Fisicismo Não-Reducionista: Uma Atitude sem Conteúdo Cognitivo? Sobre o Desafio de Bas van Fraassen
Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
DOAJ:Philosophy and Religion
Full recordShow full item record
AbstractAccording to the dominant view on causation, particular, spatial-temporally locatable events, which can be designated by singular terms and definite descriptions, are the only genuine relata of the causal relation. This supports and is supported by the accepted dicothomy between explanation, conceived of as an intensional relation between facts or truths, and the natural, extensional relation of causation. The paper takes issue with this view and makes a case for the legitimacy of the notion of fact-causation: the relata of many relations expressed by the sentential connector ‘(The fact) C causes (the fact) E’ can be genuine causes and effects (I). The extended view on causation is then applied to the problem of mental causation. Assuming the truth of physical realizationism, the paper explores the connection between causal efficacy and counterfactual relevance of properties. It is shown that, at least in many cases, the right counterfactual links required by causation can be found only at the level of the realized facts, not at the most basic level of realizing facts (II). Finally, given the similarities between the defense of nonreductive physicalism sketched here and the more immodest attempts to vindicate scientifically the claims of metaphysical materialism, justly criticized by Van Fraassen as manifestations of ‘false consciousness’, it is considered whether and how the paper’s main argument can avoid Van Fraassen’s charge (III).