The COBRAS Synthetic Theater of War Exercise Trial: Report on Development, Results, and Lessons Learned.
Contributor(s)HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION ALEXANDRIA VA
KeywordsMilitary Forces and Organizations
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
*BRIGADE LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS
BATTALION LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
COMPANY LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
STOW(SYNTHETIC THEATER OF WAR)
COBRAS(COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS AT THE BRIGADE LEVEL REALISTICALLY ACHIEVED THROUGH SIMULATIONS)
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AbstractThis report details the design and development process for the Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) exercise produced in the COBRAS III project. The exercise was to serve as the vehicle for three primary research areas: training support package and resource requirements, technology and infrastructure requirements, and potential for training value. The multiechelon training audience of the Brigade Combat Team included the brigade commander and staff, the commander and staff of one battalion task force (TF), and the line company commanders, first sergeants, fire support team leaders, and scout platoon of that TF. The STOW environment linked constructive simulation (the Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation BBS and Modular Semi-Automated Forces ModSAF) and virtual simulation (Simulation Networking SIMNET) and reconfigurable simulators). The trial implementation in February - March 1998 involved members of TF 1-101, 3rd Brigade, and 42nd Infantry Division of the New York National Guard, along with supporting participants from the Force XXI Training Program, contracted logistics support (CLS) staffs, and the COBRAS Team. Training support was found to be manageable but resource-intensive. Technology and infrastructure findings were mixed: the systems promise exciting training opportunities, but there were many suggestions for improvement from participants. From the unit members' point of view, the exercise provided valuable training, and there was strong support for continued STOW and reconfigurable simulator development and use.
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