Palestine, the Caliph and Gandhi:
A Non-violent Jihad

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Abstract
Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) is known for his political work in India and his weapon of non-violence. The demand for Indian independence dates from 1920 and springs from two coincidental causes: the agitation against the Rowlatt Act in India in 1918 and the fight to safeguard the temporal power of the Ottoman Sultan in Palestine at the end of World War 1. Gandhi was then involved in a non-violent jihad on behalf of the Ottoman Caliph to maintain Muslim rule over Palestine from 1918 to 1924. The movement became known as ‘non-cooperation’ and soon evolved into the first all-India satyagraha campaign for the independence of India. The campaign failed, the Caliphate collapsed, Gandhi’s first incursion into the affairs of Palestine ended, but the non-violent jihad and its development raised Gandhi from a relative non-entity in Indian politics to the status of the most powerful personality in his country, second only to the Viceroy in India.

Keywords: Satyagraha, Non-violence, Jihad, India, Middle East, Jew, Arab, Hindu

1. Introduction
Palestine proved to be the unlikely platform on which Mahatma Gandhi was to build his political power in India itself. He had returned from South Africa in 1915, keen to test his new political weapon, satyagraha or non-violence. Palestine was then in its last Ottoman days: an underdeveloped and neglected vilayet (administrative unit) of the Ottoman Empire.

The defeat of Turkey, an ally of Germany in World War I, called into question the Sultan’s authority as Caliph, that is, custodian of lands in the Middle East sacred to all Muslims. The Caliph’s devotees in India rushed to the defence of the Caliphate. Gandhi, prizing Hindu-Muslim unity, became the leader of their jihad. Having thus established himself as champion of the Indian Muslims he then rallied Hindu support for the Muslim cause - an extraordinary feat that propelled him to the top of political power in 1920.

Palestine had provided the base from which he went on to demand independence for India. It had cemented Hindu-Muslim solidarity, at least until the Turks themselves abolished the Caliphate in 1924.

2. Paradoxes

2.1 First paradox
It is a striking paradox that, in 1918, Gandhi, a Hindu, should take upon himself the leadership of a Muslim cause, that of preserving the status quo ante bellum in Palestine. (Note 1)

The defeat of Turkey and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had led to the redrawing of the political map – no simple matter. Seventy million Indian Muslims followed their leaders into believing that Islam was in danger, because the peace terms might deprive the Turkish Caliph in Constantinople of his temporal power over the Jazirat-ul-Arab, the ‘Island of Arabia’ which included Palestine. Gandhi offered his help to prevent the “religious calamity that has overtaken” his Indian brothers. (Note 2) He was soon promoted as the Muslims’ leader for the fight to come. In 1919 Gandhi became the defender of the Faith.

2.2 Second paradox
There was in fact an additional paradox. The Sultan’s cause was being more actively pursued, under Gandhi’s leadership, in India, than by the indigenous populations of the Middle East.

The Caliphate and the Sultanate rested in one and same person. On the one hand, the Turkish Sultan ruled over his Ottoman Empire. The end of his rule in the Middle East was greeted with relief or resignation, and in Arabia with rebellion.
On the other hand, as the Caliph, the Sultan had the allegiance of Muslim Indians. As such, he was acknowledged not only as the spiritual but also as the temporal power over what is known as the Jazirat-ul- Arab, the ‘Island of Arabia’ extended as far as Iraq and Syria, and consequently Jerusalem, the third holiest place of pilgrimage after Mecca and Medina. Waters, so to say, encircled the Island: flowing waters from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the great Tiger and Euphrates rivers – or even the Caspian Sea. Indian Muslims, religiously and passionately concerned about the Caliphate, refused to accept the loss of temporal power over the holy shrines. Known as Khilafatists, the activists pursued their fight, up to 1924, when the Caliphate was abolished and Turkey became a secular Republic under the rule of Ataturk.

2.3 Third paradox

There is even a third paradox, in that the jihad apparently took no account of the Zionist cause and the Balfour Declaration. Yet the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 envisaged “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and promised to use the British Government’s “best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object”. (Note 3)

This statement of policy antedates the start of the Caliphate’s agitation for maintaining the Constantinople Caliph’s temporal rule on the Holy Land (1918-24). Neither the Indian Muslims nor Gandhi realised at the time that the seed of the State of Israel had been sown in Palestine by the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, Gandhi, though well acquainted with South African Jews, did not seem to be so with Zionist views. The reason may be that his knowledge of Zion was fed more fundamentally by Christian influence, with its emphasis on the celestial Jerusalem. (Note 4)

The Indian Muslims were barking up the wrong tree as they realised some fifteen years later. From December 1919 right up to September 1923 the Indian National Congress had continued to pass pious resolutions in support of Turkey. It was only after Ataturk’s abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924 that the Indian National Congress resigned itself to the fait accompli. (Note 5) For instance, at the end of December 1922 at its 37th session at Gaya, the Congress carried a resolution entitled ‘Congratulations to the Turks’. This demanded the “effective guardianship of Islam and the Jazirat-ul-Arab, freed from all non Muslim control”, endorsing thereby the views of the All-India Congress Committee resolution at Calcutta (20-24 November 1922), which had threatened to act: “…unless the Jazirat-ul-Arab are freed from all non Muslim control…” As late as 15 September 1923 at the special Delhi session the Congress expressed its hopes in a resolution entitled ‘Turkish victory’, interpreting the success of Ataturk “as a sure presage of the removal of all alien control from the Jazirat-ul-Arab …”

Congress ceased supporting Turkey only in 1924, but its interest in Palestine was resumed after the Arab rebellion of 1936-1939, and its concern was expressed in renewed resolutions, this time entitled “Palestine”, concentrating on the theme of the Arab-Jewish conflict.

Same root, but a different tree, not Turkish this time, but Jewish (See Panter-Brick, 2008).

3. The profile of underdeveloped Ottoman Palestine

3.1 Not yet a nation

Muslim Indians and Gandhi might have been barking up the wrong tree in 1919, but they believed that they were defending their territory, the territory of the Caliph against the same crusader, British colonialism. General Allenby and his troops had conquered Palestine from the Turks and entered Jerusalem in December 1917. This military occupation was to lead to the Mandate of Palestine. Palestine, thus, after World War I, became a focus of Gandhi’s political activity and from there one can trace a progression to his demand for Indian independence in 1920. (Note 6)

In the wartime days leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire and its dismemberment, and in the following decade, what came to be designated as the Mandated territory of Palestine was a forlorn, neglected, derelict province under Turkish rule, a backwater, a country living in relative peace with the outside world and with the different religious communities at home. Jews and Christians had paid their taxes and so, were left to get on with their lives and worship as they wanted. The seed of the Jewish problem was still latent, not yet of any significance. Ottoman rule showed tolerance to infidels.

Jews had been coming in two waves called aliyas, in the 1880s and shortly before World War I, mainly from Yemen and Russia. Many had settled down, accounting for one in ten of the population, causing no disturbance to local employment or to the subsistence economy. They joined the small number of original Jews, who had survived centuries of persecution and displacement. More wanted to come. Theodor Herzl, who had prophesied at the end of the nineteenth century the State of Israel to incredulous ears, had been negotiating with the Sultan, albeit unsuccessfully, for the settlement of more Jews. But the war made things difficult for them. Many had kept their old nationality. Many were of Russian origin. Now that the Sultan was at war with Russia, they were faced with a difficult choice: asking for Ottoman citizenship on account of their long residence in the Holy Land – and in time of war that choice meant conscription in the Turkish army – or being considered as enemies of the State. (Note 7)
3.2 Feudal society and economics

At the time, Palestine was not a nation. There was no national consciousness as we understand it today, not in an organised way. No political parties. No representation. No recognised leaders. Its boundaries were all too vague. From the Gulf, Palestine stretched east of the river Jordan and north into Syria. Indeed, it was usually considered a part of a vague political entity called Greater Syria. The inhabitants of these regions, estimated to be less than a million, and their lands, were coveted by Arab neighbours. Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, rebelled against the Turks, for the promise, made to him by the British in 1915, of an independent kingdom – promise which, in his view, included Palestine. Consequently, he made himself king of Syria after the war, but was excluded from ruling also in Palestine by Britain, and he was later ejected even from Syria by the French Mandatory power. The dream of a Greater Syria never materialised. But Hussein’s son was given Jordan; Iraq and Lebanon were mandated to Britain and France respectively. Thus the Mandate of Palestine moulded the contours of a new country Palestine.

The social organisation of the country was best described as feudal. The economy, accordingly, had remained stagnant since the Middle Ages: small towns; ancient harbours, as in Roman times, open to the wider world by sea - but there was no Jewish Tel-Aviv yet to compete with Arab Jaffa. Communications by land were primitive. Caravans passed through. Banking, education, health were mere words. No infrastructure to sustain the economy. No industrial revolution to speak of. Even agriculture, in that propitious climate, was handicapped by the lack of water and irrigation. The Jews were to provide all that – to themselves – as bankers, industrialists, and agriculturalists with new pioneering methods. Jewish settlements brought to the land, what the Cistercian abbeys had done to Europe in the past. The Jews made the desert bloom.

The land belonged to a landed gentry. These landed families controlled the lives of the peasants working their estates. As Zionist funds were used to buy land for Jewish settlements, new ownership sometime entailed the eviction of tenants, whose families had been tending the land for centuries. Because the Jews insisted on giving employment preferably to their own coreligionists, Arab discontent was soon to grow, first in the countryside, then in the towns. This discontent fed and watered the seed of Palestinian nationalism. It was channelled by the large families, which then competed for the leadership of political life. But it took nearly two decades to build up a powerful nationalist party, at the head of a resistance movement, aimed, not only at the Jews but also at the British.

4. The Caliph and Muslim India

4.1 The cry of ‘Islam in danger’

Sponsoring – uninvited – less than one million Arabs of Palestine and reminding them – unsuccessfully - of their religious duty, more than seventy million Muslims in India were expressing distress and anger at the possible loss of control over their sacred shrines. The Ulama, their religious leaders, inspired and inflamed the protests; Indian Muslim politicians voiced the malcontents; the Viceroy was forewarned by his Muslim Counsellors of the rebellion to come, the first since the Mutiny of 1857. His Excellency was told that the Muslims fighting in the Indian Army for British victory in the Middle East were being betrayed, if their meaningful contribution to the war served the dismemberment of Turkey. He was also reminded of the promise of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, during the war, not to carve up the stable, if autocratic state, of the Ottoman Empire.

For Indian Muslims, it was “a religious question… Saving the Ottoman Empire thus became synonymous with the saving of Islam, the whole thing boiled down to the issue of the custody of the holy places and keeping the Jazirat-ul-Arab free from the influence of non-Muslims.” (Note 8) Gandhi summed up the issue in three respects. The first concerned the continuation of the Caliphate and the new boundaries of Turkey. The second considered the future of Mecca and Medina. The third centred on Palestine. The ensuing claim was put in clear and simple terms: that “pre-war status should be restored”. (Note 9)

Because the spiritual and temporal rule of the Caliph were linked indissolubly in the minds of Indian Muslims (a situation not unlike that of the Papacy in the fifteenth century), because their spiritual leader was the very Caliph of Turkey, and also because the main unifying force of their different and diverse Muslim communities was religion, the issue became strong and vital, with the unmanly prospect of living under an emasculated Caliph and a dishonoured religion. Hence the cries of hijrat and of jihad.

4.2 The mobilization of Indian Muslims

Jihad has become a familiar term: not so, hijrat. This means the injunction to leave a place committed to evil (Darul-Harb) - in this case India under ‘satanic’ British rule - to escape to the purity of another Islamic country (Darul-Islam) - in this case Afghanistan. Truly enough, 18,000 Muslims, obeying the call of their religious local leaders, trekked from Sindh and the North-West Frontier Province to Afghanistan in the month of August 1921. (Note 10) Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, later dubbed the ‘Frontier Gandhi’, was one of them. He reached Kabul. Others were refused entry, because they had no credentials and had to retrace their steps. Many died on the way from exposure, deprivation...
and exhaustion. “All told, there is reason to believe that half a million Muslims took the road to Afghanistan”, writes H.N. Brailsford. (Note 11)

The hijrat proved a tragedy. A locally organised jihad on the Malabar Coast proved equally disastrous. In July 1921 the Moplahs had risen in rebellion against the authorities with the objective of establishing a ‘khilafat kingdom’. For good measure they killed their Hindu landlords as well. The rebellion was put down at great cost. The Moplah ‘king’ was captured in January 1922 and shot; about 50,000 of his followers were either killed and wounded or taken prisoners, court-martialled and shot. (Note 12)

A third alternative was Gandhi’s non-cooperation strategy, namely a widespread boycott of Government sponsored activities. He persuaded some key Muslim leaders that the Koran approved of his own interpretation of a non-violent resistance. His lead offered some hope of success, at least the only hope.

4.3 The choice of strategy

Gandhi had to deal with two dedicated ‘Khilafatists’, the Ali Brothers, who accepted non-violence in deeds and in words, but not in thoughts, and only as a temporary measure. That was the extent of their understanding with Gandhi. M.A. Jinnah, who ten years later became the ‘Great Leader’ of the Indian Muslims, stayed resolutely out of the deal: he did not approve of the unconstitutional means that were the stock in trade of Gandhi’s non-violence. However, they all knew of Gandhi’s exploits in Transvaal and Natal. They knew of his devotion to Hindu-Muslim unity. They knew of his successes in circumstances where others could not have achieved any. Hence, Mohamed and Shaukat Ali welcomed Gandhi, not simply as a companion, but as their Commander-in-Chief, refraining as best they could from the fiery and inflammatory speeches they were used to making. (There was a notable lapse for which they had to recant). Mahatma Gandhi - as he was now addressed by his followers (Note 13) - embraced them as his ‘blood brothers’, having fallen in love with them ‘at first sight’. (Note 14) Together, in 1919, they tried to save the Caliph, Commander of the Faithful.

Thus, the Caliph could count on the support of dedicated Muslim organisations in India if not elsewhere: the All-India Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Muslim League preferred by Jinnah, the Khilafatists led by the Ali Brothers and their Khilafat Committees and Conferences. The Aga Khan and some well-known Muslims were also supportive of Turkey in their own way.

Gaining such widespread support had been a considerable achievement. Their endeavours in 1919 up to May 1922, however, were to no avail. The Khilafatist delegation to the Viceroy in January 1920 and to London in February 1920 led by Mohamed Ali, achieved nothing. The Muslim hopes now rested with Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement.

5. Gandhi’s rise to power through the Caliphate issue

5.1 Gandhi’s rise to the leadership of Indian Muslims

Gandhi, having secured Muslim approval and following, then sought to bring the Hindus on board. Saad Khairi sums up his position at the time, as a “guide, philosopher and supreme commander (of the Muslims): he was drafting their resolutions; he was corresponding with the Viceroy on their behalf; he was planning and directing their Non-cooperation Movement; and he was negotiating with Hindu leaders to join the Movement. It was indeed as the leader of the Muslims that Gandhi held talks with the Hindus. Until then Gandhi had neither any strong position nor any platform. He was just an individual, respected no doubt, but without any organized support behind him. All his satyagrahas up to that time had been as an individual; the Muslims gave him an issue, solid support and a powerful political position.” (Note 15)

Gandhi put the issue of the Caliphate in terms of ‘duty’ to their fellow Indians: actually not a very convincing argument. The British Government kindly came to the rescue. It did so in successive ways. It raised the all-India level of political sensitivity by forcing on the unwilling Indians the anti-terrorist Rowlatt Act in March 1919. Gandhi took the lead in the Rowlatt agitation, whipping up protests and demonstrations, across India. The Government’s response was to impose martial law in the Punjab, which had been set aflame by the Rowlatt Act. This led to the massacre near Amritsar of an unarmed gathering in that same month, causing horror and indignation, again India-wide. Finally – a timely master stroke for Gandhi’s benefit! – in May 1920, the British Government made known the terms of the Sèvres Treaty depriving Turkey of the holy places of pilgrimage, and in the same month, “whitewashed” the Amritsar tragedy by publishing the unsatisfactory Hunter Report on the Punjab troubles. All Gandhi had to do in June 1920 was to mobilise anti-government feeling, and to tour the country with the Ali Brothers, raising the cry of ‘Khilafat wrong’ to Muslims and ‘Punjab wrong’ to Hindus, preaching his remedy of non-cooperation, while the Ali Brothers raised the cry of Islam in danger.

Nonetheless, Hindu support for the Caliphate remained hesitant. Gandhi had still to persuade the Indian National Congress, which was marking time, that the preservation of the Ottoman Caliphate was “the question of questions”. (Note 16) Spurred by his Muslim allies, Gandhi would not wait. He launched his Campaign of Non-cooperation on 1
August 1920, hoping it would be endorsed by the Congress as a fait accompli, in September. This entailed mainly the boycott of law courts, schools, universities, official functions, liquor shops and foreign cloth.

5.2 Gandhi’s rise to the leadership of the Indian National Congress

At the Special Session of the Indian National Congress convened for that purpose in September 1920 at Calcutta, Gandhi won the day, but on condition that the decision would be confirmed at the 1920 December full session of the Congress at Nagpur. There, Gandhi convinced most delegates (only one in fourteen were Muslims) to join the fight of the Indian Muslims. He went further, demanding swaraj, that is independence, and envisaged it ‘within one year’. At his request the Congress constitution was amended to include breaking the law and refusing to pay taxes. Thus the means of achieving independence was changed from ‘constitutional means’ to ‘by all peaceful and legitimate means’.

“The Congress had virtually become an extension of the Khilafat Committee.” (Note 17)

The great poet Tagore commented that the promise of ‘swaraj in one year’ made non-cooperation irresistible. In Nagpur Gandhi became Congress and the Congress became Gandhi for years to come. At the next December session at Ahmedabad, he was appointed ‘the sole executive authority of the Congress’, with the power of nominating his successor. In August 1920 he had launched a policy of non-cooperation with the British establishment. In December 1921 he planned a more aggressive campaign of non-violent civil disobedience. He had, solidly behind him, the support of Muslim India and of Hindu India. The Ali Brothers had been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in October 1921, but the Government seemed too scared to arrest Gandhi, at the apex of his power.

6. The downfall of the Caliph and the undoing of Hindu-Muslim unity

6.1 The collapse of the campaign

“The most foolish of all foolish schemes” was the Viceroy’s comment on Gandhian strategy. Foolishly or not, many Indians had left Government service, the law courts, schools and universities, and had returned their medals. The boycott of foreign cloth lit bonfires of Manchester cotton all through the year 1921. The non-payment of taxes was to follow.

Gandhi sent the Viceroy an ultimatum on 1 February 1922, giving notice of the impending civil disobedience. Then, astonishingly, he changed his mind. On 12 February 1922, satyagraha was suspended, following an ugly incident in the remote village of Chauri-Chaura earlier that month.

Gandhi consulted no one before taking this momentous decision. His co-workers were shocked and dismayed. Now that Hindu-Muslim unity had been achieved, they were spoiling for a fight to the finish. Instead, the movement ran out of steam; Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.

6.2 The collapse of the Caliphate

For the sake of the Caliph Gandhi was now in prison, cut off from influencing the course of events. He watched from his cell the world go by. He would ponder on past events, select his initiative.

Nine months after Gandhi’s arrest, and only seven months after the Indian National Congress at their special Delhi session congratulated the Turks on their ‘victory’ as ‘the sure presage of the removal of all alien control from the Jazirat-ul-Arab’, the Sultan was obliged to flee, Turkey having been made a Republic on 29 October 1923. He was replaced by a relative. The new Caliph kept his spiritual authority, but was deprived of his temporal power. Worse was to come.

Gandhi was released early, in February 1924, following a surgical operation. Within a month, the Caliphate issue was settled for good. The 3 March of that year saw the deposition of the Caliph, a victim of Ataturk’s secular, republican ideology. To quote H.N. Brailsford: “While Indian Muslims, under the dynamic leadership of the Ali brothers, were reviving the romantic, old-world traditions of Islamic theocracy, the Turks, in whose interests they believed they were acting, were tossing it aside as medieval lumber.” (Note 18)

The Indian Muslim dream had ended in a nightmare. In disbelief, the Khilafatists resolved to send a Muslim delegation to Turkey, but they were refused passports. Their organisation, the Khilafat Conference, could do little more than debate the re-establishment of a Caliph. (Note 19) Seizing the opportunity, Hussein, the sharif of Mecca who had led the war-time rebellion against the Turks in the Arabian peninsula and had crowned himself king of ‘Greater Syria’ in 1920, now proclaimed himself Caliph on the 5 March 1924. In Muslim India, his proclamation fell on deaf ears, as Hussein was considered a stooge of the British. Thus the debate continued and there is still no Caliph today.

6.3 The breaking of Indian-Muslim unity

Gandhi quietly washed his hands of the Caliphate issue that same year, still hoping, intently, to save his top priority, Hindu-Muslim unity. He distanced himself from the Muslim claims on Palestine, while trying to stay close to the Ali
Brothers, especially as Mohamed Ali had been elected president of the Indian National Congress, an honour he could not but appreciate.

Riots between the Muslim and Hindu communities were soon to sour the concord. They became a recurrent feature. The next significant outburst happened in Kohat in the North-West Frontier Province in the summer of 1924. (The cause is familiar enough: a derogatory poem on the Prophet). As a penance, Gandhi fasted for three weeks in the home of Mohamed Ali to demonstrate Hindu-Muslim unity and set an example. And, indeed, Muslim hospitality was exemplary, in the best Islamic tradition. All through the fast the Ali household turned vegetarian; the brothers spun cotton on the charkha, Gandhi’s beloved spinning wheel; Shaukat Ali addressed Gandhi as “my chief”; and, at the end of the fast, Mohamed Ali gave his Hindu guest a sumptuous present: a cow. (Note 20) After the fast, each conducted their own enquiry into the Kohat murders. A rift was then opened that would drive them apart: they could not agree on a common report. From that time, “the Ali Brothers slowly drifted from Gandhi”. (Note 21) They became suspicious of his motivations, eventually left Congress and persevered in their own interpretation of Koranic injunctions.

Gandhi concluded on 15 April 1925: “The work of Hindu-Muslim unity has received a setback… I have washed my hands of it (the Khilafat)” (Note 22), and on 7 March 1925: “For the time being I have put away in my cupboard this Hindu-Muslim tangle… I cease to worry about what I cannot mend.” (Note 23) In July he told a Muslim: “You cannot convert India into a Jazirat-ul-Arab.” (Note 24)

It was only in July 1937 that Gandhi’s attention was once again drawn to the Middle East. His best friend from the old South African days was sent by the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem to solicit Gandhi’s support for the Zionist cause (See Panter-Brick, 2008).

7. Conclusion

Thus Gandhi, a very astute politician, gained fame and notoriety through his fight on behalf of the Ottoman Caliph. He was drawn into the affairs of Palestine, in two ways that tended to be contradictory. In the first phase that covered the years 1919 to 1924, he acted as a convinced pro-Arab agitator. In the next, he showed pro-Jewish sympathy and tried to act on it.

Circumstances had changed. Palestine was now a nation and the economy was booming. Jews made up a third of its population instead of a tenth. The Mandatory power could not cope satisfactorily with the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Gandhi wanted to help the Jews, but the animosity of the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, paralysed his initiatives. The dream of Hindu-Muslim unity that became a reality in 1920 was shattered and, as Gandhi had prophesied, the opportunity would not reappear before another hundred years. Was he too optimistic?

He stayed pro-Arab and pro-Jew to the end. The driving force of his actions was not politics, not the search for power or fame, but his unshakable conviction in the universal application of satyagraha, of love.

As for the Khilafat Committee, it outlived all its leaders. (Note 25) According to A. B. Shah, writing in 1970: “the Khilafat Committee started then (in 1919) is still in existence in India.” (Note 26)

References

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Notes

Note 1. As stated to Lloyd George by Mohamed Ali, leader of the Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister on 19 March 1920 in C.H. Philips. p.220.

Note 3. Arthur James Balfour, Foreign Secretary, writing “on behalf of His Majesty’s Government” to Lord Rotschild on 2 November 1917.

Note 4. Gandhi had at one point thought of converting to Christianity. His discovery of non-violence as a political weapon has its origin in the Sermon on the Mount.

Note 5. List of the resolutions voted by the Indian National Congress on Turkey:

a. Indian National Congress, 34th session, Amritsar, 27-30 December 1919: resolution on “Turkish Khilafat”.
b. Special Session of the Indian national Congress, Calcutta, 4-8-September 1920: resolution on “Khilafat”.
c. Congress Working Committee, Bombay, 14-15 June 1921: resolution on “Support to Turkish Government”.
d. Congress Working Committee, Bombay, 5 October 1921: resolution on “Congratulations to Ali Brothers” (Indian Muslims Caliphate leaders).
e. Indian National Congress, 36th session, Ahmedabad, December 1921: resolution on “Congratulations to Kemal Pasha”.
f. Indian National Congress, 37th session, Gaya, 26-31 December 1922: resolution on “Congratulations to the Turks”.
g. Indian National Congress, Special session, Delhi, 15 September 1923: resolution on “Turkish victory”.

Note 6. Indian National Congress, 35th session, Nagpur, 26-31 December 1920: “attainment of Swarajya (Independence) by all legitimate and peaceful means”.


Note 10. Gopal, p. 144-146.


Note 13. Jinnah was howled down at the Nagpur session of the Indian National Congress in December 1920 for referring to Gandhi as “Mr. Gandhi”.

Note 14. Gandhi’s speech on Khilafat, Bombay, 9 May 1919, in Young India, 14 May 1919.


