How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been.
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AbstractIn this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contractualists such as Scanlon. But, unlike some contractualists, I reject the view that all that matters is whether a principle can be justified to each particular individual, where such a justification is attentive to her interests, complaints, and other claims. The anonymous goodness of a distribution also matters. My attempt to reconcile contractualist and consequentialist approaches proceeds via a serious of reflections on cases.
Otsuka, Michael (2017) How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been. Politics, Philosophy & Economics. pp. 1-24. ISSN 1470-594X