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AbstractKohlberg’s developmental theory of moral reasoning about justice issues. In the Kohlberg tradition, the moral domain was circumscribed down to issues of interpersonal justice, rights, and promise-keeping; morality was considered to be a matter of impersonal rules and principles, not of habits, skills, or virtues; moral development was seen as a progression toward sorting out genuinely moral rules, first from personal goals and projects, then from social conventions; and the cognitive structures involved in moral reasoning were treated as though they applied automatically to any situation to which they could be seen as relevant. An important step toward broadening the scope of moral development research and establishing badly needed connections with neighboring areas of psychological inquiry was taken in 1980, when Augusto Blasi published his review article on the relationship between moral cognition and moral action. Discerning a failure to come to grips with moral motivation, and a need to integrate moral psychology with the psychology of the self, Blasi argued that people who have incorporated morality strongly into their own identities are more likely to act on their moral principles. Those for whom morality does not play a key role in their self-definitions may subscribe to the very same principles, but are less likely to put them into practice.