De l'erreur humaine à la faute managériale : la responsabilité et la pérennité organisationnelle en question
Contributor(s)
Laboratoire d'Innovation, Prospective Stratégique et ORganisation ( LIPSOR ) ; Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] ( CNAM )Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action ( LIRSA ) ; Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] ( CNAM )
Ministère de la Défense
Archives - Management & Sciences Sociales
Keywords
Fauteerreur
risque
management
organisation
responsabilité
JEL : G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
JEL : M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration/M.M1.M14 - Corporate Culture • Diversity • Social Responsibility
JEL : M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration
[ SHS.GESTION ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration
[ SHS.SOCIO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Sociology
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01870827/file/De%20l%27erreur%20humaine.pdf
Abstract
International audienceL’objet de cet article est de mettre en exergue le caractère de persévération dans l’erreur comme facteur d’irréversibilité dans la remise en cause de la pérennité de l’organisation. Cette erreur est alors constitutive d’une faute, forme particulière d’erreur au sens de J. reason (2003), dès lors qu’il s’agit de persévérer dans cette dernière une fois que l’on en a connaissance. Au travers de 3 études de cas menées en recherche-action dans des secteurs d’activité différents et d’entretiens complémentaires, l’apport de l’article est de mettre en lumière le caractère de persévération dans les choix stratégiques des dirigeants. Cette dimension de persévération liée à la surconfiance est caractéristique d’une faute de gestion. Les auteurs proposent alors d’appréhender le rôle du dirigeant au travers d’un principe de responsabilité se déclinant en une approche gestionnaire de risque.
Date
2012Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleIdentifier
oai:HAL:hal-01870827v1hal-01870827
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01870827
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01870827/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01870827/file/De%20l%27erreur%20humaine.pdf
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