The political cost of corruption: scandals, campaign finance, and reelection in the Brazilian chamber of deputies
Keywords
PolitikwissenschaftSoziologie, Anthropologie
Political science
Sociology & anthropology
politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
Kriminalsoziologie, Rechtssoziologie, Kriminologie
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Criminal Sociology, Sociology of Law
Brasilien
Lateinamerika
Südamerika
Korruption
Kosten
Wahl
politische Kriminalität
Wahlwerbung
Finanzierung
Brazil
Latin America
South America
corruption
costs
election
political criminality
election advertising
funding
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https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/download/957/964http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/54692
https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/957
Abstract
Políticos notoriamente envolvidos em escândalos de corrupção logram reelegerse apesar da opinião pública em geral condenar a corrupção. Nesse artigo nos debruçamos sobre esse paradoxo examinando o efeito de escândalos de corrupção no comportamento de membros da Câmara dos Deputados. Em particular, focamos em suas estratégias de financiamento de campanha e escolhas de carreira. Para explorar esses temas utilizamos um banco de dados original que contém informações sobre todos os deputados e deputadas federais de 1995 a 2010. Embora muitos parlamentares acusados de corrupção sejam penalizados nas urnas, mostramos que gastos de campanha elevados atenuam o efeito negativo de escândalos. Nossos resultados são robustos para várias especificações e controlando por explicações alternativas. Este artigo apresenta uma discussão original das estratégias utilizadas por políticos corruptos para se manterem no poder. Mostramos que se tornam imunes às consequências eleitorais de escândalos se gastarem acima de patamares específicos. Esses achados são muito relevantes para discussões normativas em termos de reforma política que visam fortalecer accountability eleitoral no Brazil.While corruption is widely disapproved of, some corrupt politicians continue to win elections. We tackle this paradox by examining the effects of malfeasance scandals in politicians' behavior. In particular, we focus on their campaign finance strategies and career choices. We explore these issues empirically with an original dataset that includes all lower-house members of Congress (MCs) in Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Although tainted incumbents tend to be penalized electorally, we show that campaign spending attenuates this effect. These results are robust, controlling for a host of potential confounders and biases. Hence, we offer a first exploration of incumbents' strategies to avoid the electoral cost of their publicized wrongdoings. Above a certain threshold of funding, Brazilian members of Congress become impervious to negative exposure, regardless of the severity of their ethical and/or criminal violations. These results carry important normative consequences in terms of regulating campaign financing as a means of improving accountability.
Date
2017-11-14Type
ZeitschriftenartikelIdentifier
oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/546921868-4890
https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/download/957/964
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/54692
https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/957
urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-9578
Copyright/License
Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Keine Bearbeitung 3.0Collections
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