Keywords
BAD POLICIESFIGHTING CORRUPTION
ABUSES
CORRUPTION LEVELS
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
CORRUPTION VARIABLE
COUNTRY AVERAGES
CITIZENS
MEDIA
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS
CONSPIRACIES
PARLIAMENTS
BURGLARY
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
DEMOCRACY
TRANSPARENCY POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
CENTRALIZATION
SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
POLITICAL STABILITY
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE
CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES
PUNISHMENT
PUBLIC SERVICE
POLITICAL SYSTEM
CRIMES
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
DECENTRALIZATION
CORRUPTION CONTROL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
STATE AUTONOMY
SEPARATION OF POWERS
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
GROWTH RATE
INCOME LEVEL
CRIME RATES
POLITICAL COMPETITION
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES
COLLECTIVE ACTION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
JUDICIARY
EXECUTIVE POWER
PER CAPITA INCOME
LEGISLATION
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ANTICORRUPTION
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
ABUSES OF POWER
PUBLIC SECTOR
TRANSPARENCY
CRIME VICTIMIZATION
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
CRIME
POLITICAL PARTIES
STATE GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
MURDER
BRIBERY
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
LEGISLATURE
ECONOMIC GROWTH
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CORRUPTION IN POLITICS
CONSTITUENCIES
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY
CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS
COUNTRY AVERAGE
POLITICAL STABILITY
ACCOUNTABILITY
CORRUPTION
POLITICIANS
DEMOCRATIC REGIME
AUTHORITY
COLONIZATION
EXTORTION
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
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http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19420Abstract
Using a cross-country panel, Lederman, Loayza, and Soares examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase political accountability. Previous empirical studies have not analyzed the role of political institutions, even though both the political science and the theoretical economics literature have indicated their importance in determining corruption. The main theoretical hypothesis guiding the authors' empirical investigation is that political institutions affect corruption through two channels: political accountability and the structure of the provision of public goods. The results suggest that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption: democracy, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption. In addition, the authors show that common findings of the earlier empirical literature on the determinants of corruption related to openness and legal tradition to not hold once political variables are taken into account.Date
2001-11Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19420http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19420
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/Related items
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