and others”, which excludes the barbarian character from the civilized being’s structure (“civilized” meaning all but having a certain culture). Historical proofs<sup>3</sup> describe aspects that point to the existence of such characters also within great civilizations. Jean-Francois Mattéi starts from Socrates’ principle *know yourself* and amends this error, by theorizing “interior barbarism”,<sup>4</sup> which finds a barbarian in every individual’s self, under the civilized mask. We therefore have a first interpretation framework.

Considering the difference between “exterior barbarism” and “interior barbarism” a necessary one, and the shift from the first to the second as an eradication of the errors made in terms of barbarism’s conceptual history, some interpretation parameters should be established. Emphasis should be put on the framework that allowed this shift, that is, the imperial colonialist context, which lies at the bottom of the subsequent globalization structures and whose universal macro-mechanism revolved round the modern slave(-owning) system as a cultural domination of the world.<sup>5</sup> The end of this system due to human rights affirmations and the dissolution of the colonial empires into scores of young states drag us out from late modernism and lay the foundations of the contemporary cultural and civilization structures. The historic direction thus described indicates a diminution of the conflicts between the civilizations that restrict the knowledge space and favours social-cultural dislocation. In this context barbarism seems to lose its forte and passes into the shade having to undergo axiological mutations.

### WEAK THINKING THEORY

In a world in which, subject to other criteria, the differences between civilizations in terms of superiority transform, so that conflicts acquire other valences and the enemies of the relations between “us” and “others” mutually accept each other, the first forms of globalization<sup>6</sup> mark the gradual uniformization of the discrepancies that located barbarism and

exiled the barbarian through obedience. However, the dialectic of “exterior barbarism–interior barbarism” remains valid. War crimes, the Holocaust and atomic bombs are only a few illustrative examples indicating that the act of barbarism, regardless of its form of manifestation, is still part of man’s natural structure. Nevertheless, after the two events that violently shook the last century, barbarism is revealed in a total different manner today. It seems that such statements as “the barbarian is the uncivilized Germanic situated outside the Roman Empire *limes*” or “the civilized European countries civilized and christened the New World” are no longer valid at the beginning of this new century. Interior barbarism focuses on the uncivilized character of human individuals; that is, on barbarism’s aprioristic-intrinsic<sup>7</sup> aspect, thus shifting its meaning towards a structural type of dissociation.

Interior barbarism, both the one Mattéi deals with under the subtitle “An Essay on the Modern Vile” and the one that has to do more with the anthropological-psychoanalytical side of human behaviour compared to exterior barbarism, describes the phenomenological nature of barbarism.<sup>8</sup> Its structural nature reveals elements connected to the cultural, political, economical, educational, scientific and technological evolutions of contemporary society compared to the past epochs and centuries. This interpretation – which takes the barbarism out of the sphere of cultural-historical events and places it in a framework dominated by technical-scientific progress, and the evolution of anthropic and global environments of all things – moves the accent from the barbarism phenomenon (the manifestation of which has to do with behavioural issues) to its structure (on what substitutes the matrix of the phenomenon’s occurrence). The differences between structure and phenomenon are differences in the level which generate a new dialectic in the interpretation of barbarism. As far as the acknowledgement of barbarism is concerned, the present conditions stress the distinction between “weak barbarism” and “strong barbarism”.

The concept of “weak barbarism” is not born out of something; it appears in a philosophical background that was very common in the last century, beginning with the works of Martin Heidegger and H.G. Gadamer, whose radical hermeneutics<sup>9</sup> on the main works of G.W.F. Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche led to the critique of modern thinking. Gianni Vattimo is maybe the most fervent promoter of “weak thinking”,<sup>10</sup> as mentioned by John D. Caputo in an exchange of ideas<sup>11</sup> with Vattimo.

The weak thinking refers to the fact that the methods of modern philosophy no longer found their representation in the contemporary world, which was why its limits needed a new sense and interpretation. Thus, a new series of hermeneutics was born and gradually began to substitute the old philosophies. The American pragmatism of Charles S. Pierce, the existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre, the French deconstructivism and contemporary postmodernism are the most radical critiques of a thinking we call “strong”. The weak types of thinking, the ones representing a *connoisseur approach*,<sup>12</sup> represent the alternatives to a modern philosophy which, unlike the present ones, could generate unitary and universal thinking systems. Based on the Occidental parameters of thinking, the philosophic works of Aristotle, Descartes or Kant can be deemed as generally valid for the time they appeared in. Contemporary pluralism and transdisciplinarity of sciences, correlated with multiplication theories and mass access to higher education which determined a very harsh critique of Michel Henry on the French university system and others,<sup>13</sup> led to the phenomenon of the philosophy field specialization. For example, if Immanuel Kant, although he had scarcely been far from the surroundings of Königsberg city, succeeded in gathering knowledge in almost every field existing during the period of the German Age of Enlightenment in the 18<sup>th</sup> century; nowadays, an educated man cannot cover any more such a variety of information. The end of the age of great geographical discoveries and the acceptance of a global world, the strong industrialization of the Occident and the acceleration of technological development – all these determined a diversification of knowledge. Although he was not the first to try it (even Voltaire had done it, sometime before him, in a great encyclopaedia), Wilhelm Dilthey managed to restructure the fields of knowledge. Thus, Dilthey dissociated the natural sciences from the ones of the spirit,<sup>14</sup> stressing the fact that the sciences of the spirit are harder to dissociate. His efforts remain a point of reference in the history of thinking. Thus, returning to the weak thinking, Gianni Vattimo is forced to accept the fact that the current way of thinking, the one which has to do more, for the above stated reasons, with the *differentiation difficulties* and *dissolution tendencies*,<sup>15</sup> is of a weak nature. But this should not discourage philosophical efforts since the weak character of thinking has nothing to do with the idea of a philosophy with no strength or consistency of ideas. The weak attribute of thinking

represents, de facto, not a weakness but, in the sense invoked by Gianni Vattimo, a transfiguration, a derivation.

Mediating a vivid dialogue between Gianni Vattimo and René Girard, Pierpaolo Antonello provokes the latter, stating that secularization and laicism are wrongly interpreted in conflict with Christianity, from both historical and philosophical points of view. René Girard, considering Christianity as a religion of victims and sacrifices, based on its origin centred on the crucifixion and death of the Son of God himself, convinces Pierpaolo Antonello to admit, using just Vattimo's terms, that the God who comes and becomes is a weak God (René Girard, Gianni Vattimo, *Verità o fede debole?: Dialogo su cristianesimo e relativismo*). Following the same idea, John D. Caputo notices that God is a "weak force", as His being is perceived in radical hermeneutics by a *postmodern theology* as, in his opinion, a *disturbing presence*.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, Gianni Vattimo talks about two senses of the value of the weak God of Christianity: the first one refers to a weakening of the Being in itself by a metaphysical structure into an interpreted one, which indicates the Dasein's direction of alterity from its pure structure, while the second one refers to the weakening of God in the world, being paradigmatically represented by the act of the incarnation, birth and death of Jesus Christ.<sup>17</sup> Based on all these ideas, which cover the idea of a religion as a ground in its own weak character, Christianity seems to be the space which allowed, evolutionarily, the appearance of weak thinking in its comprehensive space.

Back to barbarism, this weak sense, originating, as we could see, from the tendencies of the last century's hermeneutics, represents what we will call the current axiological mutation of barbarism. "Weak barbarism and strong barbarism" is another dialectic dimension in understanding this concept. Our digression on weak barbarism is not random. Thinking, defined otherwise compared to the terms of general psychology, is an activity specific to the cultural structure; therefore, it belongs to what we call the cultural background of the human being. So we can conclude that weak barbarism has the same characteristics of contemporary thinking. But, in order not to be blinded by the passion of interpreting barbarism, according to which the interpreter is animated by the passion of destruction for the sake of destroying, desacralizing the senses we use to understand the barbarism itself, becoming ourselves true barbarians of our day, we should stop here the connections that lead our way on the path of

a weak barbarism<sup>18</sup> and care more about what is new about strong barbarism.

### FORMS OF WEAK BARBARISM

In order to suggest the way barbarism should be understood today, Jean-Pierre Le Goff enriches the term “weakness” by enlarging its meaning with “gentleness”.<sup>19</sup> Weak barbarism for Jean-Pierre Le Goff becomes “gentle barbarism”. Given the French tradition to which Le Goff belongs, one can easily notice that the use of term “gentle” has to do with the relationship between barbarism and civilization. The gentle sense of barbarism is given by his idea of “broken mirrors”, which shows us that society and individuals appear as fragments of a chaotic wall, or fragments that are, in turn, fragmented.<sup>20</sup> Le Goff argues that the “gentleness” of barbarism stems from our society’s tendency to decay – barbarism decays the same way as civilization does. This time, barbarism decays from its strong sense, and this phenomenon is related to all changes or mutations from contemporary societies, which appear in succession as parts of a deconstruction process. This process is described in numerous ways, which illustrate a symptomatic dehumanization of society;<sup>21</sup> culture seems to melt in pluralism: arts multiply, literature becomes consumerist, the masses are mesmerized by entertainment television, the church undergoes modernization, laws proliferate, etc. All of these highlight the softening phenomenon of society, where the kindness of some phenomena weakens the traditional sense of their understanding; we are dealing with a uniformity that does not elude barbarism. This mutation is excellently captured by John Pettegrew in the expression *brutes in suits*,<sup>22</sup> which describes in a minimalist manner the transition from barbarism’s strong sense to the weak one (gentler). Also, although not in the same words, Alessandro Baricco in *Barbarians* says approximately the same thing: the barbarian, an animal with gills, tries to conquer the civilized world by adapting and putting on human clothes.

If, by at least two centuries ago, in the West and in the areas dominated by it, barbarism was always in opposition with everything which meant humanity, and the border between them was very un-permissive, such as crossing from one caste to another in Indian society, today the limits between barbarism and civilization are so transparent and permeable that not only their character weakens but also what relates to them directly.

Thus we talk about a new barbarism as Mattéi did but rather in the sense that humanity's and barbarism's double polarity may coexist in the same individual. In a study about the perception of the present barbarism, Nelli Motroshilova distinguishes two levels of barbarism: a primary and a secondary barbarism.<sup>23</sup> In terms of natural arithmetic, in which number "2" follows number "1", we may consider that secondary barbarism would follow the primary one. The senses Motroshilova bears in mind come from the terminology of K.S. Rehberg, who delimits intra-civilization barbarism from that located outside it.<sup>24</sup> Although resembling a great deal the distinction between "interior barbarism" and "exterior barbarism", the senses herein are not diachronic but they capture a transfiguration of the meanings of barbarism. The fact that the barbarian is no longer outside civilization, but seems to be seen everywhere inside civilization and is thus closer and closer to the ones considered civilized, makes it even harder to define barbarism and civilization. Secondary barbarism, which apparently is an evolutionary change once outside civilization, appears today, in a brief definition, as a disavowal of all values.<sup>25</sup> This is the reason we have talked about an axiological mutation of barbarism.

The mutations that occur at a historical level are perceived alike at all levels of the society. The values that elites base social-cultural reconstruction upon today create completely new regulatory systems. All interpretative directions lead today to a reconsideration of values, a re-evaluation of the masses, a restructuring of the fields of knowledge, re-adaptation to the new technologies and thus to a conversion of society, which means that, somewhere, a rupture which changed everything existed. This rupture is hard to spot. Last century, rightly called the century of speed due to the acceleration of technical-scientific development, especially in its second part, is so condensed with events that could explain up to a certain point that rupture, so that it might be spotted in any human activity. It is certain that, after such a rupture, a rethinking of all things was necessary. With such a rupture, cultural and civilization values gain new meanings and because of this axiological revival, which requires time to be implemented, barbarism can only actively participate to hinder this process.

The meanings of weak barbarism, its gentleness and its second position, cannot contribute decisively and only by themselves to the deconstruction of the cultural background. They are permanently accompanied by

ongoing strong resources remaining *a priori* in the structure of weak barbarism. The evolutionary nature of the “weak barbarism–strong barbarism” dialectic has not lost its essence of negativity, even though the structures of the two are different. Strong barbarism was always in conflict with terms in positions of superiority. Its barbarian, although situated outside civilization, has to fight the civilized world on two fronts. On the one side there was a fight for survival, to maintain previous order, at least when the civilized society was expanding, and on the other side there was a struggle for the supremacy of influence in a certain territory. In both cases, excellently portrayed in the wars between the Roman Empire and the Germanic people, barbarism brimmed over with energy and used force. We know too well that after war one counts the dead, the injured, the victories, the losses and the spoils of war, and from this perspective, that is based on violence, crime, dehumanization, vandalism, etc., nobody assigns war or armed conflict a positive character. Still, after any war, whether related by the winners or the losers, societies reorganized, established borders, strengthened their fortresses, built roads and aqueducts, fortified their cities, built cities and walls, developed their defensive and offensive systems, and invented weapons and fighting devices; in short, even though there were losers and winners, after conflicts societies developed and progressed. Strong barbarism, whose sense lies in the term “potent”<sup>26</sup> and, although it shocks through cruelty, toughness and aggressiveness, it is a creative one. The destruction of the Roman Empire by the barbarian people north of the *limes* would later lead, using the Roman law and Latin transfiguring into Romance languages, to the formation of the European nations; the aggressiveness used by Rome to treat Christianity led to the strengthening of the monotheistic religions; the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans and the Muslim threat from the gates of Europe fortified the West; the conquest of the New World by the Europeans led to the industrial development and growth of political and economic power of the European nations; slave trade practised by the colonial powers enriched the West and laid the basis of the first global economy; in the last century, the two World Wars led to the political reorganization of the world. After every great outpouring of strong barbarism, further social, cultural and political progress can be observed.

As an antithesis to strong barbarism, weak barbarism or, as we are particularly concerned about it today, new barbarism,<sup>27</sup> seems to have not



a creative force but rather a destructive one. Nothing can be seen after it. The intensity of force this barbarism brings along does not have great impact on social and cultural aspects. Its forms of manifestation are so violently not contrary to the principles of humanity as to leave traumatic scars in the cultural background of societies but, using interpretations of the law or bad interpretations of the law, it makes room and it acts as much as the normative inadequacies of societies allow. Human rights legislation resolved most of the problems connected to military invasions, major armed conflicts, genocide and extermination or slavery but, even in the foundation of this universal, global document, one may find most of the sources of weak barbarism. For example, the right to life, one of the fundamental laws of contemporary society, argues that all individuals have equal rights to life. Hence, international charitable bodies care for people that live in inhumane living conditions, especially in the very poor African states, where people often starve to death. This concern for the poor people in the world, sometimes excessive, and new medical discoveries, as well as technical progress in the field of medical devices, among which venereal diseases and deadly viruses have been (partly) isolated, in time led to a substantial demographic growth in the global population,<sup>28</sup> especially in poor or developing countries. The demographic growth in countries from Islamic Asia and Mediterranean Africa has become, Samuel P. Huntington says, a threat to the Western area.<sup>29</sup>

The normative system of contemporary societies may include just as many flaws as forms of weak barbarism there may be. The barbarian finds a place of manifestation wherever he encounters a poor interpretation of legislation and therefore weak cruelty tends to represent that category of people who do not observe the law. The barbarian is identified in any criminal, outlaw, unconventional, irresponsible, socially unadapted, immoral, illiterate, unlettered, uneducated man. All these forms that show some human individuals' poor adaptation to civilization create the basis for a second category of weak barbarism. There is only one step from the first level to the second one. At this second level, we may run into severe forms of contemporary barbarism, the majority of which are related to pathology, generally symptoms generated by neuroses, which occur in crowded cities, by sexual obsessions or by neuronal disequilibrium and psycho-social schizophrenias. This category may include the following barbarians: the serial killer, the war killer, the suicidal man, the anarchist and the terrorist. Certainly, these lists may continue but these are broadly

the most relevant examples. The two levels follow a chained sequence from legislative lapses.

But these are not the only social-political/cultural imperfections that may lead to the proliferation of new barbarians and the lapses of contemporary technical-scientific and industrial developments. We are placed on two analysis levels this time as well. On the one hand, we are dealing with the technological progress and, on the other hand, our attention is focused on the intensification of the industrialization process. In the first case, regarding the development of virtual media generating technologies, of entertainment television and mobile communications, one may easily experience an addiction to the Internet and online games, free access to press and digital pornography, and visual aggression inappropriate to certain social categories. In the case of industrial expansion, although it reaches an increasingly vast media to the detriment of the natural environment necessary to human survival, it is overwhelmingly construed as an alternate and long-term source for the same human cause. This paradox, which is made of two antithetic terms, whose finality is one and the same, leads to another type of barbarian. At this level, the barbarian is a consequence of the global policy for the insurance of the necessary living conditions. The paradoxical barbarian is, at the same time, both the inveterate consumer and the most aggressive pest of the environment, registered in documents as an eager supporter of ecologist tendencies but, in fact, one of the biggest pollutants of the planet, so deeply involved in fighting terrorism that contraceptive and interceptive measures seem to become organized actions of terrorism themselves, as concerned with slowing down the demographic increase rhythm as radical in the measures thus applied; briefly, the paradoxical barbarian is a civilized-uncivilized being, if such terms may be used, whose actions, although lacking any negative intentions, indulge him in international political-economic systems, which allow him an aggressive or violent reaction.

The forms of weak barbarism seem to belong to a sphere of uncertainty, of interpretive duality; thus, we must reflect with greater attention upon any situation that we may categorize as belonging to barbarism before being absolutely convinced by the validity of the act itself. Also, invoking the same huge problem of the contemporary demographic, given that the world population will soon reach a sensitive threshold of seven billion people,<sup>30</sup> the proliferation of the acts of

barbarism is constantly growing; nevertheless, in the same time direction suggested earlier, together with the multiplying of the acts of barbarism, we would suggest that weak barbarism could be understood as a diluted one, hence its diffuse nature, instable and uncertain in its phenomenology. Because the barbarian can be found anywhere today, everywhere, here and there, on one continent or another, in various urban areas at the same time, etc., the acts of barbarism cannot be captured in their entirety at the same time. The synchrony of the barbarian acts induces a diffuse character, the valences of incoherence and instability.

All of these outline the structure of contemporary barbarism, whose comprehensive fundament is situated in totally different parameters. The “strong barbarism–weak barbarism” dialectic places the interpretation of the concept in the present time. Without this dissociation, barbarism would have remained in a general understanding that describes an uncivilized and illiterate individual. In the political and historical conditions in which transformations in all fields of knowledge have an impact impossible to overlook, barbarism is urged to keep up with such transformations and to redefine them. The terrorist tends to replace the guerrilla of the barbarian peoples, the aggressive postmodern seems to replace the colonist bearing a cross in his hand, the internet user obsessed with online games successfully replaces the one who had a thing for trading slaves, the hackers in the era of technology remind us of the pirates of the seas from the age of great geographical discoveries, and the contemporary Mafia reminds us of the power of the medieval inquisition. In an alert world, where nothing is lost but everything is transformed, weak barbarism substitutes strong barbarism, prolonging the latter’s manifestation principles; nevertheless, the character of weak barbarism is diluted due to the multiplicity, the proliferation, the instability and the inconsistencies of the present social and cultural environment.

#### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> It is not necessary to minutely relate this particular attribute of history, for we should undertake a specific study.
- <sup>2</sup> Mutate in itself with terms becoming mutant in their turn: “others” become “us” or “others more than us” and “us” may be taken for “others”; it is defined or self assessed from the perspective of these “others”.
- <sup>3</sup> Such as: the barbarian attributes given by the Greeks to the Persian Empire organized in an empire at least as civilized as the Greek society, the Christian

- persecution and oppression by the civilized Romans, the barbarism gestures of the Western crusaders against the Muslims, colonial imperialism and slavery.
- <sup>4</sup> Roger-Pol Droit, *Généalogie des barbares*. Odile Jacob, Paris, 2007: 275.
- <sup>5</sup> *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies*. Routledge, London, 1998: 126.
- <sup>6</sup> From the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; *ibid.*: 112.
- <sup>7</sup> At this point we make a dissociation from the meaning given by Mattéi and we admit that barbarism's interior attribute has not got to do with placing it in the middle of a civilization or culture but, psychoanalytically speaking, at the level of human collective unconsciousness where by repression it expresses itself outside it, understood as the individual's exterior, as a society or life background.
- <sup>8</sup> Under these terms, barbarism is closely related to the alterity phenomenon; similarly, in a study on a general-particular track, if alterity represents, in the most vast interpretation, the phenomenon by which an aspect or a human being decays (a Heideggerian word expressing the Dasein's being-thrown-into-the-world) from an initial state, then barbarism, in a particular way, would be the phenomenon by which culture and civilization justify their decay or regression.
- <sup>9</sup> John D. Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *After the Death of God*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2007: 83.
- <sup>10</sup> "Which is above all weak and mainly due to its ontological contents, to its way of understanding the being and the truth ... which, therefore, has no reasons more reasons to claim its sovereignty which metaphysical thinking used to claim in relation with the practice" in Gianni Vattimo, Pier Aldo Rovatti, *Il Pensiero debole*. Feltrinelli, Milano, 1990: 26–27.
- <sup>11</sup> John D. Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *op. cit.*: 83.
- <sup>12</sup> Gianni Vattimo, Pier Aldo Rovatti, *op. cit.*: 42.
- <sup>13</sup> Michael O'Sullivan, *Michel Henry – Incarnation, Barbarism and Belief*. Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, Bern, 2006: 142–143, 149.
- <sup>14</sup> Wilhelm Dilthey, *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1988: 33–35.
- <sup>15</sup> Gianni Vattimo, Pier Aldo Rovatti, *op. cit.*: 20.
- <sup>16</sup> John D. Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, *op.cit.*: 62.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*: 74.
- <sup>18</sup> Paraphrasing the famous work of Martin Heidegger, *Path of thinking*.
- <sup>19</sup> Jean-Pierre Le Goff, "Modernization and Gentle Barbarism." *Diogenes*, no. 195, vol. 49, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2002: 41.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*: 44.
- <sup>21</sup> *Idem.*
- <sup>22</sup> In an evolutionary sense; John Pettegrew, *Brutes in Suits, Male Sensibility in America, 1890–1920*. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2007.
- <sup>23</sup> Nelli Motroshilova, "Barbarity as the Reverse Side of Civilization." *Diogenes*, no. 2–3, vol. 56, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2009: 74.
- <sup>24</sup> *Idem.*
- <sup>25</sup> Blame, condemnation, dissociation, disapproval, obloquy, non-approval, reprobation, rejection, stigmatization.

- <sup>26</sup> Gianni Vattimo, Pier Aldo Rovatti, op. cit.: 12.
- <sup>27</sup> Aziz Al-Aymeh, "Civilization, Culture and the New Barbarians." *International Sociology*, no. 1, vol. 16, London, 2001: 87.
- <sup>28</sup> Charles W. Kegley Jr., *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. Cengage Learning, Belmont, 2009: 306.
- <sup>29</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 1997: 103.
- <sup>30</sup> G. Tyler Miller, Scott Spoolman, *Living in the Environment: Principles, Connections, and Solutions*. Cengage Learning, Belmont, 2008: 123.

#### References

- Al-Aymeh, Aziz. "Civilization, Culture and the New Barbarians." *International Sociology*, no. 1, vol. 16, London, 2001: 75-93.
- Caputo, John D. and Gianni Vattimo. *After the Death of God*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988.
- Droit, Roger-Pol. *Généalogie des barbares*. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1997.
- Kegley, Charles W. Jr. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. Belmont: Cengage Learning, 2009.
- Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies*. Routledge, London, 1998.
- Le Goff, Jean-Pierre. "Modernization and Gentle Barbarism." *Diogenes*, no. 195, vol. 49, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002: 41-46.
- Miller, G. Tyler and Scott Spoolman. *Living in the Environment: Principles, Connections, and Solutions*. Belmont: Cengage Learning, 2008.
- Motroshilova, Nelli. "Barbarity as the Reverse Side of Civilization." *Diogenes*, no. 2-3, vol. 56, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2009: 72-83.
- O'Sullivan, Michael. *Michel Henry – Incarnation, Barbarism and Belief*. Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, 2006.
- Pettegrew, John. *Brutes in Suits, Male Sensibility in America, 1890-1920*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2007.
- Vattimo, Gianni and Pier Aldo Rovatti. *Il Pensiero debole*. Milano: Feltrinelli, 1990.