Author(s)
Margaret GraverContributor(s)
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Abstract
The concept of prop‹yeiai or Òpre-emotionsÓ is known not only to the Roman Stoics and Christian exegetes but also to Philo of Alexandria. Philo also supplies the term prop‹yeia at QGen 1.79. As Philo cannot have derived what he knows from Seneca (despite his visit to Rome in 39), nor from Cicero, who also men-tions the point, he must have found it in older Stoic writings. The prop‹yeia concept, rich in implications for the voluntariness and phenomenology of the pas-sions proper, is thus con rmed for the Hellenistic period. It is not to be expected that PhiloÕs handling of this or any concept will neces-sarily conform to the usage of his Stoic sources. His evidence is nonetheless of great value where it coincides with that of other witnesses. In QGen 4.73 the emphasis falls upon involuntariness and the mechanisms of impression and assent as in Epictetus fr. 9. The prop‹yeia saves the virtuous personÕs insusceptibility to emotion exactly as it does for the Stoic spokesman in Gellius NA 19.1; this point is of some interest in view of the Christological use of this concept inDate
2016-10-21Type
textIdentifier
oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.1015.7140http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1015.7140