Author(s)Xavier, Francis V.
Contributor(s)AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
KeywordsGovernment and Political Science
Humanities and History
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
IRAN IRAQ WAR
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AbstractThe Iran-Iraq War ended in 1989 after nearly eight years of bloodshed. When it was over, the conditions which existed at the beginning of the war remained virtually unchanged. Consequently, considerable potential exists for another war. This paper presents the argument that the war was essentially a struggle between two men, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Saddam Hussein. Saddam feared Khomeini because Khomeini threatened Saddam's power base in Iraq. Consequently, he started the war after a cost-benefit calculation convinced him that an attack on Iran could solve his external problem (Khomeini) and shore up internal support for his government. Saddam Hussein used the rallying cries of culture and religion to convince the Iraqi people to fight, but in reality, culture and religion were simply tools which he utilized to carry out his personal struggle against Khomeini. Khomeini and his advisors set the stage for war, and, in many ways, provoked Saddam's attack-they should not have been surprised by it. Although Iraq won the war militarily, and possessed a significant military advantage over Iran in 1989, the 1991 Persian Gulf War reduced Iraq's capabilities to a point where a rough parity now exists between Iran and Iraq-conditions similar to those found in 1980. Ayatollah Khomeini has been replaced by Ayatollah Khameini, who appears to be somewhat more pragmatic in his approach to exporting Islamic revolution than was his predecessor. The relationship, however, between Saddam Hussein and the government of Iran has not changed appreciably since 1980 and there are several unresolved issues which could ignite renewed hostilities.