New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking
KeywordsC7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C70 - General
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
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AbstractThe goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean.
Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. and Savadogo, Zoïnabo and Ulungu, Berthold E.-L. (2014): New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking. Published in: Advanced Studies in Contemporary Mathematics , Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 2015): pp. 19-38.