Author(s)
Moynihan, Donald P.Keywords
REFORMSFUNDING
SERVICE QUALITY
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
BUDGETING
FINANCIAL CAPACITY
PERFORMANCE BUDGETING
LEGISLATION ENVIRONMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
ELECTED OFFICIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
MIS
PROGRAM EVALUATION
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
FISCAL
CITIZENS
LEGISLATORS
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
HEALTH CARE
DRAWING
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT POLICY
MANAGERS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
STRATEGIC PLANNING
PUBLIC SERVICE
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
STATE FUNDING
OPERA
AGING
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
FINANCIAL CAPABILITY
ACHIEVEMENT
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
PRESIDENCY
MEDIA
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
PERFORMANCE AUDITING
YOUNG CHILDREN BUDGETING
POLICY DIALOGS
STATE GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SPENDING
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11324Abstract
Performance-based budgeting has long
 been a recommended reform in both industrial and developing
 countries. Yet considerable ambiguity remains on how to
 define and implement this approach. A relatively strict
 definition is that performance-based budgeting allocates
 resources based on the achievement of specific, measurable
 outcomes (Fielding Smith 1999). This definition promises a
 rational, mechanistic link between performance measures and
 resource allocations, with the ability to state the level of
 outputs that can be achieved with an additional amount of
 resources. But outputs cannot always be quantified
 precisely-and while performance information offers benefits
 to governments, it cannot eliminate the inherently political
 nature of budgeting. Over the past decade U.S. state
 governments have experimented extensively with performance-
 based budgeting. Yet while 47 of 50 states claim to use some
 form of it, driven by legislative or administrative
 requirements, there is no evidence that any state relies on
 a strict performance-based system. Even though U.S. state
 governments have fairly high human and financial capacity,
 they have encountered limitations in implementing
 performance-based budgeting-raising questions about the
 potential benefits of this approach.Date
2003-02Type
Publications & ResearchIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/11324http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11324
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOCollections
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