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Optimisation of Healthcare Contracts: Tensions Between Standardisation and Innovation; Comment on “Competition in Healthcare: Good, Bad or Ugly?”

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Author(s)
Misja Mikkers
Padhraig Ryan
Keywords
Healthcare
Competition
Contracts
Innovation
Performance
Medicine
R
Public aspects of medicine
RA1-1270

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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/1523904
Online Access
https://doaj.org/article/0f7a30fda15a44d8a3ccf7895e6d61f7
Abstract
An important determinant of health system performance is contracting. Providers often respond to financial incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft contracts to influence performance. Yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. Arguably, in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual innovation may occur more rapidly than in a single-payer system. This innovation in contract design could enhance performance. However, contractual innovation often fails to improve performance as payer incentives are misaligned with public policy objectives. Numerous countries seek to improve healthcare contracts, but thus far no health system has demonstrably crafted the necessary blend of incentives to stimulate optimal contracting.
Date
2016-02-01
Type
Article
Identifier
oai:doaj.org/article:0f7a30fda15a44d8a3ccf7895e6d61f7
10.15171/ijhpm.2015.189
2322-5939
2322-5939
https://doaj.org/article/0f7a30fda15a44d8a3ccf7895e6d61f7
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