Contributor(s)
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, Institut für Afrika-StudienKeywords
PolitikwissenschaftPolitical science
Innenpolitischer Konflikt
Bewaffneter Konflikt
Gewalttätigkeit
Aufstand/Revolte
Ethnische Bevölkerungsgruppe/Volksgruppe
Ethnie/Volk
Tuareg
Guerillaverbände
Streitkräfte/militärische Verbände
Konfliktursachen/Konfliktanlass
Konfliktverlauf
Uran
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
natural resources
English-speaking Africa
conflict potential
conflict resolution
Africa
development
Nigeria
social inequality
socioeconomic development
West Africa
ethnic group
guerrilla
conflict
socioeconomic factors
disposition to conflict
ethnic relations
participation
ethnic conflict
Niger
Africa South of the Sahara
developing country
natürliche Ressourcen
Afrika südlich der Sahara
ethnischer Konflikt
sozioökonomische Faktoren
Entwicklung
Nigeria
anglophones Afrika
Afrika
Konfliktbereitschaft
sozioökonomische Entwicklung
ethnische Gruppe
Konflikt
Niger
Guerilla
Partizipation
Konfliktpotential
Entwicklungsland
Konfliktlösung
soziale Ungleichheit
Westafrika
ethnische Beziehungen
descriptive study
deskriptive Studie
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Show full item recordOnline Access
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/27404Abstract
"Am 9. Dezember kamen bei einer Regierungsoffensive gegen Tuareg-Rebellen der Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) sieben Zivilisten ums Leben. Seit Anfang des Jahres sind Armeeposten und Infrastruktur rund um Uranminen in der Landesmitte wiederholt Ziel von MNJ-Angriffen. Dem Land droht eine Neuauflage des gewaltsamen Konfliktes der 1990er Jahre. Die Anfang 2007 gegründete MNJ ist Hauptträger der Tuareg-Rebellion. Ihre Hauptforderungen betreffen - ähnlich wie in den 1990er Jahren - eine größere Beteiligung an den Urangewinnen, ein umfassendes Entwicklungsprogramm und die politische Dezentralisierung zugunsten der Tuareg-Region. Der Konflikt hat mehrere Ursachen, die vor allem in der historisch gewachsenen politischen und ökonomischen Unzufriedenheit der Tuareg zu finden sind. Sollte die neue Rebellion einen ähnlichen Verlauf wie der erste Aufstand der Tuareg nehmen, droht die 'Konfliktfalle' einer verheerenden Armuts- und Gewaltspirale. Das Land kann der 'Konfliktfalle' nur entkommen, wenn die Forderungen der Rebellen ernst genommen werden. Dazu sind deutliche Entwicklungserfolge in Bildungs- und Bevölkerungspolitik, Fortschritte bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung und der Aufbau einer effektiveren Verwaltung sowie ein höherer Anteil der Uraneinnahmen für die Bevölkerung in den Fördergebieten notwendig." (Autorenreferat)Date
2011-11-21Type
ArbeitspapierIdentifier
oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/27404http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/27404
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-274042
Copyright/License
Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht kommerz., Keine BearbeitungCollections
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