Subjective Character of Experience in Medical Ethics: A Reply to Atkins
Online Access
http://worldcatlibraries.org/registry/gateway?version=1.0&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&atitle=Subjective+character+of+experience+in+medical+ethics:+a+reply+to+Atkins&title=Journal+of+Applied+Philosophy+&volume=21&issue=2&spage=219-223&date=2004&au=Nagasawa,+Yujinhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.2004.21.issue-2
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/995635
Abstract
In a recent issue of this Journal Kim Atkins argued that Thomas Nagel's argument regarding a bat's phenomenal experience is important for understanding the value placed on patient autonomy in medical ethics. In this reply to her paper, I demonstrate that Atkin's argument (a) is based on her misinterpretations of Nagel's argument, and (b) can be established without appealing to such a controversial assumption as that which she makes.Date
2016-01-09Identifier
oai:repository.library.georgetown.edu:10822/995635doi:10.1111/japp.2004.21.issue-2
Journal of Applied Philosophy 2004; 21(2): 219-223
http://worldcatlibraries.org/registry/gateway?version=1.0&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&atitle=Subjective+character+of+experience+in+medical+ethics:+a+reply+to+Atkins&title=Journal+of+Applied+Philosophy+&volume=21&issue=2&spage=219-223&date=2004&au=Nagasawa,+Yujin
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.2004.21.issue-2
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/995635
DOI
10.1111/japp.2004.21.issue-2ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1111/japp.2004.21.issue-2