Dzieje Najnowsze : [kwartalnik poświęcony historii XX wieku] R. 48 z. 4 (2016)

Abstract

s. 65-88

Streszcz. ang.

The article focuses on studies and memorials by Roman Knoll concerning international affairs, Polish foreign policy, and national problems, written between March 1939 and April 1944. Assessments of Polish inter-war and wartime foreign policy, contained in those documents, and proposals regarding some of its post–war currents deserve special attention. Numerous theses proposed by Knoll should be regarded as extremely apt. It would be difficult, for instance, to disagree with his opinion about asymmetrical Warsaw–Berlin and Warsaw–Moscow relations, revealing a distinct advantage in favour of the former. Apparently, in the spring of 1939 Knoll, in contrast to other observers, perceived the possibility of a German–Soviet alliance, which at the time posed the greatest threat to Poland.

Within Polish eastern policies this outstanding diplomat regarded as essential support for the liberation of nations dominated by Russia and the construction around the latter’s borders of independent national states. He espoused the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, but at the time of the war opposed embarking upon a discussion about “great Ukraine”. In doing so, Knoll stressed that while considering the Lithuanian, Byelorussian or Ukrainians questions Poland should remain concerned predominantly with the integrity of its territory. Even in April 1944, when he admitted to the possibility of Poland accepting concessions concerning the eastern frontier, he treated such a solution as a necessary evil and was well aware of the fact that the Soviet Union remained a hazard to the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic.

Knoll presented reliable accounts of the wartime situation of the Jewish population on Polish lands and depicted the extermination of the Jews in terrains included into the Third Reich and the territory of the Generalgouvernement. At the same time, he wrote about the Soviet occupant’s better treatment of the Jews than of the Poles and the Ukrainians. In the prevailing situation it was difficult to accept his projects concerning a post-war resettlement of the Jews to a state specially created for them, but the Polish diplomat was by no means the sole politician who at the time wrote and spoke about this issue.

p. 65-88

Sum. eng.

The article focuses on studies and memorials by Roman Knoll concerning international affairs, Polish foreign policy, and national problems, written between March 1939 and April 1944. Assessments of Polish inter-war and wartime foreign policy, contained in those documents, and proposals regarding some of its post–war currents deserve special attention. Numerous theses proposed by Knoll should be regarded as extremely apt. It would be difficult, for instance, to disagree with his opinion about asymmetrical Warsaw–Berlin and Warsaw–Moscow relations, revealing a distinct advantage in favour of the former. Apparently, in the spring of 1939 Knoll, in contrast to other observers, perceived the possibility of a German–Soviet alliance, which at the time posed the greatest threat to Poland.

Within Polish eastern policies this outstanding diplomat regarded as essential support for the liberation of nations dominated by Russia and the construction around the latter’s borders of independent national states. He espoused the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, but at the time of the war opposed embarking upon a discussion about “great Ukraine”. In doing so, Knoll stressed that while considering the Lithuanian, Byelorussian or Ukrainians questions Poland should remain concerned predominantly with the integrity of its territory. Even in April 1944, when he admitted to the possibility of Poland accepting concessions concerning the eastern frontier, he treated such a solution as a necessary evil and was well aware of the fact that the Soviet Union remained a hazard to the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic.

Knoll presented reliable accounts of the wartime situation of the Jewish population on Polish lands and depicted the extermination of the Jews in terrains included into the Third Reich and the territory of the Generalgouvernement. At the same time, he wrote about the Soviet occupant’s better treatment of the Jews than of the Poles and the Ukrainians. In the prevailing situation it was difficult to accept his projects concerning a post-war resettlement of the Jews to a state specially created for them, but the Polish diplomat was by no means the sole politician who at the time wrote and spoke about this issue.