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Chapter 2

Leopoldo Zea's Project of a Philosophy of Latin American History

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In honor of Leopoldo Zea's eightieth year (1992), more than fifty years after the beginning of his philosophical project (1941), in appreciation.

(translated by Amaryll Chanady)

Filosofía como compromiso... pero no como lo entienden algunos profesores de filosofía,... sino compromiso inevitable que todo hombre, filósofo o no, tiene con sus *circunstancias*, realidad o mundo. (Zea 1952a: 11)

Philosophy as compromise. ...not as some professors of philosophy understand it, ...but as the inevitable compromise that every person, whether a philosopher or not, has with individual *circumstances*, reality or world. (Emphasis in the original)

El no haber querido tomar conciencia de nuestra *situación* explica en parte por que no hemos podido tener una filosofía propia. (Zea 1952a: 33) ,
Not having wanted to become aware of our *situation* partly explains why we have not been able to have our own philosophy. (Emphasis in the original)

The first statement is inspired by Ortega y Gasset, the second by Jean-Paul Sartre, great philosophers whom Zea cultivated in his youth, together with Jose Gaos, starting from the end of the 1930s. His is thus a project inspired by thinkers within a tradi-

tion of "Continental" philosophy, as Anglo-Americans usually call it. Therefore, positivist historians as well as analytic philosophers (who are presently going through a crisis of foundation, as is illustrated by Richard Rorty's work, among that of many others) cannot help considering Zea's project as one of doubtful methodological consistency. Criticism is not infrequent, from the perspective of historical positivism, like that of Charles Hale or William Raat, or from that of the nascent analytical thought in Mexico.¹ Zea defends himself from such criticism by distinguishing between the "History of Ideas" in Latin America (which can, with absolutely no contradiction, be classified together with Hale's or Raat's position) and a Latin American "Philosophy of History" (see his treatment of the subject in 1974: 11), for whose construction he takes inspiration from authors such as Hegel (his disagreement with Hegel does not imply a difference in method, quite the contrary) Dilthey, Toynbee, Schweitzer, Sorokin, and many others. He returns to the subject several years later:

La interpretación filosófico-histórica de la relación que, desde el punto de vista cultural ha venido guardando América Latina con Europa y Occidente es lo que dará originalidad a la filosofía que parece ser la propia de esta nuestra América, al decir de Gaos. El punto de vista propio sobre la más propia realidad, incluyendo la conciencia de la relación de dependencia. (1978:27)

The philosophico-historical interpretation of the relation that, from the cultural point of view, Latin America has maintained with Europe or the West is what will give originality to the philosophy that seems to be specific to this America of ours, according to Gaos. One's own point of view on one's own reality, including an awareness of the relation of dependency.

Zea had discovered this theme right from the beginning. That is why he defines himself as "historicist": "The scholars of philosophy in Mexico are situated in the group that is oriented toward the second current," the historicist one (1953a: 11). In his first texts, furthermore, we can observe a direction that he himself designated as that of the philosophers who embark upon "the path of universality" ("el camino de la universalidad";

1953a: 11). His article entitled "Superbus philosophus" is a good example, in which, taking inspiration from the *Imitatione Christi*, he dismisses the pride of the Greek philosopher, the escapism of the Christian, and the Jewish emphasis on the terrestrial to affirm the position of Augustine ["The philosopher stops being the proud one who knows everything and becomes the modest interpreter of Divinity"] ("El filósofo deja de ser el soberbio que todo sabe y se convierte en el humilde interprete de la Divinidad"; 1942a: 30]. In other philosophical works, Zea explains this "path of universality" (for example, in *La conciencia del hombre en la filosofía. Introducción a la filosofía*, in which he gives us an overview of Western philosophy up to Pascal),² and shows us the theoretico-philosophical categorical horizon within which he situates himself methodologically. Zea does not classify these works of his when he speaks of his philosophical project:

¿En que sentido tenían que ser continuados mis anteriores trabajos? Estos han marchado, relativamente y veremos por que, en *dos direcciones*. Una, la empeñada en elaborar una *historia de las ideas de nuestra América...* Otra, buscando una *interpretación de esta historia*, su sentido como totalidad y como parte de la historia universal la historia del Hombre. (1976a: 10)

In which way did my earlier work have to be continued?
It went relatively, and we will see why, in *two directions*.
One that was concerned with elaborating a *history of ideas of our America*. ..And another that involved searching for an *interpretation of this history*, its meaning as totality and as part of universal history , the history of Humanity .(Emphasis in the original).

Three texts belong primarily to the history of ideas in a more positive sense (and these would be the most acceptable for Hale and Raat): *El positivismo en México*, *Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica. Del romanticismo al positivismo*, and *El pensamiento latinoamericano* (although 1953a, 1956, 1968, and some other texts also belong to this category). Those related to the Latin American philosophy of history are more numerous (1953a, 1953c, 1955b, 1957, 1960, 1971, 1976a, 1976b, 1978, 1981, and, to a certain extent, as prehistory , 1988). We can see that, biographically, this second direction will increasingly occupy Zea, more pre-

cisely from the end of the 1950s (his text of 1965 is an expansion of that of 1949, which is also the case with his book of 1975 with respect to his 1943-44 text).

I believe that, although it does not seem to acquire the same importance, there exists besides the third direction (the universalist) a fourth direction, which I would call the definition of a problematic horizon ("la definición de un horizonte problemático"). This subject is always present in all of Zea's texts, but becomes explicit in works such as his 1941 essay (published more than fifty years ago, which is why I indicated this date in the dedication of this short essay), expanded in 1942b and reedited in 1945, as well as in other works: 1952a, 1952b, 1969a, and 1974, among others. In the texts of this fourth direction (the "definition of a problematic horizon," which Zea himself calls "a form that combines both forms" previously mentioned; 1976a: 10), he posits the philosophical project that is developed within the second direction (the Latin American "philosophy of history"). I think that in this "problematic horizon" one can observe a certain change of perspective around 1973, a period when "dependency" (seen primarily in a cultural dimension; the subject was already present since 1949: 15) is now conceptualized from the perspective of its overcoming as "liberation" (see, for example, "La filosofía latinoamericana como filosofía de la liberación," 1974: 32-47). This is the result of a discussion begun in 1969, no longer with positivists or analytical philosophers, but with Latin American philosophers who were aware of elaborating, and claimed to elaborate, a Latin American philosophy, but who situated themselves differently with respect to historico-philosophical interpretation and philosophy itself (see the treatment of the subject in 1969a; in the conference quoted in 1974: 32-47; and in other texts written during these years).

I therefore believe that, in order to conduct a fruitful dialogue, everything should be centered around the project of a "Latin American philosophy of history," which is Zea's main contribution and has a definitive character (and which, it is not superfluous to say, consecrates Zea without any doubt as one of the great Latin American thinkers of the twentieth century). Our philosopher has continued this project with great firmness and constant fidelity for more than fifty years, and developed it in an

"exemplary and inimitable fashion [in everything that characterizes it as positive and situational, that is to say, as elaborated by a philosopher who is the product of his time, as they all are, and who was primarily formed during the 1930s and 1940s, especially by his master Jose Gaos, who, in *Carta abierta*, considered the youthful work of Zea as "a new Spanish American philosophy of history" ("una nueva filosofía de la historia Hispanoamericana")].

Furthermore, Gaos believed that this early philosophy elaborated by Zea (1949) "could be considered as particular to this America" ("podría ser considerada como propia de esta América" ; *Carta abierta*); that is,

una filosofía de la historia que, por serlo de la realidad de esta América, se expresará en forma distinta de lo que ha sido la filosofía de la historia europea u occidental.

(1978: 19)

a philosophy of history that, because it is a philosophy of the reality of this America, will be expressed in a different form from the European or Western philosophy of history.

One must remember, however, that Gaos is referring to a work belonging to the "history of ideas" (1949)-the first direction of Zea's work-and not to what Zea considers as a Latin American "philosophy of history," which is the second direction (the first of these is only formally considered as such in 1953a, or even in 1952b).

Let us now ask ourselves: In what does this Latin American philosophy of history consist? I think that it is a historical hermeneutics, interpretation as self-consciousness of one's own history. History is taken here in the sense of "happening" or "event" (*acontecimiento*; *Geschichte* in Heidegger), or situated on the level of the "world of everyday life" ("mundo de la vida cotidiana"; Husserl's or Habermas's *Lebenswelt*); as well as in the sense of history as the account of "historical science" (*Historie*); and, in a third sense, as a history already thought by Latin American thinkers (not necessarily philosophers in the strict sense of the term), whom Zea studies in a positive manner as an indefatigable reader, in order to write his works related to the

"history of ideas." One must keep in mind as theoretically central the concept of "consciousness" [*conciencia*; with a specific and increasingly Hegelian content: as historical "self-consciousness" (*auto-conciencia*)]. This is carried out in four concentric circles:

Nuestra historia como mexicanos, como latino-americanos, como americanos y como hombres sin más. Preocupación que se encuentra en la totalidad de mis trabajos. (1976a: 10)

Our history as Mexicans, as Latin Americans, as Americans, and simply as humans. A preoccupation that is found in most of my writings.

This enables Zea to affirm the concrete level (Mexican, Latin American, and American), but always tending toward the universal [the "simply" ("sin más"), which one finds so frequently in his work].³ Here we would have to ask ourselves whether this universal dimension is concrete ["all humanity" ("toda la humanidad")] or abstract ["humanity as such" ("la humanidad en cuanto tal")].

Zea uses different materials for this historical hermeneutics, this interpretation of historical self-consciousness that he calls "Latin American philosophy of history": writings particularly by Latin Americans (or by people coming from elsewhere), historiographers, sociologists, specialists in literature, thinkers, philosophers, and so forth. His methodology depends on the philosophies of history elaborated by the thinkers he studied since his youth (from Ortega y Gasset or Jose Gaos to Hegel, Toynbee, and others). His short text entitled *El Occidente y la conciencia de México*, which is not unrelated to Octavio Paz's *El laberinto de la soledad* (originally published in 1950), is an excellent methodological example of Zea's work as he passed the threshold of forty years of age.

Maybe this methodological complexity frightened Luis Villoro, but it is to this that Zea's success as an interpreter of the culture of our continent can be attributed (he is universally recognized today in all centers dedicated to Latin American studies). It is obvious that for "analytic reason" ("razón analítica"; that of Mario Bunge, for example) even psychoanalysis could

not have the status of a "science." It was thus a question of the definition of "science": for a purely instrumental and mathematical reason psychoanalysis cannot be a science (and neither can Marxism), whereas for a "more general" ("más amplia") definition of science (with a stricter sense of "rationality" as practical, hermeneutic, or pragmatic reason), psychoanalysis acquires the status of a "hermeneutic science" (that is Paul Ricoeur's position). Analytic philosophy itself, that of the linguistic turn, has now been integrated within a much richer and more profound practico-pragmatic philosophy (in the tradition of Austin and Searle, and radically transformed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas). Zea would thus have the support of many good philosophers today, and even the "hegemonic Euro-North American philosophical community" ("comunidad filosófica hegemónica europeo-norteamericana") would be in his favor. Simply abandoning "Latin American thought" for a project of historical positivism or analytic philosophy finally ended up without the expected results. Zea continued in the direction he had started from.

The same could be said of the criticism that philosophico-economist Marxism (even that of Althusser) directed at Zea with respect to the methodology of the "history of ideas." I do not want to suggest that Zea had no limitations, but it has been demonstrated that one cannot study the history of ideas only as a reflection of the processes of the "infrastructure." It is also clear today that the criticism of economist Marxism, including the Latin American version, should be the task of the Latin American philosopher who claims that he is producing a Latin American philosophy, for there is the need for a "reconstruction" of Marxism itself that Zea did not include in his hermeneutic project (but which, once realized, helps to provide a better grounding for this project of a Latin American philosophy).⁴ In a third stage (after the criticism of positivism, analytic philosophy, and Marxism), a new debate arises, as I have already indicated, on which Zea, as a philosopher of Latin American history, takes position in *La filosofía latinoamericana como filosofía sin más*. The central argument, which had been evolving in Zea's thought since 1941, consists in affirming that the Latin American past cannot be negated (as Augusto Salazar Bondy apparently

claimed in his short work entitled *¿Existe filosofía en América Latina?*.⁵ As Zea put it:

Pasado propio y pasado impuesto y, por impuesto, también propio, han de formar el pasado que ha de ser dialécticamente asimilado por pueblos como los nuestros. De allí esa lucha con la filosofía y la cultura occidentales que parece propia del pensamiento latinoamericano. (1978: 32)

One's own past and an imposed past, and as it is imposed, it is also one's own, must form the past that has to be dialectically assimilated by cultures such as ours. That explains the battle with Western philosophy and culture that seems peculiar to Latin American thought.

Yet it seems strange to criticize the negation of the past in historians who have repeatedly dealt with Latin America. Salazar Bondy (1965) has two admirable volumes on the history of Peruvian philosophy, on the level of the history of ideas.⁶ In my own case,⁷ I have more than a dozen works on Latin American history, in some aspects of the area of historical science;⁸ several on the interpretation of Latin American history⁹ starting from its protohistory;¹⁰ and even some on the history of ideas (Dussel 1968, 1979, 1982).

I do not want to refute the history of a liberating Latin American thought. What I do refute, together with Salazar Bondy, is the existence of a Latin American critical philosophy that is in a "stage of philosophical normalcy" ("etapa de normalidad filosófica")¹¹ and has been able to affirm itself as Latin American philosophy, while being recognized as an expression of universal philosophy, one that is practiced in the main programs of philosophical studies and not in the specialized area of Latin American studies, or in a program related to a specific university chair; in other words, philosophy in a *restricted* sense (*restringido*), according to the definition of the "hegemonic Euro-North American philosophical community." This philosophy in the restricted sense must be distinguished from philosophy as "Latin American philosophy of history" ("filosofía de la historia latinoamericana") or as a historico-fundamental hermeneutics of the "world of everyday life" [Husserl's *Lebenswelt*, starting from

Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, certainly because of the impact Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) had on it]. Zea's "Latin American philosophy," according to my interpretation, is a hermeneutics that makes explicit a presupposed attitude in the "understanding" of the world (*Verstehen* in the Heideggerian sense) from which the work of philosophy itself "in a restricted sense" can start. (I am saying "restricted sense" in order not to judge whether it is philosophy "in the strict sense.") Zea's project is in a stage of "pre-comprehension," which is really fundamental in the historical and daily *weltanschauung* (in Dilthey's sense), and which is always present at the beginning of the act of philosophizing. The imitative and Eurocentric philosopher in Latin America (who is supposedly "universalist") is already outside Latin America when starting to philosophize. On this point, Salazar Bondy (and I myself) proposes the same thesis as Zea, when the latter writes:

México, como el resto de los países de Iberoamérica, no ha dado aun origen a una filosofía a la que se pueda llamar propia. Más bien ha venido glosando las grandes corrientes del pensamiento europeo. (1955: 47)
 Mexico, like the other countries of Iberoamerica, has not yet produced a philosophy that it can call its own. Rather, it has glossed the great currents of European thought.¹²

Is this not exactly Salazar Bondy's position, and my own? On the one hand, we all think that it is necessary to be aware of reality or of the "world of everyday life" in Latin America (as its past), and in this sense there have been some authentic Latin American thinkers [not "normalized philosophers" ("filósofos normalizados")]. On the other hand, philosophy in the restricted sense (which affirms itself as universal and is recognized by the "hegemonic Euro-North American philosophical community,") has not produced its "own" philosophy in Latin America. Is this a contradiction? I do not think so, because we are talking about two levels: on one we can situate the authors interpreted in Zea's "philosophy of history," and on the other, the philosophers of "normalized philosophy" to which I, together with Salazar Bondy, am referring.

Latin American philosophers must elaborate a hermeneutics that can discover¹³ the *meaning* of their own history and own reality, an impressive task carried out by Zea, in the way that Aristotle emphasized that in the use of the most fundamental method of all, the dialectic method, neither science nor philosophy was useful, because it was necessary to reflect directly on *tà éndoxa* (the opinions of the "world of everyday life" from which the "principles" of science and even of philosophy in the strict or restricted sense can be thought) (*Topicon* 1.1: 100 a 18-b: 23; I have discussed this in Dusse1974: 17ff.), and only *paideia* was useful for that (a *paideia* that was like a fundamental "culture").¹⁴ I think that Zea's "Latin American philosophy of history" is situated on this historico-fundamental level, as philosophers, who are aware of their self-consciousness, reflect on the "world of everyday life" (*Lebenswelt*), always already presupposed a priori beneath one's feet as a dependent and marginal world that is historically situated as Latin American. I think (against all those detractors who demand specific methods) that Zea is right in this. In this sense all the great Latin American thinkers (to name only a few: Bartolomé de Las Casas, Clavijero, Bolívar, Alberdi, and Martí) have thought on the basis of their own reality and with the purpose of affirming "Latin American-ness" (*lo latinoamericano*). It is not in this sense that Salazar Bondy and I have spoken of "imitative philosophy" (or as Zea writes, philosophy that "has glossed the great currents of European thought"). In what sense were they inauthentic "glossers" of "imitators"? Not finally in the sense of authors who enable one to elaborate a historical hermeneutics (in the manner of Zea's "Latin American philosophy of history"), but in something quite different that I would like to explain in some detail.

The "hegemonic Euro-North American philosophical community" (Popper, Austin, Ricoeur, Vattimo, Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Rorty, to name some philosophers from philosophically "hegemonic" countries) and even the hegemonic "philosophical community" in Latin America (in faculties, institutes, research councils, and so forth) *ignore* all peripheral philosophical thought (from Latin America, Africa, or Asia) and dismiss it as not relevant, pertinent, or central. The "*outside* of history" ("el *fuera* de la historia") that Zea discovers in the European

"philosophies of history" (like that of Hegel) is now interpreted as an "outside," as an "exclusion," as an "exteriority" of the "community of philosophical *communication* itself" ("*comunidad de comunicación* filosófica"); that is to say, of the community that dominates philosophical discourse (and that is why we call it hegemonic) situated on the Europe-United States axis. It is a position of exclusion that is imitated by the colonial "universalist" philosophers. And it is with respect to this supposedly universal "philosophy" (to be precise: European and North American) that we are excluded.

The problem is threefold: (1) we have to think in a self-conscious manner "from Latin America" ("*desde América Latina*"), with an awareness of our place in world history; (2) we have to think philosophically "about our reality" (from our positivity, but also as dominated, impoverished, and so forth); and (3) we have to think in such a way that we can "enter" the discussion with this "hegemonic philosophical community ." Because we are "excluded" from it, we must "interpellate" it so that our own philosophical discourse will be "recognized." The "recognition" of this hegemonic community is not the origin of our philosophizing (which starts from our negated reality, from ourselves), but given the colonial condition of our "normalized" philosophy (or academic: "philosophy as compromise. ..but not as some professors of philosophy understand it"; Zea 1952b: 11), it is necessary to proceed by self-affirmation and the recognition of this hegemonic community in order to establish among ourselves the conditions for a philosophical dialogue that is creative, respectful and rigorous.

In this aspect, a "history of Latin American thought" (even in the form of a "Latin American philosophy of history") is not sufficient anymore. It is now necessary to resort to the whole range of discourse, the problematics, and the methods of this "hegemonic philosophical community ," in order to elaborate our challenge on the basis of its own rules: as a distinct reality (marginal, dominated, and exploited) and as a philosophy in the strict sense that is still excluded. This need for an argumentation that makes use of the discourse of hegemonic philosophy from the position of "*a reality as an exteriority not thought by its thinkers*" ("*una realidad como exterioridad no pensada por ellos*") forces us, at

the same time, to construct and reconstruct new universal categories, and develop new methodological aspects (valid for Africa and Asia, but also for Europe and the United States). We have advanced considerably since Salazar Bondy's question was formulated in 1968. I think that, little by little, this challenge of a Latin American philosophy will be "received" by the "hegemonic philosophical community",¹⁵ and this will force it to "include" a problematic, a thematics, some categories, and so forth, that it had not thought before. Eurocentrism and the fallacy of development, so characteristic of contemporary Euro-North American philosophy, will thus be problematized from something like an *outside* of history (mentioned by Zea).

I think that both projects, that of a "Latin American philosophy of history" as a historical hermeneutics of the concrete presuppositions of the "world of everyday life" in Latin America (Zea's project), and the elaboration of a philosophy that, starting from this hermeneutics, proposes to construct a Latin American philosophy orchestrated with the language and the discursivity of the hegemonic philosophical community,¹⁶ are complementary (and in no way mutually exclusive).¹⁷

These pages are, once again, dictated by a feeling of respect for the great master of Latin American thought, and by appreciation for my first reading of his works, when, in Paris at the beginning of the 1960s, I discovered myself as "outside of history," thanks to Leopoldo Zea. It is the affirmation of our Latin American exteriority, as the Other, as the poor one, that has urged me on in a philosophical project that I have been working on for the past thirty years, one that attempts to negate this negation and subsume it in a future universality (that is as much human in a general sense, as philosophical in the strict sense, and I believe this is the case with Zea's project as well).

Notes

1 See, for example, Luis Villoro's judgment when he writes, speaking of Mexican philosophy in the decade following his own: "They will be works with scarce *local color* and the Mexican philosophical production will be like that existing in any other part of the world" (1972: 3; emphasis in the original). It is difficult to formulate a philosophical project more opposed to Zea's [although Zea defends a certain universalism, in his expression "simply philosophy" ("filosofía sin más") directed against Salazar Bondy]. For Villoro, this decision

was clear, because he had produced in his youth excellent works in the line of Zea, such as *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México* (1950), and also studies, in the tradition of the history of ideas, on ideology in the process of national emancipation.

2. I would like to point out that Zea does not pose the question of Latin American philosophy here. It is obvious that this is an early work of his, but it should always be important to introduce the question of Latin American thought into "universalist" philosophical works, because introducing it is inevitable if we think from our reality .

3. "Latin American philosophy? No, simply philosophy, for its being Latin American is inevitable. It will be the reply of Latin American philosophy to the question concerning its own existence" (1971: 186). Universality is the pretension toward which we strive from a particularity that starts from a specifically Latin American reality.

4. This was my intention in the three books on Latin American philosophy entitled *La producción teórica de Marx* (1985), *Hacia un Marx desconocido* (1988), *El último Marx* (1990), in which I ask questions that Zea does not include as the task of a Latin American philosophy.

5. Salazar Bondy wrote: "Our philosophy with its own peculiarities has not been a genuine and original thought, but one that was inauthentic and imitative in what was fundamental" (1968: 131). To which I added: "If that is so, is an authentic philosophy possible in our continent, which is underdeveloped, dependent (and underdeveloped because of its dependency), and oppressed, even culturally and philosophically?" (Dussel1973: 154). See "The Destruction of European Philosophy" (Schelkshorn, chapter 2: 31ff.) and "About the Philosophico-historical and Historico-philosophical Conception of E. Dussel" (Schelkshom, chapter 3: 57ff.).

6. In his conclusion, Salazar Bondy writes the following on Peruvian philosophy: "Meditation has essentially had an imitative character; its evolution can still be reduced to successive foreign influences. ...Because of this it has largely lost its sense of authentic reflection, only repeating and divulging ideas and doctrines" (1965, 2:456). Critical of his own national reality, he also writes: "The frustration of the historical subject in Peruvian life has been especially serious for philosophy up to the present time" (1965, 2:459). Here we already find all the theses of his later work with which Zea enters into a polemical discussion. When I met with Salazar Bondy in Buenos Aires in 1973 we had thought of starting to collaborate actively on a future philosophical construction. Augusto died "too early," at the height of his creative youth, in 1974.

7. Zea repeatedly criticizes my position, although I can only appreciate the tone with which he does so, for example when he writes: "Salazar Bondy, Dussel, Fanon, and those who like them fight or have fought for a philosophy of liberation" (1974: 42).

8. See, for example, the first of the nine volumes of Dussel1969-71, the result of four years of research in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville (and presented as a thesis in *history* at the Sorbonne).

9. See, for example, Dussel1%5. I must point out that in these years Zea's book *América como conciencia* had such an influence on me that since that time until today my entire purpose has been precisely to make possible the "entry" of

Latin America into world history (with respect to the historical self-interpretation of Humanity, and with respect to the "hegemonic philosophical community," to which I will return later). I must thank Zea, and that is why I express my appreciation in the dedication, for having taught me that Latin America was *outside* history. Years later he repeated: "Asia on account of its anachronism, and America and Africa on account of their being young or primitive, remain *outside*" (1978: 36; emphasis in the original). I return to this theme in my latest work, "1492. El encubrimiento del Otro. Hacia el origen del 'mito de la Modernidad.'" 10. Dusse 1969, 1974, and 1975, as well as the unpublished *Hipótesis* (1966). As one can observe, not only have I not negated our history, but I have dedicated, as few philosophers have done, many years and books to it, and have started, in order to situate Latin America in World History, from several millennia B.C., as I pointed out explicitly in the prologue to *El humanismo semita*, and as a presupposition for a Latin American philosophy.

11. This is Francisco Romero's expression; see "Sobre la filosofía en Iberoamérica," *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 24 December 1940; quoted by Zea 1945: 20.

12. It is obvious that Zea uses "philosophy" in this quotation in a restricted sense, which does not include Bolívar, Alberdi, or Martí; otherwise the statement would be contradictory.

13. This discovery is like an inversion of the original discovery of America. Zea writes: "The discovery of America had really been a concealment [*encubrimiento*]. A concealment of the reality of the people and cultures of this America" (1981: 53).

14. "In every kind of speculation and method, from the most quotidian to the most elevated, there seem to be two types of attitude: the first could be called the science of the *ente*, and the other something like a culture (*paideia*). In fact, it is the cultivated man (*pepaideuénou*) who can carry out criticism (*krisis*). And it is precisely this attitude that I think belongs to the man who possesses universal culture and that is the result of culture" (Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium* 1.1: 639a: 1-10).

15. Maybe Karl-Otto Apel's (1992) article is indicative of this advance; or that of Paul Ricoeur (1992).

16. One calls "philosophy of liberation" a philosophy that uses categories that can be universalized, from the situation of dependency, domination, and exploitation in Latin America, but also, at the same time, of any other position of oppression: of women, nonwhite races, youth, popular culture, workers exploited by capitalism, continents excluded from the benefits of central capitalism, and so forth. It is a metalanguage that can be universalized and that starts from Latin America.

17. There are still many other themes to discuss, such as the difference between an "assumptive project" ("proyecto asuntivo"; Zea 1978: 269ff.) and a popular "project of liberation" (which is not the project of the Creoles, fighting for independence, or that of conservatives or liberals, but of the ethnic groups, exploited classes, marginal persons, and the "social block of the oppressed": the Latin American people); the problem of the mestizo and the necessary inclusion of Indians and blacks in a Latin American project; the articulation of cultural together with economic dependency (which explains the continuing importance of

Marx today), and so forth. There is a dialogue to be created even on the level of a historical hermeneutics of the world of everyday life, or Zea's "Latin American philosophy of history

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