Realism, not relativism : a critique of Gilbert Harman

Abstract

This thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of
 moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending
 a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the
 anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist
 conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal
 belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman
 may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the
 very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove
 that relativism is false, and realism true.

Arts, Faculty of

Philosophy, Department of

Graduate