La politique européenne de transparence (2005-2016) : de la contestation à la consécration du lobbying
Author(s)
Robert, CécileKeywords
Commission européenneCorporate Europe Observatory
ONG
Parlement européen
plaidoyer
réglementation du lobbying
sociologie de l’UE
transparence
transparency international
advocacy
Corporate Europe Observatory
European commission
European parliament
lobbying regulation
NGO
sociology of European Union
transparency
transparency international
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Cet article s’attache à comprendre comment une politique promue au nom d’un meilleur contrôle des pratiques de représentation d’intérêts, et parfois d’une vision très critique de ces dernières, a contribué à en consacrer l’usage, y compris auprès de ses plus virulents détracteurs. La transparence apparaît en effet comme une « solution » investie par des acteurs porteurs de représentations très différentes du « problème du lobbying ». Tant chez les acteurs institutionnels que parmi les ONG mobilisées et pour des raisons variées, c’est néanmoins progressivement une conception moralisante, l’envisageant comme une question d’éthique qui l’emporte, au détriment d’une lecture plus politique, qui l’analysait comme l’un des vecteurs de la domination des intérêts privés sur le processus décisionnel européen. L’analyse de la coproduction de cette politique par ses promoteurs publics et privés au cours de la dernière décennie permet ainsi conjointement d’interroger leurs capacités différentielles à orienter l’action publique, et notamment ce qu’implique le fait que le système politique européen impose à ses opposants la forme de leurs revendications.European transparency policy (2005-2016): from contestation to consecration of lobbyingThis article proposes to explain how stricter control of lobbying at the EU level has eventually contributed to its legitimization, even in the eye of its most virulent detractors, although the policy of more thoroughly controlling lobbying was sometimes inspired by a strong critique of existing practices. It shows that transparency has been seen as a “solution” by various actors who defend very different views of problems raised by lobbying. Nevertheless, the institutional actors as well as civil society organizations and NGOs have gradually taken a moralizing outlook on lobbying, making it a matter of personal ethics. Thus, the political critique of lobbying as an efficient vehicle for the domination of private interests over the European decision process has been relegated to the background. This transparency policy, which has been co-produced by public and private actors over the last decade, reveals the asymmetric capacities to influence public policymaking at the EU level. Analyzing European transparency policy also sheds light on the heavy influence the European political system exerts on the modes of contestation adopted by its opponents/critics.
Date
2017Identifier
oai:cairn.info:GAP_171_0009https://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=GAP_171_0009
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