The debate over human nature in warring states China

Abstract

(Uncorrected OCR) Abstract of thesis entitled The Debate over Human Nature in Warring States China submitted by Dan Robins for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in April 2001 This dissertation is an account of the most famous disagreement in early Chinese philosophy. The disagreement is usually thought to have taken place between Mencius (c. 385-303 BC) and Xunzi (c. 310-230 BC) (the two most prominent Confucians of the Warring States period), and to have concerned the goodness or badness of human nature. I give a novel interpretation of the dispute, and a fully-worked out account of its history. I argue that ren zhi xing A2tt (or �eople� xing� is not a near analogue of human nature, and that the dispute unfolded over a short period between Xunzi and members of a Mencian school operating decades after Mencius� death. I try to show that if we read Mencian and Xunzian discussions of the issue as contemporary documents, we can see them interacting in surprisingly precise ways. This allows me to portray the specifically philosophical character of the dispute in much tighter focus than has previously been possible. My interpretation of the concept of xing stresses its links with nature, health, and spontaneity. A person� xing is a locus of continuity with nature that sustains normal physiological and psychological functioning, including in particular the proper functioning of her sense organs and the appropriate production of emotions and desires. This functioning might also involve certain sorts of behavior; if it is a person� xing to behave in a particular way, then she will behave that way as reliably and as thoughtlessly as she desires food when hungry. Xing is vulnerable, and can be damaged by either deprivation or over-indulgence. This damage undermines a person� spontaneity in a way that renders her unhealthy. The dispute concerned the extent to which virtue could be made to participate in the spontaneous economy sustained by xing. Mencius� followers argued that the right sort of self-cultivation could nurture a natural growth that would preserve xing while i ii developing virtue. Xunzi argued that no serious course of moral improvement could limit itself to natural development. Both parties made several attempts to incorporate a theory of xing into their moral and psychological views. By distinguishing between chronological layers of their texts, I am able to trace developments in their views and interactions between them. Though I focus on these Confucian philosophers, I suggest that the dispute was originally provoked by primitivist philosophers whose texts have been preserved in the Zhuangzi, which is usually considered a Daoist anthology. I follow scholars such as Herbert Fingarette, Robert Eno, and Chad Hansen in attributing a �erformance model�of action to early Chinese philosophers. In detailed interpretations of central statements of Mencian and Xunzian psychology, I show how they stressed ability rather than desire. I build on this conclusion to dispute accounts that make reasoning or moral intuition central to the dispute over people� xing.