• Mística, Moral Social e a Ética da Resistência

      Brüseke, Franz Josef (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      Na longa história do pensamento místico registramos a insistência dos seus protagonistas na valorização de algo que transcende o mundo fatual, algo que pesa mais do que os bens materiais. O que interessa o místico é o ser e não o ter. Será que é possível fundamentar uma ética, na base deste propósito? Esta e outras questões referentes à questão moral e sua relação com a ética da resistência vão nos ocupar neste texto.
    • "A segunda parte da moral:" a antropologia moral de kant e sua relação com a metafísica dos costumes

      B. Louden, Robert (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      "A segunda parte da moral:" a antropologia moral de kant e sua relação com a metafísica dos costumes
    • Perspectives in moral philosophy

      Dall´Agnol, Darlei; Gollnick Ferreira, Sofia Helena (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      An Interview with ROBERT LOUDEN
    • Quasi-Realismk in moral philosophy - An interview with Simon Blackburn

      Dall´Agnol, Darlei (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
    • Kant e Habermas: a reformulação discursiva da moral kantiana

      Rohden, Valério (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
    • Contemplation and politics in the life of the aristotelian philosopher

      Verhaegh, Marcus (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      Contemplation and politics in the life of the aristotelian philosopher
    • Nietzsche e o problema da transcendência imanente

      Tugendhat, Ernst (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      Nietzsche e o problema da transcendência imanente
    • As críticas ao utilitarismo por rawls

      Esteves, Júlio (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      As críticas ao utilitarismo por rawls
    • Are we responsible for our characters?

      Levy, Neil (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that we are each, typically, responsible for our characters; for what we are, as well as what we do. This paper demonstrates that this is true only of the basically virtuous person; the basically vicious are not responsible for their characters. I establish this claim through a detailed examination of the conditions upon the attribution of moral responsibility. Most accounts of moral responsibility claim that it is only appropriately attributed to an agent if she exercises control over the action, omission or consequence for which she is held responsible; it is therefore natural to think that we are responsible for our characters only if we exercise a sufficient degree of the right kind of control over their contents. Accordingly, I devote the first half of the paper to establishing that only the basically virtuous person exercises the requisite control. It is a condition upon responsibility for bringing about a consequenc! e that we are capable of understanding the value of that consequence obtaining or failing to obtain; I show that the vicious are unable to understand this value. I then turn to an examination of various non-control conceptions of responsibility for character; I show that all fail. Responsibility for character requires control, but only those who are already basically virtuous exercise the requisite degree of control.
    • Razões para o utilitarismo: uma avaliação comparativa de pontos de vista éticos

      F. Costa, Cláudio (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      O trabalho apresenta os três principais pontos de vista éticos que são predominantes, hoje, nas discussões da filosofia moral, a saber, a ética de virtudes, a deontologia e o conseqüencialismo. Ele revela os principais traços de cada teoria apontando os seus pontos positivos e negativos. Posteriormente, ele argumenta em favor de um enfoque conseqüencialista, isto é, por uma forma particular de utilitarismo.
    • O que você precisa saber sobre Ética

      Consenso Tonetto, Milene (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
    • Editorial

      Dall´Agnol, Darlei (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
    • Editorial

      Dall´Agnol, Darlei (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
    • Is Kantian ethics left defenseless in the face of evil?

      Stapleton, Matthew (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      Within this essay the question of whether Kantian ethics is left defenseless in the face of evil is unfolded. Some thinkers claim that it is not advisable to rigorously adhere to the categorical imperative. That is to say, it is prudent only to follow the categorical imperative, acting in such a way that you may will that the maxim of your actions becomes a universal law, when one is dealing with other ethical beings. However, when dealing with evil, it is claimed that we should develop other special principles that allow for consequences favorable to the ethical party. This essay takes exception with this claim, demonstrating that for Kant such a problem would not have even appeared. Furthermore, this essay argues that to deviate from the moral principle does damage to the truth and humanity as a whole.
    • Les enjeux de la théorie de l'argumentation comme base de l'éthique discursive

      Volpato Dutra, Delamar (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
    • P.F. Strawson y D. Hume - Una comparación a propósito de "Moralidad Social e Ideal Individual"

      Rosales Rodríguez, Amán (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      Peter F. Strawson ofreció en su “Moralidad social e ideal individual” (1961) un sugerente conjunto de reflexiones en torno a la tensión entre ideales éticos del individuo y exigencias morales de la sociedad. Dichas reflexiones se reexaminan en este trabajo con el apoyo de la segunda Investigación (1751) de David Hume. Se arguye que esta obra ofrece una clave para entender varios de los problemas planteados por Strawson. De hecho, el propio Strawson adoptó años más tarde una interesante estrategia naturalista moderada de raigambre humeana.
    • Kant on synpathy and moral motives

      de Lourdes Borges, Maria (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2002-01-01)
      The aim of this paper is to examine the role of sympathy in Kant’s moral theory, in order to determine whether there is any essential change from the Groundwork to works of the 1790’s (Doctrine of Virtue and the Anthropology).1 The point of departure is the distinction between motive (the objective ground) and incentive (the subjective ground) of an action. I attempt to identify what constitutes a moral motive and a moral incentive in the philanthropist example of the Groundwork, and argue that the only moral incentive is the respect for moral law. The mere presence of sympathy, however, will not make an action morally unworthy, as long as this feeling is not what drives the agent to perform benevolent actions. The second part of the paper provides an account of sympathy in the Doctrine of Virtue. In the later works, Kant accepts that sympathy can be the incentive for moral action that is performed with the motive of duty, as long as it is useful to the accomplishment of the duty of humanity. I show that the duty of humanity plays the role of an intermediate principle that enables us to decide the right action in a particular case. Moreover, it works as a procedure to encourage good sympathetic feelings, which promote others’ happiness, and to discourage feelings that lead to nothing but a shared state of pain. The third part of this essay asks whether Kant’s moral account of sympathy is a coherent one, or whether there is an important turning point in the texts of the late 1790’s.
    • Hare e o Problema da Ladeira Escorregadia

      Feldhaus, Charles (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2003-01-01)
      This paper deals with Richard Hare's Kantian Utilitarianism aplied to bioethics and discusses his attempt to solve the problem of the slippery-slope. The distinction between two levels of moral thinking, the intuitive and the critical, is appointed by the philosopher as a possible solution. The question, then, is the following: can Hare really avoid the slippery-slope problem? The answer seems to be "no".
    • The Tragedy of Platonic Ethics and the Fall of Socrates

      C. Hamblet, Wendy (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2003-01-01)
    • Philosophy of Science and Ethics

      Dall´Agnol, Darlei (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2003-01-01)