Author(s)Campos, Nauro F.
DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE
EXCHANGE OF IDEAS
COUNTRY RISK GUIDE
EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE
DIMENSION OF GOVERNANCE
IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNANCE
HEAD OF STATE
RULE OF LAW
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL RISK INTELLIGENCE
PER CAPITA INCOME
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AbstractThe author presents measures with which to map institution building during the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Data collection and indicators are measured in terms of five institutional dimensions of governance: a) accountability; b) quality of the bureaucracy; c) rule of law; d) character of policy-making process; and e) strength of civil society. The author highlights the differences over time and between Central and Eastern European countries and those of the former Soviet Union. In terms of effects of per capita income and school enrollment, he finds the rule of law to be the most important institutional dimension, both for the sample as a whole and for differences between the two regions. In terms of life expectancy, however, the quality of the bureaucracy plays the most crucial role. One important message the author draws from the results is that institutions do change over time and are by no means as immutable as the literature has suggested. The range of feasible policy choices (for changing institutions) may be much wider than is often assumed.
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Growth without GovernanceKraay, Aart; Kaufmann, Daniel (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-08-01)It is well known that there is a strong positive correlation between per capita incomes and the quality of governance across countries. the authors propose an empirical strategy that allows separation of this correlation into (1) a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to higher per capita incomes, and, perhaps surprisingly at first, (2) a weak and even negative causal effect running in the opposite direction from per capita incomes to governance. The first result confirms existing evidence on the importance of good governance for economic development. The second result is new and suggests the absence of a "virtuous circle" in which higher incomes lead to further improvements in governance. This motivates the authors' choice of title, "Growth Without Governance." They document this evidence using a newly updated set of worldwide governance-indicators covering 175 countries for the period 2000-01, and use the results to interpret the relationship between incomes and governance focusing on the Latin America and Caribbean region-within a worldwide empirical context. Finally, the authors speculate about the potential importance of elite influence and state capture in accounting for the surprising negative effects of per capita incomes on governance, present some evidence on such capture in some Latin American countries, and suggest priorities for actions to improve governance when such pernicious elite influence shapes public policy.
The World Bank and Governance : The Bank’s Efforts to Help Developing Countries Build State Capacityde Janvry, Alain; Dethier, Jean-Jacques (2012-11)This paper examines historically the World Bank's twin features: lending to developing economies to achieve tangible results and advocating specific development policies. Section 1 provides some conceptual underpinnings for the view that an effective state is essential for development. It asks whether development can be engineered, and state capacity increased, with large aid flows. Section 2 sketches the historical evolution of what characterizes the World Bank: lending to developing economies and advocacy of development policy. It concludes that, while the Bank discourse explicitly recognizes that developing countries need to improve their governance and build the capacity of the public sector to improve living standards, the Bank's performance in assisting governments in building state capacity and achieving better governance outcomes has been disappointing. Section 3 proposes an interpretation of why this has been the case. The interpretation is structural, and related to the way the Bank is organized. This concerns in particular (1) how its research is prioritized and used for decision-making, (2) how its leadership achieves a consensus between shareholders who hold different views on the role of government in the economy, and (3) how incentives for its staff emphasize disbursement and short-term success, and not capacity building and longer-term institutional sustainability.
Governance, Fragility, and ConflictAgborsangaya-Fiteu, Ozong (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2017-09-07)This report seeks to inform the
development of a framework for addressing governance reform
in fragile and conflict affected environments through are
view of international experiences. The report analyzes the
experience both of countries that sustained a transition to
peace and those that fell back into conflict. Pertinent
lessons will be drawn selectively from a range of fragile
and conflict affected countries, including Haiti, Cambodia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mozambique, Liberia, Timor-Leste,
Afghanistan, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. No
specific typologies have been adopted or formed in order to
assess these lessons, because typologies can be limiting and
experiences can be better assessed based on the specificity
of each country's context. The first section of the
report sets out broadly accepted definitions of key terms
such as governance, state building, and fragility. The
second section reviews experiences with diverse governance
dimensions and explores the objectives, opportunities, and
constraints associated with each.