Keywords
SAVINGSACCOUNTING
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
BANKING CRISES
VETO BANKING SYSTEMS
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
FINANCIAL PLANNING
BANK MANAGEMENT
PREDICTIONS
SOCIAL WELFARE
BANKING SECTOR
EXTERNAL FINANCE
BANKING SYSTEM
CORRUPTION
INFLATION
ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
BANK ASSETS
CAPITAL ALLOCATION
POLICY FRAMEWORK
MONITORING CRITERIA
LAWS
DEPOSITORS
BANK SUPERVISION
FOREIGN ENTITIES
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AUTHORITY
EMPLOYMENT
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
CAPITALIZATION
POLITICAL CONTROL
DEPOSITS
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
PUBLIC POLICY
CORPORATE CONTROL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
FAVORITISM
EXTERNAL AUDITORS
CORPORATE FINANCE
ECONOMIC GROWTH
SHAREHOLDERS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
BANKS
SECURITIES
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
STATE OWNERSHIP
BANKING REGULATION
DEBT
COMPETITIVENESS
BANKING CRISIS
BANK SUPERVISION
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
RESERVE REQUIREMENT
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
FINANCING CONSTRAINTS
BANK LIABILITIES
MORAL HAZARD
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES
TRANSACTION COSTS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
LEGAL SYSTEMS
SUPERVISORY AGENCIES
SUBORDINATED DEBT
MARKET DISCIPLINE
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
FINANCING OPTIONS
POLITICIANS
BANKING SYSTEMS
CORPORATE FINANCE
BANK DEPOSITS
LEGAL PROTECTION
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18209Abstract
The authors examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. They find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political and regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, the authors find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.Date
2014-05-09Identifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/18209http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18209
Copyright/License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/Related items
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
-
Corporate Governance and DevelopmentClaessens, Stijn (Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2013-12-19)The literature shows that good corporate governance generally pays for firms, for markets, and for countries. It is associated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity, greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders, although the direction of causality is not always clear. The law and finance literature has documented the important role of institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement, including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm level data, researchers have documented relationships between countries corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance, valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financing on the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance, firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistance by entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and political economy factors at the level of markets and countries partly explain why they do not.
-
Reforming Corporate Governance : Experiences with Public Takeover Bids in Chile and PanamaBarsallo, Carlos A.; Clarke de la Cerda, Alvaro (International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC, 2014-07-23)Focus 6 covers the experiences of two
 high-profile cases in Chile and Panama and analyzes reforms
 that shape new legislation and protect minority
 shareholders. The first article in this publication explores
 the impact the reforms to the regulation of corporate
 governance in 2000 on the capital market in Chile. After
 seven years of implementing the new law it is possible to
 consider, with a more informed vision, what the positive and
 negative elements that strengthening the regulation of
 corporate governance have brought. The experience of Panama
 is also an ironic commentary on the Chilean experience. It
 is the case for reform to protect minority shareholders
 which was introduced by the Panamanian securities regulator.
 In reaction to this, some interested individuals rejected
 the reform proposal in theory, tying up the initiative in
 the courts, but accepted it and followed it in practice. And
 continue to do so even today. The history, regulation and
 the practice of takeovers in Panama presents interesting
 paradoxical and contradictory features, which can provide
 lessons that can be of general use.
-
Corporate Governance Scorecards : Assessing and Promoting the Implementation of Codes of Corporate GovernanceInternational Finance Corporation (Washington, DC, 2014-12-08)This is a supplement to second IFC's toolkit: developing Corporate Governance codes of best practice. The focus of second toolkit is the development of codes of corporate governance. This supplement focuses narrowly on how to use scorecards to measure the observance and implementation of such codes. It does not cover the full panoply of governance assessment tools. This supplement provides practical guidance and a step-by step approach on how to develop a corporate governance scorecard. It also presents different approaches to scorings based on the experience of different scorecard users in different countries. This supplement is not intended to be a full manuscript of all the available tools or assessment techniques but more a guidance on various possible uses and applications of scorecards It is, however, intended to cover most of the issues that might confront any institution, regulator, stock exchange, and so on, that has in mind to develop a scorecard and to provide some practical guidance on how to approach those issues. This supplement provides practical guidance and a step-by step approach on how to develop a corporate governance scorecard. It also presents different approaches to scorings based on the experience of different scorecard users in different countries. The supplement also shows how scorecards are adapted to local circumstances and the local corporate governance framework.