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AbstractThis thesis analyzes the idea of ‘zhi’—&#12300;&#30693;&#12301;, knowledge, knowing, wisdom—in the text of the Zhuangzi, compiled around the 3rd to 2nd century B.C.E. In particular, it argues that the idea of knowledge is not conceptually independent of practice and ideal personality. This feature is shared by the Zhuangzi and other ancient Chinese texts. To show this, the first three chapters explicate the idea of knowledge in three texts of around the same period, namely the Analects, the Daodejing, and the Mozi. The Zhuangzi inherits certain views from each of them. Among them are: the view of the Analects that attaining knowledge implies transforming one’s emotions and sentiments; the view in the Daodejing that there is a distinction between conventional and non-conventional knowledge; and the view of the Mozi that people have an inclination to insist on what they think is right practice, which provokes disputation. However, the Zhuangzi challenges the Confucian-Mohist conception of knowledge as reliable correct practice, because the project to fix the correct way of practice is undermined by the indeterminacy of language and justification. Contrary to this indeterminacy, a person’s completed heart takes for granted that there is a fixed scheme of distinctions by which correct practice is ensured. This is a characteristic of petty knowledge, which stands in contrast to great knowledge. Zhuangzi’s great knowledge is a meta-praxis that makes one refrain from attaching oneself to a fixed way of practice. The process of attaining great knowledge is continuous with the process of fasting the heart. By doing so, a person is free from the attachments and psychological disturbances that accompany petty knowledge. For Zhuangzi, being such a person is the end of knowledge.