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dc.contributor.authorErlanson, Albin
dc.contributor.authorSzwagrzak, Karol
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-24T22:44:54Z
dc.date.available2019-10-24T22:44:54Z
dc.date.created2017-02-28 02:03
dc.identifieroai:RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_005
dc.identifierRePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_005
dc.identifierhttp://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//D/E/A/%7BDEA6DF8B-9FF5-4EDE-B551-B94E60DEDFEF%7Ddpbe5_2014.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/1133775
dc.description.abstractWe examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
dc.description.abstractPackage assignment; Indivisible objects; Strategy-proofness
dc.titleStrategy-proof package assignment
dc.typepreprint
ge.collectioncodeOAIDATA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:10795244
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gtl/10795244
ge.lastmodificationdate2017-02-28 02:03
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@pointsoftware.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149001
ge.oai.repositoryid1228
ge.oai.setnameRePEc
ge.oai.setspecRePEc
ge.oai.streamid5
ge.setnameGlobeTheoLib
ge.setspecglobetheolib
ge.linkhttp://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//D/E/A/%7BDEA6DF8B-9FF5-4EDE-B551-B94E60DEDFEF%7Ddpbe5_2014.pdf


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