From Son Tay to Desert One: Lessons Unlearned.

Abstract

In the planning, preparation and execution of special operations, lessons learned from previous missions are sometimes overlooked or discounted. This was true of the Iranian Rescue Mission undertaken in April 1980, which failed, in part, by not studying and following the lessons learned from the Son Tay Raid ten years before. By examining these missions through the principles of objective, unity of command, unity of effort, and security, the contrasts between these complex special operations are clearly illustrated. Like all military operations, special operations require a clear objective coupled with political commitment, a unified effort directed toward the attainment of these objectives, a well-defined chain of command, and security, both operational security and force protection. while failing to rescue any American prisoners, the Son Tay Raid was nearly flawless in its execution and validated the need to insure that these principles are observed. However, from the beginning of planning, the Iranian Rescue Mission failed to recognize the need to abide by these principles and would end in disaster. In its future, the Iranian Rescue Mission has served as a catalyst for major improvements among today's Special Operations Forces (SOF), but serious oversights continue to be committed, especially with regard to unity of effort and objective. With the emergence of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as a predominant focus of today's military, SOF must be prepared to conduct complex special operations. By learning from past successes and failures, SOF can insure that the principles of war and MOOTW are not neglected.