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Taking the moral hazard out of banking: the next fundamental step in financial reform

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Author(s)
Rainer Masera
Keywords
financial crisis
SIFIs
sovereign risk
moral hazard
resolution procedure
Economic theory. Demography
HB1-3840
Social Sciences
H
DOAJ:Economics
DOAJ:Business and Economics
Political science
J
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/1511959
Online Access
https://doaj.org/article/1e5ca25c656541eea956f19dd331092d
Abstract
The path between financial meltdown and moral hazard in banking is, at best, narrow and impervious. During the financial crisis, public support became the standard response to save the banks in difficulty, heightening and broadening the moral hazard issue: subordinated/senior debt holders and large depositors were bailed out and equity holders were partially sheltered. In the Eurozone, the implicit promise to bail-out governments in difficulty has encouraged SIFIs and other financial operators to speculate on the yield differential between sovereigns and the ECB money market interest rates. The policy framework proposed here is two-pronged: the EFSF should evolve to permit more flexible and wide-ranging interventions, and be able to manage sovereign debt restructuring; with respect to SIFIs, very early corporate, market and supervisory responses are suggested. Intervention of supervisory authorities with mandatory (special) powers would occur before the threshold of non-viability and, on a gone-concern basis, in terms of a European resolution procedure.
Date
2011-01-01
Type
Article
Identifier
oai:doaj.org/article:1e5ca25c656541eea956f19dd331092d
2037-3635
2037-3643
https://doaj.org/article/1e5ca25c656541eea956f19dd331092d
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