• Gathering and Dispersing: The Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s Philosophy

      George Vassilacopoulos; La Trobe University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      This paper explores the meaning and being of the absolute spirit in Hegelrsquo;s thought by reflecting through the idea that spirit is the activity and being of gathering through dispersal. In Hegelrsquo;s thought gathering and dispersing are the primary movements through which spirit engages in the processes of its absolute self-cognition, the processes, that is, that underpin the eternal becoming of communal being. Gathering and dispersing thus define the pulsating movement of the absolute spirit in all its facets
    • Geist and Ge-Stell: Beyond the Cyber-Nihilist Convergence of Intelligence

      Hilan Nissior Bensusan; University of Brasilia (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2020-10-14)
      This article argues that nihilism engages thought in a project of converging norms that assumes a contemporary form in Negarestani's inhumanism. Nihilism is described as a cyber-cosmopolitical project that engages with the (metaphysical) effort to extract the ultimate intelligibility of what exists. Heidegger's remarks on Ge-Stell are explored to question whether thought could possibly engage in anything other than the endeavor to turn the world into an artifice. The inhumanist reading of Geist is shown to be committed to the convergence of norms which is at odds with the very practice of reasoning. A post-nihilist Marxist picture of thought is then sketched according to which thought is taken to be a diverging force of production. In this alternative picture, the development of thinking leads to social, cybernetic and cosmopolitical relations that gradually diverge while distancing themselves from the current engagement in the extraction of the intelligibility of things.   
    • Geometroneneurodynamics and Neuroscience

      Keun-Hang S. Yang S. Yang; Menas C. Kafatos; Chapman University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2018-08-26)
      The Orthodox Interpretation of quantum mechanics, as developed by many physicists, particularly John von Neumann, addresses the role of measurement, available choices and response of the quantum system to questions posed by an observer in specific quantum laboratory experiments. As such, it is, more consistent and clearer than other interpretations of quantum mechanics and it provides an account of the interactions of observers with the external world. However, in order to explore whether quantum mechanics plays a role in the brain, which is the primary issue, one has to examine the applicability of Hilbert space structure as a valid geometric description of neurodynamics. Here, we re-visit previous work involving the orientation selectivity of neurons, which constructed a type of statistical distance function, in agreement with quantum formalism. This is proportional to the usual distance (or angle) between orientations of the neurons. The equivalence between the statistical distance and the Hilbert-space distance was developed before. As such, it gives rise to the possibility of reanalyzing the issue of measurement and information processing in the brain function, what is termed geometroneurodynamics. Several issues of this geometrical approach are examined and work that needs further development identified, such as measurement and observation, what is Nature and who the observer is, all of course relevant to functions of the brain. Extending Orthodox quantum mechanics to neurodynamics may be the ontological opening to the relevance of universal non-dual Awareness, examined in previous works.
    • Giordano Bruno e il Problema della Modernita

      Stefano Ulliana (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2005-10-20)
      Il testo viene pubblicato per gentile concessione della casa editrice ESI ed e’ tratto dal libro di Stefano Ulliana “Il concetto creativo e dialettico dello Spirito nei Dialoghi Italiani di Giordano Bruno. Il confronto con la tradizione neoplatonico-aristotelica: il testo bruniano De l’Infinito, Universo e mondi”, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli, 2003. Le argomentazioni presentate ne Il concetto creativo e dialettico dello Spirito nei Dialoghi Italiani di Giordano Bruno (Il confronto con la tradizione neoplatonico-aristotelica: il testo bruniano De l’Infinito, Universo e mondi) costituiscono le conclusioni ultime e definitive di un lavoro di ricerca che ha investito l’insieme dei Dialoghi Italiani, riuscendo a reperire ed a far emergere quello che pare il nucleo più profondo ed importante—il vero e proprio elevato fondamento—della speculazione bruniana: la presenza attiva di un concetto triadico teologico-politico—il Padre, il Figlio e lo Spirito della tradizione trinitaria cristiana—però riformulato attraverso il capovolgimento rivoluzionario di questa stessa tradizione, attuato attraverso il concetto creativo e dialettico dell’infinito. In questo modo la stessa tradizione platonica pare subire una trasformazione essenziale, abbandonando qualunque forma di alienazione e negazione, per riaprirsi invece verso soluzioni che paiono riprendere moniti ed osservazioni suscitati dalle prime, grandi e maestose, speculazioni dei filosofi presocratici. Parmenide, Eraclito ed Empedocle sembrano rivivere nei testi bruniani, riproponendo una soluzione ben diversa a quei nodi e problemi teoretico-pratici—fondamentale il rapporto Uno-molti e tutto ciò che da esso consegue, sia sul piano naturale che politico—apparentemente risolti e codificati dal pensiero postsocratico, prima platonico e poi aristotelico. L’inscindibilit� del principio di libert� (la figura teologica del Padre) ed eguaglianza (il Figlio), attraverso il richiamo alla fonte amorosa infinita ed universale (lo Spirito), consente alla riflessione bruniana di presentare per la prima volta nel panorama filosofico mondiale di tutti i tempi la possibilit� di salvaguardare sia l’aspetto creativo naturale, che la diversit� politica, presentando nel contempo un concetto di ragione capace di esprimere un movimento infinito sempre aperto ed attento alla molteplicit� . In questa liberazione della potenza e della volont� dalle strettoie ordinate e gerarchiche della tradizione il pensiero e la riflessione di Giordano Bruno danno inizio alla modernit� , ripresentandosi quale mirabile soluzione ogni qual volta potere e violenza paiono assestarsi e reciprocamente incrementarsi, in un circolo apparentemente indistruttibile. Allora i capitoli di questo libro—attraverso l’analisi di concetti importanti nella filosofia bruniana, quali quelli del desiderio e dell’immaginazione, della materia e della ragione—riattraversano la storia della definizione filosofica delle entit� reali più importanti—Dio, Natura, Ragione, Uno—per mostrare un’opposizione fondamentale: l’opposizione fra la fusione speculativa apportata dal pensiero neoplatonico-aristotelico (antico, moderno e contemporaneo), attenta alla difesa della necessit� ordinata di un mondo unico, e la liberazione speculativo-pratica bruniana, attenta a far rivivere la coscienza dell’infinito, in noi e fuori di noi. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The arguments that have been presented in this essay, which are part of the book ‘The creative and dialectical concept of the Spirit in the Italian Dialogues of Jordanus Brunus. The comparison with the neoplatonic-Aristotelian tradition: the brunian text De l’Infinito, Universo e mondi’, constitute the ultimate and definitive conclusions of a body of research that has mainly focused on Bruno’s work “Dialoghi Italiani”. This research has managed to rise the deepest and most important core of the true foundation of Giordano Bruno’s speculative thinking—the active presence of a triadic theological-political concept of the Father, the Son and the Spirit of Christian tradition. However, this triad has also been reformulated through the revolutionary overturning of this tradition and realized through a creative and dialectical concept of the infinite. In this way the same Platonic tradition seems to undergo an essential transformation by abandoning any form of alienation and negation and indeed to open itself to recover those warnings and observations that the first great speculative thoughts of the Presocratics philosophers brought about. Parmenides, Heraclitus and Empedocles seem to come to life again in Bruno’s essays by proposing a different solution to those theoretical and practical problems such as the fundamental relation between One-many and what it can represent either at the natural level or at the political level which have been apparently solved and codified in the Platonic and Aristotelian thought. The indissolubility of the freedom principle (the theological character of the Father) and equality (the Son), through the use of the loving, infinite and universal source (the Spirit), allows Bruno’s reflection to present for the first time in the entire philosophical tradition the possibility of safeguarding the creative aspect as well as the political diversity. He achieves this by showing a concept of reason which is able to express the infinite movement that it is always open and measured (careful) towards the multiplicity. In this release of power and will from the ordered and hierarchical paths of the philosophy tradition, Bruno’s thought gave birth to Modernity.
    • Giorgio Agamben’s Franciscan Ontology

      Lorenzo Chiesa (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2009-07-23)
      This paper analyses Agamben’s notion of homo sacer, showing how it should not be confined to the field of a negative critique of biopolitics. In his work, Agamben cautiously delineates a positive figure of homo sacer, whom, according to him, we all virtually are. Such figure would be able to subvert the form in which the relation between bare life and political existence has so far been both thought and lived in the West. How and when is this passage from negative to positive sacredness historically accomplished for Agamben? Is such transit after all thinkable? These are the two basic questions he both unintentionally formulates and leaves undecided in his book Homo Sacer (1995). Agamben further elabourates his investigation of biopolitics in the book he dedicates to Saint Paul, The Time That Remains (2000). Chiesa suggests that, in this volume, the figure of homo sacer as earthly hero is transposed onto that of the messianic man. This can only be achieved by means of an elabourate Christian—and more specifically Franciscan—development of the ontological notion of ‘form of life’. Problematically enough, Agamben is able to carry out a transvaluation of biopolitics only in the guise of a bio-theo-politics.
    • Giving Form to Its Own Existence: Anxiety and the Subject of Truth

      Sam Gillespie; University of Warwick (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2006-10-27)
      For anyone willing to accept the two primary theses of Alain Badiou#39;s emBeing and Event/emmdash;that mathematics is ontology, and that there is an inconsistency that cannot be exhausted by presentationmdash;a number of questions immediately follow. To accept that mathematics is ontology may prove useful for one particular set of problems (for example, finding the most adequate means of understanding multiplicity), but this only opens the door to a whole series of other problems. To give only the most general and obvious example, there is an uncertainty surrounding the particular relation between mathematical being (inconsistent multiplicity) and its manifestation in particular situations. Badiou maintains that the relations between a situation and its latent being are purely subtractive insofar as presentation is an operation that presents particular beings as multiples and not multiplicity as such. What we are left with, then, is not so much a relation that follows from the inherent limitations of either presentation or language (however limited they may in fact be), but rather an axiomatic presupposition that the nothingness that escapes presentation is an inaugural existence. Being, in other words, is not inferred from presentation, but axiomatized. And as Deleuze has shown in his reading of Spinoza, axioms can just as readily generate positive manifestations (or expressions) of being. This creates problems if Badiou wishes to create an effective connection between axiomatized being and its manifestation in situations (through presentation or forcing).
    • Giving Naturalism a Chance: Interactivism, Emergence, and Nonlinearity

      Robert L. Campbell; Psychology, Clemson University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2014-06-08)
      This paper offers a defense of naturalism, which might improve its chance of being adopted as a direction, both for theory and for empirical research.  This defense responds in particular to three themes:: the emergence of mind (as opposed to nonemergence or reductionism), the pervasiveness of nonlinearity in biology and psychology, and the need for levels and degrees of self (as opposed to a human self that is self-evidently unitary, or a self that turns out to be illusory, or a concealment of what is truly there).
    • Global Insanity Redux

      James A. Coffman; Mount Desert Island Biological Laboratory; Donald C. Mikulecky; Virginia Commonwealth University Center for the Study of Theoretical Biology (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2015-08-23)
      In our book Global Insanity we argued that the existential predicament faced by humanity is a predictable consequence of Western Enlightenment thinking and the resulting world model, whose ascendance with the Industrial Revolution entrained development of the global consumer Economy that is destroying the biosphere. This situation extends from a dominant mindset based on the philosophy of reductionism.  The problem was recognized and characterized by Robert M. Hutchins.  In 1985, Hutchins ideas were discussed by Robert Rosen in Chapter 1 of Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, Mathematical & Methodological Foundations.  Building on Hutchins' ideas, Rosen laid the foundation for an entire new, non-reductionist paradigm, which he called "complexity theory".  This new paradigm is what we are further developing here.  One has to recognize that a paradigm shift is needed to overcome the entrenched mindset and world model that reductionism has created. Here we explore the myriad interconnected ways-psychological, social, cultural, political, and technological-that the Western world model and consumer economy works as a complex system to thwart, neutralize, or co-opt for its own ends any effort to bring about the kind of radical change that is needed to avert global ecological catastrophe and societal collapse. This resistance to change stems from the need, inherent in the Western model, to continually grow the consumer economy.  The media's continued portrayal of consumptive economic growth as a good thing, the widely held belief that the Economy is paramount, and current political and technological trends all manifest the system's active resistance to change. From the perspective of the mature economic system, any work that does not serve to grow the Economy is counterproductive, and viewed as unnecessary, a luxury, or subversive. The potential for real change (i.e. toward creation of a better system) is thus inversely related to the viability of the Economy, which will eventually decline as the system develops into senescence. To the extent that the fragile metastability of senescence affords opportunity for radical change, economic decline can be viewed as a hopeful sign. But taking maximum advantage of that opportunity will be extraordinarily difficult, as it will require widespread recognition of the problem, major voluntary sacrifice by the relatively large numbers of people who still benefit from the system (including what remains of the "middle class"), and concerted "grassroots" efforts.  It can be expected that the system will resist those efforts until the end, becoming increasingly reliant on media-enabled distraction and divisive politics, as well as violent coercion, to maintain itself.  Investment in education and science is widely touted as necessary for improving our situation, but this is misguided as long as the educational system and scientific enterprise continue to work in collusion with the larger system, as they currently do. Until the reductionist mindset and world model that drives the system is effectively challenged, there can be little hope for the kind of change needed to avert the catastrophic collapse of civilization.
    • God Comes to Her: St. Teresa of Ávila, Simone Weil, and the Kantian Conception of Modern Religious Experience

      Elvira Basevich; University of Massachusetts, Lowell (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2020-05-06)
      What does god mean to have a mystical experience of god? Does it entail the ecstasy or affliction? In this essay, I present St. Teresa of Ávila and Simone Weil’s somatic accounts of religious experience in light of the idea of the highest good. The highest good aligns virtue with happiness to ensure that those who are good are rewarded and the evil suffer. For Teresa, she primes herself for divine visitation by cultivating a patient orientation towards the heavens and visits from god can assume a physically gratifying form, whereas Weil confronts the presence of god through the experience of affliction, that is, the extreme suffering of the innocent at the hands of others. I then offer a Kantian reflection on why the experience of affliction present a distinct challenge for the cultivation of moral agency: How can those who have experienced affliction keep intact the moral faith that goodness can (re)appear in the world in the aftermath of affliction. 
    • God's Unlikely Comeback: Evolution, Emanation, and Ecology

      Sean O Nuallain; stanford (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2012-05-03)
      This paper has three contrasting sections. The first starts with a description of the academic context that has led researchers like Stewart Kauffmann to introduce "God" into respectable discourse. It then goes on to juxtapose his schema with similar others that his work does not reference. It is proposed that, since humanity is the cutting edge-for good and evil-of emanation/revolution, it is human development that we must focus on. This, in turn cannot properly be discussed without reference to first person descriptions and their contrast with third person descriptions. Likewise the role of those contrasting accounts within and outside the academy, which is currently under threat, must be referred to.   Accordingly, the second section begins with the delineation of subjectivity suggested by current neuroscience. It is argued that the cluster sampling of EEG will yield significantly more meaningful results than other competing methods. This paper makes the admittedly radical contention that it may be intellectually responsible to engage in forms of thought and practice that engage the whole of life in a manner heretofore addressed by “religions”. Such forms of life cannot responsibly emerge from an insight into the nature of physical reality, which is the province of the academy. Rather, these forms emerge from consideration of the human psychophysical unity as it engages with a succession of different contexts and attempts to reflect on and refine its responses to them. The nature of the academy early in the 21st century is a confounding factor. The corporate pressure to attenuate academic freedom is real, as is the fact that academic freedom in liberal democracies would immediately migrate to other, initially unfunded structures in civil society with the internet offering myriad opportunities for dissemination and immediate critique of ideas. Orthogonal to this is the attempt to specify and refine one's psychological life, the bane of academic psychology from 19th century German research onwards. It is argued that academic psychology has an asymptote at this point; better to distinguish between the “academy' and the “real world” in a way that best does justice to both, and allows the layperson participate in a genuine attempt to seek knowledge by providing him with a veridical cosmology and psychology, than risk a new absurdity rivaling ontological behaviourism. Many salient facts about human psychology can be discovered by oneself in the “real world”, if only because the imperatives there will always be more compelling, try as we might.   Finally, a synthetic narrative is proposed, one in which the evolutionary ethos of the first section is interrelated with the signs of the second section. This final section may yet be read independently of its predecessors. Kauffman’s imperative  “reinventing the sacred” indicates something is awry in our conceptual and political  systems; it is argued that historically authentic religious movements have preserved something they considered divine, and done so on the margins of society. In fact, this marginalization may be the essence of the religious impulse,
    • Grand Narratives, Metamodernism, and Global Ethics

      Andrew J. Corsa; Lynn University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2018-12-12)
      Some philosophers contend that to effectively address problems such our global environmental crisis, humans must collectively embrace a polyphonic, environmentalist grand narrative, very different from the narratives accepted by modernists.  Cultural theorists who write about metamodernism likewise discuss the recent return to a belief in narratives, and contend that our society’s current approach to narratives is very different from that of the modernists.  In this paper, I articulate these philosophers’ and cultural theorists’ positions, and I highlight and explore interconnections between them.  Additionally, I argue that if the authors I discuss are correct, then we morally ought to embrace a metamodernist, polyphonic, environmental grand narrative, in order to effectively address an array of global crises.  Such a grand narrative is a necessary ingredient of an adequate global ethics.
    • Guilt: Facing the Problem of Ethical Solipsism

      Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies; Sami Pihlstrom; Professor, Univ. of Jyvaskyla; Director, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2011-12-30)
      Abstract: This article deals with the constitutive role played by the emotion of guilt, or the capacity of experiencing such emotions, in our moral life. The deeply personal nature of moral guilt (or remorse) leads to the problem of ethical solipsism: it seems that guilt can in the end concern only me, not anyone else, in a morally profound sense. Echoing Dostoevsky, the truly ethical thinker ought to acknowledge that everyone is guilty in front of the entire mankind, “and I more than anyone else”. This problematic feature of our moral perspectives on the world is examined through comments on a number of authors, including Kant, Wittgenstein, Levinas, Gaita, and Todorov. While we do need to avoid solipsism, there is a “truth” hidden in it: morality is something that we are individually and personally deeply responsible for.
    • Had We But Worlds Enough, and Time, This Absolute, Philosopher…

      Justin Clemens; Deakin University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2006-10-27)
      In Logiques des Mondes, Paris, Seuil, 2006, Alain Badiou has produced a sequel to his magnum opus Being and Event. Whereas Being and Event primarily restricted itself to the relationship between ontology and the event, mathematics and poetry, the new book seriously extends and revises certain of its predecessor#39;s propositions in order to construct a logic of different 'worlds'; This article outlines some of the major doctrines, arguments, and motivations for the new work, as well as several points of possible difficulty.
    • Hans Driesch Re-Visited after a Century: On "Leib Und Seele – Eine Untersuchung Uber Das Psychophysiche Grundproblem"

      Stefan Gruner; University of Pretoria (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2017-11-11)
      Approximately a century after the bio-philosopher Hans Driesch had published some of his most interesting books, which had been to some extent misunderstood and subsequently fallen to some extent into oblivion, the relevance of some of Driesch's ideas for our own time is, since recently, beginning to be rediscovered. This is, inter alia, because the philosophical triple-relation between the notions of 'mind', 'living body', and 'machine' is still not compellingly clarified by any of the various competing philosophical 'schools' until today, whereby the advent of the programmable computer as an entirely new type of 'machine' (which Driesch was not able to foresee during his own life-time) has made all the related problems even more complicated. Within this science-philosophical context, this review article revisits and briefly recapitulates some of Driesch's most 'salient' thoughts on the mind-body-problem, and additionally provides some bibliographic auxiliary materials which nowadays students of Driesch's ideas might (hopefully) find useful. The writing of this review was motivated by the desire to clarify some often-seen misunderstandings of Driesch's concept of 'soul' within his two-fold framework of 'vitalism plus phenomenology', as well as by the desire to reconnect our contemporary science-, mind-, nature- and computer-philosophical discourses with one of their most important historic sources.
    • Hans Jonas’s Noble ‘Heuristics of Fear’: Neither the Good Lie Nor the Terrible Truth

      Nathan Dinneen; Rochester Institute of Technology (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2014-12-15)
      In this essay, Jonas’s political teaching is discussed through examining his judicious use of the natural sciences, especially evolutionary theory and scientific ecology, in developing a new ontology and a new ethic. His ontological and ethical arguments are considered in terms of their public communication via his “heuristics of fear,” with particular attention to his claim that an ontological axiom that he makes use of is an argumentum ad hominem. I also make the case that the accusations against him as being an ecoauthoritarian fail to consider that his suggestions regarding the necessity of tyranny and the use of the noble lie to halt an ecological crisis are themselves expressions of the heuristics of fear, which is intended to foster willful change now before change of a forced sort becomes the only option. With this interpretation in mind, one sees the ennobling character of his heuristics of fear.  
    • Hegel and the Becoming of Essence

      David Gray Carlson; Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      One of the more mysterious transitions in Hegelrsquo;s mnoumental lsquo;Science of Logicrsquo; is the transition from the last stages of Being into the shadowy negative realm of Essence. This paper assesses the logic of those steps, in which measure becomes fully present but unable to capture an absence Hegel will eventually name as Essence. The paper emphasizes that the correlativity that marks the realm of essence is already introduced in the final two chapters of Hegelrsquo;s analysis of measure. It concludes by explaining why Hegel thought bad astronomymdash;the division of planetary orbit into centripetal and centrifucal forcemdash;illustrates the final sublation of quality and quantity. While quality and quantity both have lsquo;beyondsrsquo;, the realm of essence does not. Essence is revealed to be a totality that contains both itself and other (measure, or appearance)nbsp; in a single correlation.
    • Hegel Today: Towards a Tragic Conception of Intercultural Conflicts

      Karin G de Boer; University of Groningen (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      This essay draws on Hegelrsquo;s conception of tragedy in the emPhenomenology/em to reinterpret the intercultural conflicts that confront us today. It is argued that the prevailing self-conception of modern states, relying on the opposition between universality and particularity, effaces the irresolvable entanglement of contrary values such as progress and tradition or reason and faith. The essay seeks to employ Hegelrsquo;s insight into the dynamic of tragic conflicts to conceptualize precisely this entanglement. This requires, however, that the tragic strand of this insight be extricated from the predominant optimism of Hegelrsquo;s dialectics as a whole. By turning this tragic strand into a conceptual perspective of its own, this essay seeks to account for the inherent tendency of contending cultural paradigms to oppose their counterpart instead of recognizing themselves in the other.nbsp; br /
    • Hegel's Philosophy of Nature of 1805-6; Its Relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit

      Daniel E Shannon; DePauw University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2013-07-08)
      Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) was supposed to be the introduction and first part of the Jena System III, and as such it was to introduce us to the other parts of the project. Most commentators on Hegel’s Phenomenology, however, do not consider how the Phenomenology relates the other parts, and some discount Hegel understanding and commitment to the natural philosophy of his day.  This paper attempts to make the connection between the Phenomenology and the Natural Philosophy of 1805-06 explicit; to show where and how the connections are made; to identify how Hegel uses the natural sciences of his day in creating his system.  By showing this I hope to prove that his concept of Spirit is born within his natural philosophy. It is part of his cosmology.
    • Hegel, Derrida and the Subject

      Simon Lumsden; University of New South Wales (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      There is a simple story to be told about Derridarsquo;s relation to Hegel. He develops his core concepts such as diffeacute;rance and trace through an essentially negative relation to the central notions of the idealist tradition. Derrida has been particularly concerned to undermine what he takes to be the heart of the idealist projectmdash;the self-present subject. This paper examines the influence of Heidegger on the deconstructive critique of idealist subjectivity and presents Derridarsquo;s alternative to the metaphysical subject. It argues that his critique of idealist subjectivity does not accord with Hegelrsquo;s presentation of subjectivity when one conceives that project as a response to problems in the view of subjectivity developed by Fichte and Kant. br /
    • Hegel, Idealism and God: Philosophy as the Self-Correcting Appropriation of the Norms of Life and Thought

      Paul Redding; University of Sydney (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      Can Hegel, a philosopher who claims that philosophy lsquo;has no other object but God and so is essentially rational theologyrsquo;, ever be taken as anything emother than/em a religious philosopher with little to say to any philosophical project that identifies itself as emsecular/em?nbsp; If the valuable substantive insights found in the detail of Hegelrsquo;s philosophy are to be rescued for a secular philosophy, then, it is commonly presupposed, some type of global reinterpretation of the enframing idealistic framework is required. In this essay, this assumption is challenged. br /br /Kantrsquo;s interpretation of space and time as a response to Newtonrsquo;s theologically based spatio-temporal emrealism/em is taken as a model of what it is to be a Kantian emidealist/em about God and the self. In turn, Hegelrsquo;s philosophy is taken as a development of this approach that overcomes the limitations of Kantrsquo;s formal approach. Hegelrsquo;s major contribution to Kantrsquo;s revolutionary transformation of the task of philosophy is, it is argued, his recognitive conception of lsquo;spiritrsquo;. While this has been widely appreciated with regard to the relations between lsquo;subjectiversquo; and lsquo;objectiversquo; spirit, it is suggested that a fuller understanding of the nature of Hegelrsquo;s emabsolute/em idealism requires a proper understanding of how this approach also applies to the domain of lsquo;absolute spiritrsquo;. br /br /