It's about authority, stupid! Having power is not enough to get things done
Author(s)
Ringen, SteinKeywords
PolitikwissenschaftPolitical science
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
form of domination
leadership
national state
power
Machiavelli, N.
government
legitimation
political power
authority
morality
politician
decline of power
Führung
politische Macht
Macht
Machtverfall
Moral
Staat
Autorität
Herrschaftsform
Politiker
Machiavelli, N.
Regierung
Legitimation
descriptive study
deskriptive Studie
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/30867Abstract
"Macht ist im Spiel, wenn ein sogenannter Bestimmer den sogenannten Anderen gegenübersteht. Dabei werden die Bestimmer die Anderen nicht für sich einspannen können, indem sie einfach nur ihre Macht nutzen; vielmehr müssen sie geschickt von ihrer Macht Gebrauch machen. Zu diesem Zweck müssen sie ihre Autorität mobilisieren, und diese Autorität fußt auf einem gezügelten Gebrauch von Macht. Wie viel Autorität ein Bestimmer hat, hängt davon ab, ob die Anderen bereit sind, auf ihn zu hören und sich von ihm überzeugen zu lassen. Auch die anderen haben übrigens Macht - sie können dem Bestimmer nämlich die Autorität absprechen, die er für seine Führungsrolle braucht." (Autorenreferat)"Power is involved when so-called 'governors' are up against 'others.' The ability to get things done does not go through power, but through the use of power. The effective use of power is to motivate others to get things done for you. To that end, the governor must mobilize authority, which again depends on the restrained use of power. The authority of a governor is contained in the willingness of others to listen and be persuaded. The ultimate power of others is their ability to deny the governor the authority he needs to lead." (author's abstract)
Date
2012-05-29Type
journal articleIdentifier
oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/30867http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/30867
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-308673
Copyright/License
Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine BearbeitungCollections
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