Practical remote end-to-end voting scheme

Abstract

Recently, remote voting systems have gained popularity and
 have been used for government elections and referendums in the United
 Kingdom, Estonia and Switzerland as well as municipal elections in
 Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France.
 Current remote voting schemes assume either the voter’s personal computer
 is trusted or the voter is not physically coerced. In this paper, we
 present a remote end-to-end voting scheme, in which the voter’s choice
 remains secret even if the voter’s personal computer is infected by malware
 or the voter is physically controlled by the adversary. In particular,
 our scheme can achieve absolute verifiability even if all election authorities
 are corrupt. Based on homomorphic encryption, the overhead for
 tallying in our scheme is linear in the number of candidates. Thus, our
 scheme is practical for elections at a large scale, such as general elections.