How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
Author(s)
Fernando Rudy HillerKeywords
controlfair opportunity
reasons-responsiveness
responsibility
moral luck
Nagel
Logic
BC1-199
Philosophy (General)
B1-5802
Full record
Show full item recordAbstract
Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.Type
ArticleIdentifier
oai:doaj.org/article:c5bbeef1a1df40c88f19b987662b7f052317-630X
10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.FRH
https://doaj.org/article/c5bbeef1a1df40c88f19b987662b7f05