Keywords
POST-CONFLICTVIOLENCE RESEARCH
ILLICIT PAYMENTS
ECONOMIC POLICIES
EPIDEMICS
LAW ENFORCEMENT
WAR ECONOMIES
PETROLEUM SUPPLY
CIVIL WAR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
DEFENSE
ETHNIC MAJORITY
CONFLICT AREAS
NONCOMBATANTS
SOCIAL CAPITAL
CONFLICT AREAS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
TRANSPARENCY
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
NATURAL RESOURCES
REVENUE SOURCES
CIVIL WARS
MILITARY SPENDING
POOR GOVERNANCE
REBEL MOVEMENTS
DIASPORA
ECONOMIC BENEFIT
TRANSACTION COSTS
INTERNATIONAL AID
ECONOMIC GROWTH
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW ENFORCEMENT
POVERTY INCIDENCE
INCOME
REBELLION
EXTERNAL SHOCKS
CONFLICT PREVENTION
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
EXTORTION
CONFLICT RISK
HUMAN RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
RISK MANAGEMENT
VIOLENT CRIME
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
DEFENSE SPENDING
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
MONEY LAUNDERING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
RISK ASSESSMENT
ECONOMICS
REBEL LEADERS
FINANCIAL SECTOR
ENDANGERED SPECIES
MONEY SOURCES
REBEL GROUPS
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
COMMODITIES
VIOLENT CONFLICT
NATURAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
RISK REDUCTION
COLD WAR
CORRUPTION
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
CONFLICTS
LIVING CONDITIONS
PRODUCERS
MILITARY OPERATIONS
ETHNIC GROUP
OIL
LOW-INCOME ECONOMIES
RISKS OF CONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
BOUNDARIES
IMPORTS
COSTS OF CONFLICT
MORTALITY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
RISK OF REBELLION
ARMED FORCES
ADVERSE EFFECTS
HIGH RISK
ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTICORRUPTION
MINING INDUSTRY
REBELLIONS
REBEL GROUP
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
TIMBER
REBEL RECRUITMENT
FOREIGN INVESTORS
EXPLOITATION
INSURANCE
PEACE
REBEL ORGANIZATION
ARMY
INCOME PER CAPITA
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
COMMODITY TRADE
DEMOCRACY
NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLOITATION
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
SOCIAL POLICIES
RISK OF CONFLICT
CRIME
PER CAPITA INCOME
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
CONFLICT COUNTRIES
ARMS RACE
ILLICIT TRAFFIC
FIREARMS
TERRORISM
SANCTIONS
ORGANIZED CRIME
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15047Abstract
Recent research undertaken by the Bank and others, suggest that developing countries face substantially higher risks of violent conflict, and poor governance if highly dependent on primary commodities. Revenues from the legal, or illegal exploitation of natural resources have financed devastating conflicts in large numbers of countries across regions. When a conflict erupts, it not only sweeps away decades of painstaking development efforts, but creates costs and consequences-economic, social, political, regional-that live on for decades. The outbreak of violent domestic conflict amounts to a spectacular failure of development-in essence, development in reverse. Even where countries initially manage to avoid violent conflict, large rents from natural resources can weaken state structures, and make governments less accountable, often leading to the emergence of secessionist rebellions, and all-out civil war. Although natural resources are never the sole source of conflict, and do not make conflict inevitable, the presence of abundant primary commodities, especially in low-income countries, exacerbates the risks of conflict and, if conflict does break out, tends to prolong it and makes it harder to resolve. As the Governance of Natural Resources Project (a research project) took shape, the discussion moved toward practical approaches and policies that could be adopted by the international community. This book presents the papers commissioned under the Governance of Natural Resources Project, offering a rich array of approaches and suggestions that are feeding into the international policy debate, and hopefully lead, over time to concerted international action, to help developing countries better manage their resource wealth, and turn this wealth into a driver of development rather than of conflict.Date
2013-08-14Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/15047http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15047
0-8213-5503-1
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/Related items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
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Riots, Coups and Civil War : Revisiting the Greed and Grievance DebateElbadawi, Ibrahim A.; Bodea, Cristina (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-06-08)The most influential recent work on the
 determinants of civil wars found the factors associated with
 the grievance motivation to be largely irrelevant. Our
 paper subjects the results of this empirical work to further
 scrutiny by embedding the study of civil war in a more
 general analysis of varieties of violent contestation of
 political power within the borders of the state. Such an
 approach, we argue, will have important implications for how
 we think theoretically about the occurrence of domestic war
 as well as how we specify our empirical tests. In the
 empirical model, the manifestation of domestic conflict
 range from low intensity violence and coups to civil war.
 Our multinomial specification of domestic conflict supports
 the hypothesis that diversity accentuates distributional
 conflict and thus increases the risk of civil war. We also
 find that democracies may be more efficient than autocracies
 in reducing the risk of civil war.
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Oil and Civil Conflict : Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?Singh, Raju Jan; Higashijima, Masaaki; Bodea, Cristina (World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2014-12-03)This paper explores the conditions under
 which public spending could minimize violent conflict
 related to oil wealth. Previous work suggests that oil can
 lead to violent conflict because it increases the value of
 the state as a prize or because it undermines the
 state's bureaucratic penetration. Yet, little has been
 said on how oil wealth could be used to prevent the onset of
 violent conflict through public spending by buying off
 citizens and elites, increasing state legitimacy by
 providing basic services, or strengthening the military and
 security apparatus. The empirical analysis (148 countries
 over 1960-2009) shows that higher levels of military
 spending are associated with lower risk of small- and
 large-scale conflict onset in countries rich in oil and gas.
 By contrast, in economies with little natural resources,
 increases in military spending are associated with a higher
 risk of conflict. Welfare expenditure is associated with
 lower risk of small-scale conflict, irrespective of the
 level of oil revenue. However, general government spending
 does not appear to have any robust mitigating effects.
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Oil and Civil Conflict : Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?Singh, Raju Jan; Higashijima, Masaaki; Bodea, Cristina (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-09-12)In this paper, the conditions under
 which the spending patterns of oil resources may mitigate
 the risk of violent domestic conflict are studied. Some
 recent research suggests that more government spending
 either in general or specifically in welfare and military
 may reduce the risk of civil conflict onset (Hegre and
 Sambanis, 2006; Basedau and Lay, 2009; Fjelde and de Soysa,
 2009; Taydas and Peksen, 2012). While oil wealth has begun
 to be considered in the study of civil conflict as an
 important source of revenue for governments, there has not
 been a systematic analysis of whether oil-rich countries can
 increase public spending or alter the particular allocation
 of such spending to social sectors or the military as a way
 to mitigate the risk of conflict. We use time-series cross
 section data (148 countries, 1960-2009) to test the
 hypothesis that oil has a conditional effect on civil
 conflict depending on the size of government expenditure and
 the allocation of government spending. Our dependent
 variable is the onset of small and large civil conflict
 (Gleditch et al., 2002). The empirical estimations show that
 small and large conflicts alike are less likely when large
 parts of oil resources are dedicated to military spending.
 Increased spending in education, health or social security
 is associated with lower risk of small-scale conflict,
 irrespective of the level of oil revenue. On the other hand,
 higher levels of general government expenditure do not
 appear to have any robust mitigating effects. The paper
 proceeds as follows: Section II reviews work on natural
 resources and conflict; Section III discusses the literature
 on public spending and conflict; Section IV presents our
 approach, derives testable hypotheses, and presents the
 data; Section V describes the results; and Section VI concludes.