Author(s)
Fürtig, HennerContributor(s)
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, Institut für Nahost-StudienKeywords
PolitikwissenschaftPolitical science
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
Iran
voter turnout
opposition
Islam
reform
Middle East
election campaign
political power
election result
parliamentary election
politische Macht
Wahlbeteiligung
Iran
Wahlkampf
Opposition
Parlamentswahl
Wahlergebnis
Reform
Islam
Nahost
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/29054Abstract
Am 2. März 2012 waren in Iran circa 48 Mio. Wahlberechtigte aufgerufen, über die Zusammensetzung des neunten Parlaments seit der islamischen Revolution von 1979 abzustimmen. Obwohl im April 2012 eine zweite Runde in jenen Wahlbezirken stattfinden wird, in denen es keinem Kandidaten gelang, mehr als 25 Prozent der Stimmen auf sich zu
 vereinen, gilt der grundsätzliche Wahlausgang bereits nach der ersten Runde als sicher.
 Unter den Bedingungen zunehmender internationaler Isolation und – nicht zuletzt dadurch bedingter – erheblicher sozialer und ökonomischer Probleme Irans wurden die Parlamentswahlen im Kern von zwei Fragen beherrscht: Wird die iranische Bevölkerung
 trotz der bedrückenden Erfahrungen mit den Präsidentschaftswahlen von 2009 mehrheitlich ihre Stimme abgeben? Werden sich das heterogene oppositionelle Parlamentslager und namentlich die Anhänger Präsident Ahmadinejads behaupten können? Das Wahlergebnis lässt folgende Schlüsse zu: Mit einer Wahlbeteiligung von über 60 Prozent sowie erheblichen Stimmenverlusten der Reformer und der Anhänger Mahmud Ahmadinejads konnte die Kernfraktion des Regimes um Revolutionsführer Khamenei einen Erfolg verbuchen. Die Beständigkeit des Erfolges bleibt aber fraglich, weil sich das Regime fraktionell verengt und seine Basis geschwächt hat. Abstriche am seit 1979 konstitutiven Dualismus
 des Staatsapparates schmälern seinen Spielraum. Innerhalb des "Pro-Khamenei-Lagers" gewannen pragmatische Konservative die meisten Stimmen. Nach Erfahrungen bisheriger Parlamentswahlen zeichnet sich dadurch möglicherweise bereits eine Richtungsentscheidung für die nächsten Präsidentschaftswahlen ab. Die Wahlen vertieften den Trend der Machtkonzentration in sicherheitsrelevanten Institutionen des Staates. Das Büro des Revolutionsführers, das Geheimdienstministerium, die Revolutionsgarden und die Justizgewalt sind die entscheidenden Machtorgane der Islamischen Republik Iran.Date
2012-03-28Type
ArbeitspapierIdentifier
oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/29054http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/29054
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-290549
Copyright/License
Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht kommerz., Keine BearbeitungCollections
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