• Walking With Death, Walking With Science, Walking With Living: Philosophical Praxis and Happiness

      Frances Gray; University of New England (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2005-12-19)
      This paper explores the consequences of acknowledging that we are the dead walking with the dead. I argue that if we take the view that life frames death, rather than the view that death frames life, then we must refigure our living as ethical creatures. Using Aristotle's notion that we become virtuous by practising virtue, I argue that happiness, thought of in terms of ethical living, should temper our attitude to death as the inevitable end we must all encounter. Acknowledgement of our dying and our death enhances the ethical imperative to live virtuously and to promote human flourishing. I adopt a Buddhist reading of death and dying to interpret the Aristotelian perspective.
    • Walking With Death, Walking With Science, Walking With Living: Philosophical Praxis and Happiness

      Frances Gray; University of New England (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2005-12-19)
      This paper explores the consequences of acknowledging that we are the dead walking with the dead. I argue that if we take the view that life frames death, rather than the view that death frames life, then we must refigure our living as ethical creatures. Using Aristotle's notion that we become virtuous by practising virtue, I argue that happiness, thought of in terms of ethical living, should temper our attitude to death as the inevitable end we must all encounter. Acknowledgement of our dying and our death enhances the ethical imperative to live virtuously and to promote human flourishing. I adopt a Buddhist reading of death and dying to interpret the Aristotelian perspective.
    • Was Samuel Butler Mainly Right About Evolution?

      Murray Code; University of Guelph (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2013-07-08)
      Samuel Butler, a contemporary critic of Charles Darwin, proffered an alternative, vitalistic account of evolution. At the same time, he put into question all modern naturalistic treatments of this fundamental idea which presuppose that evolution is mainly a scientific problem. On the contrary, Butler in effect insists, this extremely vague idea calls for not an `explanation' but rather a fairly comprehensive, plausible story that helps elucidate an inherently complex idea. Butler can thus be read as outlining an anthropomorphic metaphorics that evokes a living Cosmos wherein it might be possible to do justice to the problem which Darwin left unresolved---the problem of heredity. In this picture of the Cosmos Butler links the fundamental notion of organization not to the allegedly universal and immutable `laws of nature,' as the moderns would have it, but rather to dynamically evolving relationships between only more or less stable habits. The variations in extant habits that emergence elicits are moreover the products of quasi-intelligent responses to new challenges from the environment. For Butler follows Lamarck in holding that all organisms possess powers capable of responding to felt needs and/or desires to make alterations in the habits (or instincts) that characterize their modes of existence. He thus in the end effectively bequeaths to his readers a challenge to extend and amplify, if possible, his outline of a promising metaphysical imaginary that can take into account some highly unorthodox conjectures.
    • Wave Function Collapse in Retinal Structure Under Aided/Unaided Conditions

      BIAL Foundation, grant # 255.; Karla M. Galdamez (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2017-03-26)
      Photon-rhodopsin interaction is investigated within the context of information transfer at a distance.  John von Neumann's idea of wave function collapse (WFC) forms the framework for the process of information transfer via a single light quanta along with human intention between pairs.  Mathematical formalism relating to the density matrix is studied to distinguish the collapse phenomena from  absorption and decoherence thus isolating more clearly the possible dynamics of a photon wave function via intention.  Our main hypothesis consists on the assumption that the interaction of distant intention and photon-rhodopsin pair will result in a swift from a simple and straight forward absorption process to that of a single entry in the density matrix representation thus leading to case of wave function collapse (WFC).
    • What is a Philosophical Institution? Or: Address, Transmission, Inscription

      Alain Badiou; Ecole Normale Superieure and at the College international de philosophie in Paris (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2006-10-27)
      This translation is taken from Alain Badiou, emConditions/em, Paris: Eacute;ditions du Seuil, 1992, pp.83-90. Except for some final improvements, this is the text was first presented, in 1989, as a colloquium intervention at the Collegrave international de philosophie.
    • What is Life? Among Other Things, It's a Synergistic Effect!

      Peter Corning; Institute for the Study of Complex Systems (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2009-03-14)
      There have been many different ways of characterizing and describing the phenomenon of life over the years. One aspect that has not often been stressed is lifersquo;s emergent propertiesmdash;the synergies that are produced when many elements or parts combine to produce distinctive new ldquo;wholesrdquo;. Indeed, complex living systems represent a multi-leveled, multi-faceted hierarchy of synergistic effects that has evolved over several billion years. Some of the many examples of synergy at various levels of life are briefly described, and it is emphasized that life is still creating itself and still exploring its potentialities.
    • What makes “a mental illness?” What makes “a new mental illness”?: The cases of solastalgia and hubris syndrome.

      Seamus P MacSuibhne; St VIncent's University Hospital/University College Dublin (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2009-11-25)
      What is a “mental illness”? What is an “illness”? What does the description and classification of “mental illnesses” actually involve, and is the description of “new” mental illnesses description of actually existing entities, or the creation of them?  “Solastalgia” is a neologism, invented by the Australian environmental philosopher Glenn Albrecht, to give greater meaning and clarity to psychological distress caused by environmental change (Albrecht et al 2007) The concept received some coverage in the international mass media in late 2007 (Thompson, 2007) Much of this described solastalgia as “a new concept in mental illness”, a description endorsed by Albrecht himself. The doctor and former British Foreign Secretary, Lord Owen, has coined the phrase “hubris syndrome” to describe the mindset of prime ministers and presidents whose behaviour is characterised by reckless, hubristic belief in their own rightness. This paper uses both the concept of solastalgia and the related concepts Albrecht posited of psychoterratic and somaterratic illnesses and hubris syndrome as a starting point to explore issues around the meaning of mental illness, and what it means to describe and classify mental illness. These issues illustrated tensions between natural and social philosophy, with the nature and status of psychiatry as a scientific, “value-free” enterprise or a humanistic, “value-laden” one discussed. Should “the distress caused by environmental change” be deemed a mental illness? Could it thereby included in catalogues of mental illnesses such as DSM-IV and ICD-10? The process whereby the psychiatric establishment defines and categorises mental illness is described, and as well as examining whether solastalgia and hubris syndrome meets these criteria, those criteria  are compared to more critical views of psychiatry and the nature of mental illness. The approaches of Szasz, Boorse, Fulford, Canguilhem and other thinkers to issues related to mental illness are discussed. Finally it is suggested that the language of mental illness is increasingly used for rhetorical purposes, and that caution should be exercised in extending the label of illness to the phenomena of solastalgia and hubris syndrome.
    • What Matters Now? Review of Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things

      Alan Van Wyk (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2012-12-14)
      Review of Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things
    • What ought we to do? Tragic answers from Heidegger and Castoriadis

      Andrew Cooper; University of Sydney (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2012-12-14)
      Martin Heidegger and Cornelius Castoriadis both understood Greek tragedy in relation to a political rupture in the Athenian world, a rupture containing insights into the ontological grounding of human beings. This paper critically explores the role of 'the Greeks' in Heidegger and Castoriadis' political thought, drawing implications for the availability of the Greeks for any philosophical thinking. After his infamous Rectoral Address in 1933 Heidegger turned explicitly to Greek tragedy in his lectures at Freiburg (Introduction to Metaphysics and Hölderlin’s Hymn) to search for resources that might prove fundamental to instigating a new political era. However, he constructed a transcultural notion of 'the Greeks' at the expesnse of seeing tragedy as the development of a public institution that facilitated the criticism of the shared values and ideas of a particular historical epoch. Castoriadis, on the other hand, saw tragedy not simply as an awareness of the groundlessness of human society, but as the ceaseless questioning of what society is for. For Castoriadis, the Greeks are present to us in the same political rupture we experience today. In this paper I will argue that Castoriadis is more successful than Heidegger in developing an account of human creativity that holds open the problematic relation between the created world and human beings, though not without significant problems. I will conclude by suggesting that Euripides, a tragedian overlooked by Castoriadis, can supply some critical recouses for addressing them.
    • 'What ought we to think?' Castoriadis’ Response to the Question for Thinking

      Toula Nicolacopoulos; La Trobe University; George Vassilacopoulos; La Trobe University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2012-12-14)
      Castoriadis views the project of autonomy as central to both political action and philosophical thinking. Although he acknowledges that the political project has retreated, he insists on its thinkability as a viable project. We argue that this insistence gives rise to an unresolved tension. Specifically, Castoriadis’ substantive response to the question ‘what ought we to think?’, which he gives in terms of the pursuit of the philosophical project of autonomy, ultimately fails to recognise the unavoidable effect of the political project’s retreat on the thinker and this failure raises doubts as to whether Castoriadis’ own thinking has the potential to move beyond a merely journalistic style of critique, which he finds objectionable.
    • Where Times Meet

      Theodore R. Schatzki; University of Kentucky (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2005-12-19)
      This essay pursues two goals: (1) to argue that two fundamental types of time—the time of objective reality and “the time of the soul”—meet in human activity and history and (2) to defend the legitimacy of calling a particular version of the second type a kind of time. The essay begins by criticizing Paul Ricoeur’s version of the claim that times of these two sorts meet in history. It then presents an account of human activity based on Heidegger’s Being and Time, according to which certain times of the two types—existential temporality and succession—meet in human activity. The legitimacy of calling existential temporality a kind of time is then defended via an expanded analysis of activity that examines where the two times meet there. The concluding section briefly considers a conception of historical time due to David Carr before showing why history is a broader domain encompassing human activity where the two times meet.
    • Wherefore Art Thou Philosophy? Badiou without Badiou

      Jason Barker (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2012-05-03)
      This data was previously provided. Nothing has changed
    • Whitehead's Cosmology - Process Relational Perspective to Relativity and Quantum Theory

      Deepak Bansal (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2018-01-13)
      Whitehead believed that science and philosophy mutually criticize each other to provide imaginative material for their shaping the history of thought. In the early twentieth century, as a mathematician turned philosopher, he took up the task of challenging the emerging scientific theories of the time, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, and provided a radically novel cosmological scheme. He challenged the incoherence of the mechanistic materialistic scientific world with his visionary process-relational model, based on the ontology of organisms. Almost a century later, his challenges to science are as, or even more, valid. This paper explores Whitehead's struggle with relativity, reflects on his response to quantum mechanics, and reviews his tribute to God, based on his philosophical model, as an attempt to understand divergent perspectives on the nature of universe.
    • Why Even Mind? -- On The A Priori Value Of “Life”

      Amien Kacou (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2009-03-14)
      This article presents an analysis of the matter of the “meaning” of life in terms of whether it should even be lived in the first place. It begins with an attempt at defining the question as an inquiry on the a priori value of attention in general, and develops into an axiological reflection distantly inspired from Martin Heidegger’s notion of “care.” The main objective of the article is (1) to “answer” the question (or to proceed as if the question could be answered) objectively by “playing along” with its naïve logic—that is, by finding a basis for comparing the good that can be found a priori in life (mainly, pleasure) with the good that can be found a priori in death (mainly, the absence of pain)—and, then, (2) to suggest why we have no good reason to feel dissatisfied with where this leaves us (i.e., possibly facing a certain specter of ethical foundationalism: the question of the “value of value”). Its basic conclusion is, assuming we are committed to assigning value to life in general, that we should be able to say that life is good irrespective of any explanation for its existence.
    • Why Is There Life?

      James Clay Thornton; Martin Health System, Stuart, Florida (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2017-11-11)
      ABSTRACT: Ongoing theoretical explorations of and experimental research on the origins of life focus predominately on the details of how life evolved. But there remains an intriguing second-order question one step removed from these focused investigations.  That is: Why is there life? Exploring the forces, mechanisms, and physical laws (and their interactions) that define the creation of animate out of inanimate matter is both theoretically interesting and useful to understanding the biological and philosophical nature of life. Defining the key factors (“effectors”) behind the creation of life opens a fertile field of possibilities that is as yet incompletely explored.This paper’s discussion of these effectors helps to advance our understanding of what life is by elucidating the motive force behind the creation and evolution of life throughout the universe and by giving insight into life’s apparent teleonomy and other unique characteristics.  The results of these effectors, working in conjunction with the electromagnetic force, are summarized. Similarities in the evolution of animate and inanimate complex matter are explored to explain why life evolves in the universe. Characteristics considered unique to life (creation, metabolism, growth, reproduction, evolution, self and the logic of the metabolic machinery, together “teleonomy”) are explained employing an expanded definition of complexity applicable to both sides of the animate-inanimate divide.
    • Why the World is One

      Andrew Haas (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2020-05-06)
      The understanding of the unity of the world-in the human and natural sciences, and the arts-has remained steadfast from ancient metaphysics to contemporary phenomenology: the world is one accidentally and necessarily, as true and false, potentially and actually, and categorically. But these four ways of being one can be traced back to how unity is or comes to be present and/or absent in anything whatsoever. If presence and absence, however, have their common root in implication, then this is how the world is (and why it must be) one-for unity is implied in everything that is.
    • Why Tononi is Wrong; Epileptic Seizure is More Complex Either than Sleep or the Resting State

      Sean O Nuallain; stanford; Tom Doris (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2014-06-08)
      ECOG data obtained from a patient under conditions of resting brain, sleep and epileptic seizure were analyzed. Contrary to some theorists, the seizure state was found to be informationally the most complex of the three states.
    • Why We Fight: Hegel’s ‘Struggle to the Death’ Revisited

      Jim Vernon; York University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2013-12-29)
      My goal in this paper is to counter an increasingly common interpretation of the most famous moment in Hegel's thought - the struggle for recognition. Specifically, through a close reading of the movement from self-conscious desire to the moment of struggle, I seek to refute three key claims: a) that self-consciousness finds itself, qua determining center, challenged by another desire, b) that self-consciousness responds to this challenge by seeking to somehow subjugate the other as determining desire, and c) that self-consciousness risks its own life primarily as a consequence of seeking the death of the other.  I close with some (somewhat speculative) comments on the import of this reversal for understanding the role of recognition in Hegel's thought.
    • Would Hegel Be A ‘Hegelian’ Today?

      H. S. Harris; York University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      In this paper H. S. Harris argues that it is misguided to suggest that Hegelrsquo;s philosophical project was a dialectical illusion generated by his historical situation and that he would never have believed that his vision was achievable if he had been faced with the world that we face today. Not only does Harris proclaim himself to be a Hegelian, he claims that Hegel would today also remain a Hegelian. He goes on to argue that despite the fragmentation of the twentieth century and the apparent collapse of the vision articulated in the French Revolution, Hegelrsquo;s thinking continues to be relevant because although his philosophy is the lsquo;comprehension of onersquo;s timersquo;, Hegel also produces a philosophy that is out of time and somehow final.br /
    • Would Hegel Be A ‘Hegelian’ Today?

      H. S. Harris; York University (Cosmos Publishing Cooperative, 2007-12-28)
      In this paper H. S. Harris argues that it is misguided to suggest that Hegelrsquo;s philosophical project was a dialectical illusion generated by his historical situation and that he would never have believed that his vision was achievable if he had been faced with the world that we face today. Not only does Harris proclaim himself to be a Hegelian, he claims that Hegel would today also remain a Hegelian. He goes on to argue that despite the fragmentation of the twentieth century and the apparent collapse of the vision articulated in the French Revolution, Hegelrsquo;s thinking continues to be relevant because although his philosophy is the lsquo;comprehension of onersquo;s timersquo;, Hegel also produces a philosophy that is out of time and somehow final.br /