• Had We But Worlds Enough, and Time, This Absolute, Philosopher…

      Justin Clemens; Deakin University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2006-10-27)
      In Logiques des Mondes, Paris, Seuil, 2006, Alain Badiou has produced a sequel to his magnum opus Being and Event. Whereas Being and Event primarily restricted itself to the relationship between ontology and the event, mathematics and poetry, the new book seriously extends and revises certain of its predecessor#39;s propositions in order to construct a logic of different 'worlds'; This article outlines some of the major doctrines, arguments, and motivations for the new work, as well as several points of possible difficulty.
    • Hans Driesch Re-Visited after a Century: On "Leib Und Seele – Eine Untersuchung Uber Das Psychophysiche Grundproblem"

      Stefan Gruner; University of Pretoria (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2017-11-11)
      Approximately a century after the bio-philosopher Hans Driesch had published some of his most interesting books, which had been to some extent misunderstood and subsequently fallen to some extent into oblivion, the relevance of some of Driesch's ideas for our own time is, since recently, beginning to be rediscovered. This is, inter alia, because the philosophical triple-relation between the notions of 'mind', 'living body', and 'machine' is still not compellingly clarified by any of the various competing philosophical 'schools' until today, whereby the advent of the programmable computer as an entirely new type of 'machine' (which Driesch was not able to foresee during his own life-time) has made all the related problems even more complicated. Within this science-philosophical context, this review article revisits and briefly recapitulates some of Driesch's most 'salient' thoughts on the mind-body-problem, and additionally provides some bibliographic auxiliary materials which nowadays students of Driesch's ideas might (hopefully) find useful. The writing of this review was motivated by the desire to clarify some often-seen misunderstandings of Driesch's concept of 'soul' within his two-fold framework of 'vitalism plus phenomenology', as well as by the desire to reconnect our contemporary science-, mind-, nature- and computer-philosophical discourses with one of their most important historic sources.
    • Hans Jonas’s Noble ‘Heuristics of Fear’: Neither the Good Lie Nor the Terrible Truth

      Nathan Dinneen; Rochester Institute of Technology (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2014-12-15)
      In this essay, Jonas’s political teaching is discussed through examining his judicious use of the natural sciences, especially evolutionary theory and scientific ecology, in developing a new ontology and a new ethic. His ontological and ethical arguments are considered in terms of their public communication via his “heuristics of fear,” with particular attention to his claim that an ontological axiom that he makes use of is an argumentum ad hominem. I also make the case that the accusations against him as being an ecoauthoritarian fail to consider that his suggestions regarding the necessity of tyranny and the use of the noble lie to halt an ecological crisis are themselves expressions of the heuristics of fear, which is intended to foster willful change now before change of a forced sort becomes the only option. With this interpretation in mind, one sees the ennobling character of his heuristics of fear.  
    • Hegel and the Becoming of Essence

      David Gray Carlson; Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      One of the more mysterious transitions in Hegelrsquo;s mnoumental lsquo;Science of Logicrsquo; is the transition from the last stages of Being into the shadowy negative realm of Essence. This paper assesses the logic of those steps, in which measure becomes fully present but unable to capture an absence Hegel will eventually name as Essence. The paper emphasizes that the correlativity that marks the realm of essence is already introduced in the final two chapters of Hegelrsquo;s analysis of measure. It concludes by explaining why Hegel thought bad astronomymdash;the division of planetary orbit into centripetal and centrifucal forcemdash;illustrates the final sublation of quality and quantity. While quality and quantity both have lsquo;beyondsrsquo;, the realm of essence does not. Essence is revealed to be a totality that contains both itself and other (measure, or appearance)nbsp; in a single correlation.
    • Hegel Today: Towards a Tragic Conception of Intercultural Conflicts

      Karin G de Boer; University of Groningen (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      This essay draws on Hegelrsquo;s conception of tragedy in the emPhenomenology/em to reinterpret the intercultural conflicts that confront us today. It is argued that the prevailing self-conception of modern states, relying on the opposition between universality and particularity, effaces the irresolvable entanglement of contrary values such as progress and tradition or reason and faith. The essay seeks to employ Hegelrsquo;s insight into the dynamic of tragic conflicts to conceptualize precisely this entanglement. This requires, however, that the tragic strand of this insight be extricated from the predominant optimism of Hegelrsquo;s dialectics as a whole. By turning this tragic strand into a conceptual perspective of its own, this essay seeks to account for the inherent tendency of contending cultural paradigms to oppose their counterpart instead of recognizing themselves in the other.nbsp; br /
    • Hegel's Philosophy of Nature of 1805-6; Its Relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit

      Daniel E Shannon; DePauw University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2013-07-08)
      Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) was supposed to be the introduction and first part of the Jena System III, and as such it was to introduce us to the other parts of the project. Most commentators on Hegel’s Phenomenology, however, do not consider how the Phenomenology relates the other parts, and some discount Hegel understanding and commitment to the natural philosophy of his day.  This paper attempts to make the connection between the Phenomenology and the Natural Philosophy of 1805-06 explicit; to show where and how the connections are made; to identify how Hegel uses the natural sciences of his day in creating his system.  By showing this I hope to prove that his concept of Spirit is born within his natural philosophy. It is part of his cosmology.
    • Hegel, Derrida and the Subject

      Simon Lumsden; University of New South Wales (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      There is a simple story to be told about Derridarsquo;s relation to Hegel. He develops his core concepts such as diffeacute;rance and trace through an essentially negative relation to the central notions of the idealist tradition. Derrida has been particularly concerned to undermine what he takes to be the heart of the idealist projectmdash;the self-present subject. This paper examines the influence of Heidegger on the deconstructive critique of idealist subjectivity and presents Derridarsquo;s alternative to the metaphysical subject. It argues that his critique of idealist subjectivity does not accord with Hegelrsquo;s presentation of subjectivity when one conceives that project as a response to problems in the view of subjectivity developed by Fichte and Kant. br /
    • Hegel, Idealism and God: Philosophy as the Self-Correcting Appropriation of the Norms of Life and Thought

      Paul Redding; University of Sydney (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      Can Hegel, a philosopher who claims that philosophy lsquo;has no other object but God and so is essentially rational theologyrsquo;, ever be taken as anything emother than/em a religious philosopher with little to say to any philosophical project that identifies itself as emsecular/em?nbsp; If the valuable substantive insights found in the detail of Hegelrsquo;s philosophy are to be rescued for a secular philosophy, then, it is commonly presupposed, some type of global reinterpretation of the enframing idealistic framework is required. In this essay, this assumption is challenged. br /br /Kantrsquo;s interpretation of space and time as a response to Newtonrsquo;s theologically based spatio-temporal emrealism/em is taken as a model of what it is to be a Kantian emidealist/em about God and the self. In turn, Hegelrsquo;s philosophy is taken as a development of this approach that overcomes the limitations of Kantrsquo;s formal approach. Hegelrsquo;s major contribution to Kantrsquo;s revolutionary transformation of the task of philosophy is, it is argued, his recognitive conception of lsquo;spiritrsquo;. While this has been widely appreciated with regard to the relations between lsquo;subjectiversquo; and lsquo;objectiversquo; spirit, it is suggested that a fuller understanding of the nature of Hegelrsquo;s emabsolute/em idealism requires a proper understanding of how this approach also applies to the domain of lsquo;absolute spiritrsquo;. br /br /
    • Hegel, Recognition And Rights: ‘Anerkennung’ As A Gridline Of The Philosophy Of Rights

      Jürgen Lawrenz; University Of Sydney (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      Although the emlocus classicus /emof the concept of recognition is the master/slave episode of the Phenomenology, it is readily portable into the emPhilosophy of Right/em. However, the fact that the term occurs only six times in the 400 pages of the emPhilosophy of Right/em has obscured its structural role, and accordingly scholarly effort is scant on the concept as it might pertain to this work. It is the argument of this paper that despite its lsquo;invisibilityrsquo; it governs foreground proceedings as if from behind a curtain, for it cannot be gainsaid that the conceptual foundation of the Rights empresupposes/em the principle of recognition. The suspicion has been voiced that Hegel deliberately emsuppressed/em reminders of the presence of emAnerkennung/em in his philosophy of rights in order to distance himself from the perceived limitations of the Fichtean exposition of the concept. Accordingly this paper brings up the background of Fichte and examines the PhR in its strategic dispositions to uncover the recognitive structure implied in it.
    • Hegel’s Science of Logic and the “Sociality of Reason”

      Jorge Armando Reyes; UNAM (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      span/spanspanspan style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px" class="Apple-style-span"spanThis paper is intended to examine the significance of Hegelrsquo;s emScience of Logic/em for social thought. I attempt to show that the claims advocating directly the social character of reason present in Hegelrsquo;s thought must be regarded against the background of the logical demand of a presuppositionless thinking. After reviewing the criticisms addressed against the possibility of fulfilling that demand, I suggest that Hegelrsquo;s demand of presuppositionless thinking could be understood as a transformation ofnbsp; Kantrsquo;s transcendental philosophy (particularly the concept of the Originary Synthetic Unity of Apperception mdash;OSUA).nbsp; That explanation will allow us to suggest that the demand of presuppositionless thinking works as the recognition of a gathering in which the ldquo;meaningrdquo; is both unified and dispersed. In base to that idea, it will be explained why most of the interpretations which emphasizes the social character of reason as the key to account the development of Hegelrsquo;s philosophy fail to recognize that presuppositionless ground.nbsp; So, it will be concluded that the sociality of reason must be understood as a determination reason gives itself through its self-situating in the field of meaning. br //span/span/span
    • Hegel’s Theory of Moral Action, its Place in his System and the ‘Highest’ Right of the Subject

      David Rose; Newcastle University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      There is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of Hegelrsquo;s social and political theories, the flavour of old-style lsquo;apologyrsquo; for his liberal credentials, as though there exists a real need to prove he holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, contemporary political worldview. Such an approach is no doubt motivated by the need to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when Hegel has finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judgement. The main claim made in the following pages is that the critique of lsquo;subjectiversquo; moralities is neither the sole nor even the main reason for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics. This paper will look to Hegelrsquo;s mature theory of action as motivating the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely filling in the hole left when one rejects Kant and it will discuss what the consequences of this approach are for the role of the moral conscience within the political sphere, arguing that Hegelrsquo;s own conditions of free action would not be met unless the subjective moral conscience was operative in the rational state.
    • Hegel’s Theory of Moral Action, its Place in his System and the ‘Highest’ Right of the Subject

      David Rose; Newcastle University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      There is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of Hegelrsquo;s social and political theories, the flavour of old-style lsquo;apologyrsquo; for his liberal credentials, as though there exists a real need to prove he holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, contemporary political worldview. Such an approach is no doubt motivated by the need to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when Hegel has finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judgement. The main claim made in the following pages is that the critique of lsquo;subjectiversquo; moralities is neither the sole nor even the main reason for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics. This paper will look to Hegelrsquo;s mature theory of action as motivating the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely filling in the hole left when one rejects Kant and it will discuss what the consequences of this approach are for the role of the moral conscience within the political sphere, arguing that Hegelrsquo;s own conditions of free action would not be met unless the subjective moral conscience was operative in the rational state.
    • Heidegger's Historicisation of Aristotlean Being

      Susan Roberts; Unaffiliated (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2013-07-08)
      This article examines Heidegger’s early work concerned with establishing a fundamental ontology. Specifically, it examines Heidegger’s interpretation and presentation of Aristotle’s own ontological thought. Given Heidegger’s predetermined assessment of being as historically determined, it is sought to show how that predetermined view influences Heidegger’s presentation of Aristotle’s metaphysical work. The wider implications of Heidegger’s assertion that being human is irretrievably historical are also considered.
    • Heraclitean Critique of Kantian and Enlightenment Ethics Through the Fijian ethos

      Erman Kaplama; University of the South Pacific (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2016-05-23)
      Kant makes a much-unexpected confession in a much-unexpected place. In the Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology of the first Critique Kant accepts the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject. The major Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei makes it impossible to conduct philosophical inquiry by assuming a self-conscious subject or “I,” which would potentially be in constant motion like other thoughts. For it rules out the possibility of completely detached reasoning which necessitates an unchanging state of mind. In this paper, Kaplama uses panta rhei to critically examine the philosophical shortcomings and contradictions of Kantian and Enlightenment ethics. In his examination, he specifically focuses on the teleological nature of Kant’s principle of freedom and ideal of moral autonomy which have dominated the Enlightenment thought. By doing so, he argues that it is essentially inaccurate to posit Überlegenheit (the state of being superior to nature) as the foundation of philosophical inquiry mainly because this would contradict the Enlightenment’s claim to constitute a rupture from classic and medieval metaphysics and would render Enlightenment a mere extension of Christian metaphysics. As in Christianity, Überlegenheit presupposes two separate realms, the actual (contingent) and ideal (pure) realms of thought and assumes that the transcendence commences from the level of the late metaphysical/teleological construction of the ‘subject’ who is completely persistent, self-conscious and immune to change. He then substantiates these points with reference to the philosophical roots of ethnic prejudice displayed by the post-Enlightenment colonialists and the missionaries in Fiji and the Pacific. This brief critical examination of the post-Enlightenment ethnocentrism will be conducted under the following three points: a) On the Enlightenment’s teleological and universalistic understanding of humanity and the concept of progress versus the Fijian concepts of the continuity of life, regeneration, and reproduction b) On the Enlightenment’s ideal of the free-willing and independent individual subject versus the Fijian ideas of 'the cord', reciprocity, and vanua, and c) On the Enlightenment’s (and Christianity’s) strict dualism between physics and metaphysics, nature and human mind, body and soul versus the Fijian bio-centrism, the sanctity of vanua and the cosmological concept of mana.  
    • Hermeneutics and the Conservatism of Listening

      David Liakos; Houston Community College (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2020-10-14)
      It is well known that philosophical hermeneutics has long been associated in political discussions with a conservative orientation. Many Gadamerians have sought to rebut this suggestion, convincingly emphasizing progressive political dimensions of hermeneutics in general and of Gadamer’s thought in particular. One version of the association of hermeneutics with conservatism has been overlooked, however, namely, Hans Blumenberg’s provocative claim that the predilection in the hermeneutic tradition for metaphors of hearing and listening indicates that hermeneutics passively heeds and takes in tradition as we would unwillingly receive a loud sound, and is thereby politically conservative. This paper critically responds to Blumenberg’s critique of what I call the conservatism of listening, and aims to interrogate the extent to which Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be characterized by this form of conservatism. Through a consideration of ocular metaphors in Gadamer’s thinking, we will discover in Gadamerian hermeneutics a conception of dynamic, constructive, and embodied engagement with historical traditions that makes room for critique. In this way, Gadamer avoids the charge of adhering to the conservatism of listening.
    • Hidden Variables: Ontology/Epistemology & Contextuality/Non-Classicality

      Fred Alan Wolf; Have Brains / Will Travel (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2018-08-26)
      What does quantum physics tell us about the nature of reality, specifically the parts of reality we do not directly perceive called hidden variables? One may think it could tell us a lot because of our enhanced technological sensing abilities that delve into the realms that quantum physics covers so well. Surprisingly, it seems to surround us in a deeper mystery rather than reveal more of nature's secrets. It seems that we cannot escape from philosophical consideration when dealing with what is hidden in quantum physics. In Part I we will look at how Epistemology and Ontology bear upon Hidden Variables. In Part II we will consider Hidden Variables in the light of Contextuality, and Non-Classicality. Inevitably questions of subjectivity and objectivity arise in dealing with states of observation. How should we think about these states? Perhaps it is a question of the meaning associated with our knowledge of a state-that is, a question of ontology or epistemology. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering hidden variables in quantum physics because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how reality is constructed; if it is constructed or not. It also raises the question of what attributes we are able to observe simultaneously and that brings contextuality into the discussion. If it turns out that reality is constructed contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? If on the other hand reality is constructed non-contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? Many implications can arise when considering these questions from a quantum physical point of view. In this paper I shall discuss how quantum physics provides some answers to these questions by considering quantum physical states and their measurements.
    • Highest Ground

      Rodney Ferguson (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2015-11-29)
      I believe that life, consciousness, and free will are intertwined. Our current scientific efforts at understanding them are undermined by studying these as discrete phenomena. It is my contention that although science, particularly quantum physics and biology, has made some strides in how the brain may work; however, this effort will not yield the desired outcome. Only by raising the consciousness level of all humans will we begin to fully understand human consciousness.
    • Historicising Historical Theory’s History of Cultural Historiography

      Alison Melissa Moore; Western Sydney University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2016-05-23)
      Historical theory, as a mode of theoretical criticism, engages in both descriptive and prescriptive readings of historiographic practices, with a view to interpreting and evaluating their meaning as epistemological moves. But it also, often implicitly, situates these practices within its own historical narrative, replete with its own telos of rupture, revolution, and the loss of innocence. As such, historical theory has elaborated its own history of cultural historiography. But these elaborations too have a history. This paper considers a number of theory-driven accounts of cultural historiography, which situate it within a specific historical narrative about its origins. That narrative consists in vision of radical rupture, distinguishing the ‘new cultural history' both from prevailing modes of historical ontology and epistemology up until the end of the twentieth century, and most importantly, distinguishing it from earlier variants of cultural historiography as it was practiced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This paper describes the narrative of rupture that has imbued theoretical views of cultural historiography and examines the history of their elaboration; Secondly, it proposes that this narrative may itself be inappropriate, and suggests an alternative narrative about why earlier forms of cultural historiography have not commonly been seen as continuous with its current expressions. It argues that several genealogical tentacles connected older forms of cultural historiography to the newer variants, and that these connections cannot be assimilated within the telos of epistemological rupture that is typically invoked to describe the "linguistic turn". Finally, a set of geo-political and institutional contexts are elaborated to explain the sensation of rupture reported by many cultural historians as, alternatively, the product of a series of nationalist hostilities and disciplinary exclusions from the late nineteenth century until after World War Two. Cultural historiography's apparent ‘newness' can better be understood as a late-twentieth-century myth generated by both historical theorists and by cultural historians themselves, which has served to instantiate a new scholarly identity for historians as theory-sophisticates in the ambiance of post-structuralist university humanities cultures of the western world.
    • History of the NeoClassical Interpretation of Quantum and Relativistic Physics

      Shiva Meucci Jr (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2018-08-26)
      The need for revolution in modern physics is a well known and often broached subject, however, the precision and success of current models narrows the possible changes to such a great degree that there appears to be no major change possible. We provide herein, the first step toward a possible solution to this paradox via reinterpretation of the conceptual-theoretical framework while still preserving the modern art and tools in an unaltered form. This redivision of concepts and redistribution of the data can revolutionize expectations of new experimental outcomes. This major change within finely tuned constraints is made possible by the fact that numerous mathematically equivalent theories were direct precursors to, and contemporaneous with, the modern interpretations. In this first of a series of papers, historical investigation of the conceptual lineage of modern theory reveals points of exacting overlap in physical theories which, while now considered cross discipline, originally split from a common source and can be reintegrated as a singular science again. This revival of an older associative hierarchy, combined with modern insights, can open new avenues for investigation. This reintegration cross-disciplinary theories and tools is defined as the "Neoclassical Interpretation."
    • History, Narrative, and Meaning

      Roberto Artigiani; U.S. Naval Academy (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-08-17)
      Recent developments in the natural sciences make a renewed dialogue with the humanities possible. Previously, humanists resisted transferring scientific paradigms into fields like history, fearing materialism and determinism would deprive experience of its meaning and people of their freedom. At the same time, scientists were realizing that deterministic materialism made understanding phenomena like life virtually impossible. Scientists escaped the irony of describing a nature to which they did not belong by also discovering that their knowledge can never be complete and that descriptions of nature at the subatomic level were essentially random. These developments, as Monod said, weakened the “Modern” paradigm sufficiently to make life scientifically possible. To understand how life might actually exist, however, scientists had to move beyond laments about observations losing information and concentrate on how nature creates information. Nature creates information in the process of reducing thermodynamic gradients and stores created information in self-organized systems. Nature thus becomes historical, for it is defined by qualitative changes accumulating over time because of unpredictable contingencies. This paper will explore the possibility that the patterned processes by which nature changes apply in the human realm, where interactions can change people and created information can be stored in self-organized societies. Values, Ethics and Morals (VEMs) are the qualitatively new information stored in social systems. VEMs script the actions structuring societies, demonstrating there is meaning in history and solving the problem of how sequences of events –“chronicles”–become narratives. Moreover, when societies compete, their system-structuring information is tested in the same way natural selection tests DNA. Thus, the succession of social systems suggests there is a meaning of history. The meaning of history need be no more transcendental or intended than Darwinian evolution. But if organs and traits can have biological value without implying design, socially constructed attributes like morality, consciousness, and freedom can be valued without supposing history has an ultimate or eternal purpose. Aspiring to show how the cacophony of historical events becomes a cosmos, a “well-ordered” context in which changes become meaningful, this sketch suggests a new understanding of nature may provide a basis for ethics.