Are Incentives Everything? Payment Mechanisms for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries
Author(s)
Gauri, VarunKeywords
HOSPITALSPRICE ELASTICITIES
SAVINGS
MARGINAL COST
MANAGED CARE
ISOLATION
PHYSICIANS
EXPENDITURES
PRIVATE INSURANCE
COMMUNITIES
MORTALITY
PRODUCTIVITY
POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
PHARMACISTS
DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS
COUNSELING
HEALTH SECTOR
PATIENT CHOICE
SPILLOVERS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
ELASTICITIES
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
FUELS
MORAL HAZARD
BREAST CANCER
LEISURE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES
PROPERTY RIGHTS
URBAN AREAS
CAPITATION
HMO
HOSPITAL CARE
HEALTH ECONOMICS
POLICY MAKERS
MANAGERS
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
IMMUNIZATION
HEALTH POSTS
HMOS
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE
HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
HEALTH SERVICES
HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
NONPROFIT HOSPITALS
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
HEALTH SYSTEMS
SOCIAL WORKERS
POLICY RESEARCH
FAMILIES
WELFARE ECONOMICS
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
DECISION MAKING
HEALTH CLINICS
EMPLOYMENT
SOCIAL WELFARE
NURSING
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSACTION COSTS
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE
NURSES
CLINICS
INCENTIVE SCHEMES
MARKET FAILURES
POLICY DECISIONS
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
HEALTH EXPENDITURES
PATIENT DUMPING
PATIENTS
RISK SHARING
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
HEALTH POLICY
MARKET POWER
SCHOOLS
PROBABILITY
MEDICARE
INCOME
HEALTH OUTCOMES
ECONOMIC REVIEW
HEALTH CARE
SURGERY
CONDOMS
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
HOSPITAL SERVICES
EMERGENCY ROOMS
THEORETICAL MODELS
MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
TRADEOFFS
RELATIVE VALUE
INSURANCE MARKETS
HEALTH CARE SERVICES
MOTIVATION
PATIENT EDUCATION
EDUCATION
HOSPITALIZATION
PARTNERSHIP
HEALTH PROVIDERS
HEALTH
EXTERNALITIES
HEALTH CARE PROVISION
INSURANCE
RURAL AREAS
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
HOUSEHOLDS
PRIMARY CARE
SCREENING
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
MARGINAL COSTS
QUALITY CONTROL
DOCTORS
INFORMAL SECTOR
PUBLIC HEALTH
STERILIZATION
CITIES
HEALTH SYSTEM
PUBLIC SECTOR
Full record
Show full item recordOnline Access
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19652Abstract
This paper assesses the extent to which
 provider payment mechanisms can help developing countries
 address their leading health care problems. It first
 identifies four key problems in the health care systems in
 developing countries: 1) public facilities, which provide
 the bulk of secondary and tertiary health care services in
 most countries, offer services of poor quality; 2) providers
 cannot be enticed to rural and urban marginal areas, leaving
 large segments of the population without adequate access to
 health care; 3) the composition of health services offered
 and consumed is sub-optimal; and 4) coordination in the
 delivery of care, including referrals, second opinions, and
 teamwork, is inadequate. The paper examines each problem in
 turn and assesses the extent to which changes in provider
 payments might address it.Date
2001-06Type
Publications & ResearchIdentifier
oai:openknowledge.worldbank.org:10986/19652http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19652
Copyright/License
CC BY 3.0 IGOCollections
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