Understanding Policy Change : How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice
Keywords
CIVIL SERVANTSTAX REFORMS
CORRUPT
PRIMARY EDUCATION
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
PRIMARY SCHOOL
GOOD GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
ACCOUNTING
JUSTICE
PUBLIC GOOD
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
ECONOMIC TOOLS
SANCTIONS
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
COLLUSION
SANCTION
MONOPOLY
LABOR UNIONS
RULE OF LAW
ECONOMICS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
DEBT
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
ENERGY CONSUMPTION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS
BRIBE
ELECTORAL RULES
COLLECTIVE ACTION
JUDICIARY
POLITICAL PARTY
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
PRIVATE GOODS
BANK LENDING
BRIBES
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
INVENTORY
CORRUPTION
BASIC SERVICES
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
CITIZENS
POLITICIANS
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
VESTED INTERESTS
LITERACY RATES
ORGANIZED CRIME
TRADE POLICIES
FOREIGN LABOR
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
TELEVISION
BENEFITCOST ANALYSIS
FISCAL POLICY
PATRONAGE
DATA COLLECTION
SOCIAL CAPITAL
GOVERNANCE ISSUES
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
CONSUMERS
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
LABOR REGULATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION
POLICE
BRIBERY
CLEAN WATER
GRAFT
MORAL HAZARD
DEMOCRACIES
TRANSPARENCY
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
CORRUPT REGIME
POLICY ENVIRONMENT
SERVICE DELIVERY
CDF
POLITICAL STABILITY
DEMOCRACY
CIVIL SOCIETY
GERRYMANDERING
ACCOUNTABILITY
POLITICAL INFLUENCE
CRONIES
CENTRAL BANKS
INFANT MORTALITY
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISTS
EXPENDITURES
ECONOMIC THEORIES
POLITICAL DYNAMICS
FOREIGN AID
BAD POLICIES
POLICY OUTCOMES
LEADERSHIP
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
TRADE UNIONS
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
POLITICAL PROCESS
BAD GOVERNANCE
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ABSENTEEISM
LAWS
POLITICAL COMMITMENT
GANGS
STREAMS
MEDIA
VOTERS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
COMPLAINTS
MINISTERS
TAX COLLECTION
POLITICAL PARTIES
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
INTEREST RATES
ENVIRONMENTS
SERVANTS
GAME THEORY
BORROWING
ECOLOGY
INCOME
DECENTRALIZATION
POLICY MAKERS
POLITICAL LEADERS
PARLIAMENT
POOR GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS
ECONOMIC FACTORS
ECONOMIC CRISES
FOREIGN WORKERS
INVESTIGATIONS
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
DECISION MAKING
DISTRIBUTIVE IMPLICATIONS
INTEREST RATE
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
GDP
UNEMPLOYMENT
CITIZEN
BUREAUCRACY
PER CAPITA INCOME
SIDE EFFECTS
ECONOMIC REFORMS
PUBLIC GOODS
DISCRETION
WAGES
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11879Abstract
The introductory chapter sets the stage and outlines the logic of the rest of the handbook. First, we present the main learning objectives; second, we introduce the pedagogical approach, methodology, and structure of the book. This handbook is intended to introduce the concepts of political economy to a wide audience of development practitioners, including civil society activists, journalists, students, and bureaucrats. Since the target readers vary widely in their previous exposure to the subject matter, the book summarizes a vast academic field and presents a comprehensive repertoire of concepts, theories, and empirical examples. Rather than offering a 'do-it-yourself' framework, we opted for developing a step-by-step analytical puzzle. First, the paper introduces the core mechanisms of political economy and their inner logic, and, subsequently, we help our readers learn how to recognize these mechanisms in their daily development-related work. By the end of the book, the authors hope that readers will be able to: recognize core development problems stemming from the political-economic environment; link theoretical concepts to real-life situations; diagnose the symptoms and the root causes of malfunctions; and understand the short-term and long-term consequences of poor governance and low institutional equilibria. This handbook is also designed to provide trainers with some of the pedagogical materials they need to develop an introductory course on political-economy analysis for policy practitioners. The content focuses on the what, the why, and the how to of policy change. The readers or trainees will encounter key theories and concepts and learn how to apply the analysis to an understanding of their own policy-making environment. Pedagogically, the handbook uses interactive classroom exercises and the case study method to reinforce learning objectives and to capture the concepts, methods, experiences, and challenges relevant for practitioners. Structured learning activities at the end of most chapters and a comprehensive group exercise in appendix D will also give readers and trainers the opportunity to apply the knowledge and tools of political economy to simulated or specific development puzzles.Date
2012-12-04Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/11879http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11879
978-0-8213-9538-7
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/Related items
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