Author(s)Silber, Norman I.
corporate governance models
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AbstractThe cultural and political demand for nonprofit financial accountability has grown rapidly in recent decades. At the same time, donations and gifts continue, apparently, to decline as a proportion of overall revenue received. To remain viable in this environment, many nonprofit groups are changing their operating models and organizational structures, the better to attract contracts, grants, and fee-for-service revenue. An under-appreciated consequence of the convergence of these accountability and viability challenges is an anti-consultative or anti-collaborative imperative. With increasing frequency, scholars, attorneys, and consultants are advising nonprofit groups that seek to comply with nonprofit laws and to enhance their financial performance, to turn away from the popular cultural traditions and from the legal norms that have, by and large, encouraged collaboration and consultation in the normal course of internal decision making and governance. This advice often entails the adoption of strategies for streamlining nonprofit governance along for-profit business principles, in order to augment corporate efficiency, and management development, in the name, ultimately, of service to the nonprofit mission. Until now, law has largely accommodated and encouraged transplanted business models with new statutory proscriptions, administrative guidelines, and with liberal common law interpretations of the older statutes which demote consultative values. It may be time for courts and legislatures to start to impose limits on the wholesale adoption of for-profit management and governance models in nonprofit organization.
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Growth without GovernanceKraay, Aart; Kaufmann, Daniel (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-08-01)It is well known that there is a strong positive correlation between per capita incomes and the quality of governance across countries. the authors propose an empirical strategy that allows separation of this correlation into (1) a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to higher per capita incomes, and, perhaps surprisingly at first, (2) a weak and even negative causal effect running in the opposite direction from per capita incomes to governance. The first result confirms existing evidence on the importance of good governance for economic development. The second result is new and suggests the absence of a "virtuous circle" in which higher incomes lead to further improvements in governance. This motivates the authors' choice of title, "Growth Without Governance." They document this evidence using a newly updated set of worldwide governance-indicators covering 175 countries for the period 2000-01, and use the results to interpret the relationship between incomes and governance focusing on the Latin America and Caribbean region-within a worldwide empirical context. Finally, the authors speculate about the potential importance of elite influence and state capture in accounting for the surprising negative effects of per capita incomes on governance, present some evidence on such capture in some Latin American countries, and suggest priorities for actions to improve governance when such pernicious elite influence shapes public policy.
Sub-National Performance Incentives in the Intergovernmental FrameworkSmoke, Paul; Lewis, Blane D. (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-06)This paper provides background for the
Government of Indonesia as it considers if and how to
introduce more robust local government performance
incentives into the intergovernmental fiscal framework. The
next section briefly examines the forces that have driven
the recent national wave of interest in improving local
government performance. This is followed by a review of the
relatively limited set of local government performance
incentives currently in force in Indonesia. The fourth
section provides a conceptual overview of how to think about
the possible expansion of local government incentive
programs, outlining the potential role(s) of such programs
in general and the key issues involved in designing and
implementing them. The fifth section tentatively considers a
number of options for additional local government incentives
in Indonesia that the central government may wish to
consider pursuing. The paper concludes with an outline of
next steps for moving forward with the possible development
of more purposeful and meaningful performance incentives in
Indonesia's intergovernmental fiscal framework.
Decentralization and Local Governance in MENA : A Survey of Policies, Institutions, and PracticesWorld Bank (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-08-21)Entering the 21st century, the 1999-2000 World Development Report (WDR), identifies two main forces that are shaping the world in which development policy is being defined and implemented: (i) globalization, the increasing worldwide integration of private sector interaction and commercial relationships; and (ii) localization, a process of devolving fiscal and administrative roles and responsibilities from central to sub-national tiers of government. It goes on to note that these global-private and local-public pressures are not only reinforcing, but also challenging traditional paradigms and forms of intergovernmental systems. Political decentralization, often associated with pluralistic politics and representative government, aims to give citizens more say in public policy and decision-making. Its advocates assume that decisions made with greater participation will be better informed and more relevant to diverse interests in society than those made only by national political authorities. The concept implies that the selection of representatives from local electoral jurisdictions allows citizens to know better their political representatives and allows elected officials to know better the needs and desires of their constituents. Administrative decentralization aims to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. It typically takes three forms: de-concentration, delegation and devolution. Fiscal decentralization vests greater autonomy and authority with local governments in matters of fiscal importance, empowering local governments to generate their own revenues, through taxes and user charges, as well as determining their expenditure priorities based on a clear assignment of functions and responsibilities. Over the last two decades, it has been estimated that more than 100 countries, most of them in the developing world, have experimented with various forms of decentralization.