US-Cuba Relations: Revisiting the Sanctions Policy

Abstract

In October 1960, faced with an increasingly hostile and threatening Marxist dictator, the United States implemented economic sanctions against Cuba. As Cuba aligned itself with the Soviet Union, it became a legitimate threat to U.S. national security interests. During the Cold War period, the sanctions policy was successful in achieving some of its aims; most notably, containing Communism the hemisphere. However, it clearly failed in removing Fidel Castro from power. In 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Soviet subsidies to Cuba ended. Since the Cuban economy bad become extremely dependent on Soviet infusions of capital and military support, when Soviet subsidies disappeared, Cuba's ability to threaten the U.S. national security quickly evaporated. In this new multi-polar international system, U.S. policymakers have chosen to tighten the existing sanctions policy, rather than developing a new one. Passing the Cuban Democracy Act (1992) and the Helms-Burton Act (1996), the sanctions policy, previously an executive policy, became codified into U.S. law. This thesis will examine the origins of the sanctions policy, and follow its successes and failures during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. It will argue that the rise of domestic influence has eclipsed the international and national security justifications for the current policy.