Emotionell påverkan på moralbedömning : kan irrelevanta äckelkänslor medföra starkare fördömande?
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AbstractAn experiment was conducted to see which impact the basic emotion of disgust has on moral judgment. Earlier studies have been dominated by the belief that moral judgment is caused by moral reasoning alone, and not by emotions. The social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) constitutes an alternative to such theories. 60 university students (30 male and 30 female) participated in the experiment. They read stories that described morally questionable actions. For half of the participants the stories had a vivid disgust ending and for the other half the stories had a more vaguely disgusting ending. The results indicate that the participants used their emotions when they made their moral judgments, t (56) = 1.491, p = .071. The group that read stories with the vivid endings rated the action to be more morally wrong than the group that read stories with non-vivid endings. Keywords: Moral judgment, emotion, intuition, disgust.