Eş’arî Kelâmcisi Miklâtî’nin Lübâbü’l-ʿukûl Bağlamında Bazı Kelâmî Görüşleri
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AbstractEbü’l-Haccâc Yûsuf b. Muhammed Miklâtî, 550-626 (1155-1229) yılları arasında yaşayan Eş’arî âlimidir. Felsefî görüşleri eleştirerek Ehl-i Sünnetin görüşlerini savunmak için Lübâbü’l-ʿukûl fî red ale’l-felâsife fî ilmi’l-usûl adıyla bir eser telif etmiştir. Miklâtî, Muvahhidî devletinde yaşamış önemli şahsiyetlerden biridir. Kuzey Afrika ve Endülüs bölgesinde Eş’arî kelâm sisteminin öğrenilmesinde katkıda bulunan bir müderristir. Ancak günümüzde onun hakkında herhangi bir çalışma yapılmamıştır. Bundan dolayı bu makalede felsefî görüşleri eleştirileri bağlamında Miklâtî’nin bazı kelâmî görüşlerini inceledik.
Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yusuf b. Muhammad al-Miklâtî is an Ash’arî scholar who lived between the years 550-626 (1155-1229). He has a work entitled Lubāb al-ʿuqūl fī radd ʿalā al-falāsifa fī ʿilm al-uṣūl to defend the opinions of Ahl al-Sunnah by criticizing philosophical views. Miklātī is one of the most important figures who lived in the Muvahhidī state. He is a professor who contributed to learning of Ash’arī kalām system in the North Africa and Andalusia. But today it has not been demonstrated. Therefore, in this article we looked at some theological views of Miklātī in the context of his criticism of the philosophical views.Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yûsuf b. Muhammad al-Miklātī is an Ash’arī scholar who lived in North Africa and Andalusia between the years 520-626 (1155-1229). He is one of the tutors working at madrasahs of the Muvahhidī state established by Ibn Tumart. Becoming meeting point of Salafī and philosophical understanding is one of the main factors which makes important the period and the region where he lived. Muvahhidīs on the one hand called for the returning to the Book and the Sunnah, and ordered to burn the works of Malikī fuqahā related to the branches (furūʿ) with the reason that they became distant from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. On the other hand, the last great represantatives of Islamic Philosophy, Ibn Tufayl and Averroes wrote their most precious works at Muvahhidî palace.Only extant work of al-Miklâtî is Lubâb al-‘uqûl fî radd ‘alâ al-falâsifa fî ‘ilm al-uṣûl. In Lubâb al-‘uqûl, al-Miklâtî by giving a place to the philosophical opinions about theology, prophethood and the hereafter criticizes the viewpoints of Aristotle, from Periphatetic philosophers al-Fârâbî and Avicenna, from Mu’tazilah Abu Hudhayl al-‘Allaf and Qa’bî. He has benefited from the works of Ash’arî theologians like Baqillanî, al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazzâlî when he make criticism. Especially in the theology section, when he considers some subjects he has followed the method which al-Ghazzalî used in his Tahâfut which was written to criticize the philosophers. However, with the impact of the fuqahâ, who has Salafî understanding, and that of the Islamic philosopher Averroes, the ruler of the region ordered to burn the works of al-Ghazzâlî and notify that whoever has these works will be killed and whose wealth will be seized. In this regard al-Miklâtî’s work has an important contribution to the settlement of Ash’arî theology against Salafî and philosophical opposition.The main reason of the opposition of Salafî understanding towards the science of Kalâm is the claim that Kalâm has been established through outward impacts at a philosophical basement. The main reason of opposition of Averroes towards Kalâm is that Kalâm follows argumentative (jadalî) methods not instead of demonstrative ones (burhânî). This work of al-Miklâtî provides benefits to the establishment of Kalâm with the hands of Muslims and on the Qur’anic base and also has contributed to the development of a demonstrative tradition against philosophical opposition. Because according to him, the purpose of a theologian is to declare the demonstrative proofs which help for the soundness of the religious creed. Principles of the science of Kalâm are introduction, by which a theologian establishes his demonstrative proofs. A declaration-based defence of Islamic creed made by theologians like al-Miklâtî has constituted the basis of Philosophical Theology (Kalâm). According to al-Miklâtî, the science of Kalâm is ʿuṣûl al-dîn, i.e. the principles of religion, and it is not trivial (juz’î) but it is complete (kullî) science. What is the logic comparing to the philosophy, it is ʿuṣûl al-dîn comparing to the sharʿî sciences. Methodists (ʿuṣûlî scholars) examine the shar’î proofs and the prototype of proofs. The difference between philosopher and a theologian becomes clear in their approach to the relation between reason and narration. According to al-Miklâtî, reason and narration have a different area from each other. Theologians through ʿaql/reason examine the most general subject of things like “wujûd/existence.” Theologians, at first, prove divinity and prophethood, and then they affirm narrations about something like realities of the hereafter which cannot be known by reason, but through the prophet whom God teaches. However, philosophy reinterprets most of the narrations of the prophet. Despite that, one of the principles of the science of ʿuṣûl accepted by Miklâtî, when he criticizes philosophy, is that “it is necessary to confirm the outer meaning of naṣṣ (a religious statement) unless it has no contradiction with reason.” Most of the contradictions between Kalâm and philosophy come from this principle. This is clearer especially on issues like comprehensiveness of eternal knowledge, natures of genie (jinn) and angels, and modality of resurrection.Miklâtî tries to determine and explain the demonstrative proofs of Islamic creed in his work which consists of one introduction and seventeen sections. About the formation of universe, Except God, every existent thing is possible compared to itself,Every existent thing which is possible compared to itself, is originated,In that case, every existent thing except God is originated.Miklâtî claims that the first premise is a demonstrative proof which constitutes from the first type of analogy. According to Miklâtî the reasonable and precise proof that God knows all existent things is that “all things except God have originated with the will and power of God. All things which are originated with the will and power of God are known, so all things are known.” On the subjects, which are related to divine attributes, the point of disagreement between the philosophers and theologians, is the place of thubûtî attributes. According to philosophers, attributions of knowledge, will, and power have the same reliance. According to Miklâtî, the reliance of the attributions knowledge, will and power are different from each other. The reliance of the attribution of knowledge is to encompass and investigate all knowledge related to the obligatory, possible and impossible; the reliance of the attribution of power is to create the non-existent whose existence is possible; the reliance of the attribution of will is to restrict the created things with time and place. Because of this, existent things belong to God’s knowledge as well as they belong to God’s wish. However, according to most of the theologians, when the existent things belong to God’s knowledge, God’s knowledge belongs to the known things. Philosophers have different ideas about the resurrection because of the principles and regulations and denied the bodily resurrection. According to Kalâm principles and rules, the one who is capable of doing something, is also capable of doing its similar. The one who is capable of creating people from substance and accidents, is capable of resurrect creatures. According to Miklâtî there is no need to discuss about this subject since this proof is reasonable and demonstrative one. According to theologians, God will resurrect the people with their original essence which they have from born, on the Day of Judgment.Miklâtî did not abstain from giving different opinions. Especially about the question of whether human beings have one or two time of death, he provides his opinion which assembles the opinions of theologians from Ahl al-Sunnah and Muʿtazilah. Miklâtî, who supports the idea that the death person is died in his time of death, says that we cannot give a precise answer as he would live or he would die to the question “if the killer didn’t kill the murdered, what would happen?” For there are two judgments in Lawh al-Mahfuz: certain (mutlaq) and restricted (muqayyat). While there is a certain judgement concerning the livelihood and the time of death, there is a conditional and restricted rule as “if he does so, may his lifetime become that much.” Extension of life through visiting relatives (sila al-rahim) can be understood as a restricted judgement.