What Drives the Arrangement Timetable of Bank Loan Syndication? ∗
Author(s)
Christophe J. GodlewskiContributor(s)
The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX ArchivesKeywords
Syndicated loans arrangement timetableAgency problems
Information disclosure
Legal risk
Survival analysis
Accelerated failure time models
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http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.192.7652http://69.175.2.130/%7Efinman/Prague/Papers/arrangement_timetable_loansyndication_Godlewski_0707_draft2.pdf
Abstract
We investigate the influence of loan and syndicate characteristics and information disclosure and legal environment factors on the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndications (measured as the time elapsed from the launching until the completion of the deal) from 68 countries over the 1992-2006 period. Employing accelerated failure time models from survival analysis methodology, we find that loan, syndicate, legal environment and information disclosure characteristics which reduce agency problems related to syndication reduce the arrangement timetable. Among the country level characteristics, information disclosure which reduces moral hazard due to informational frictions between syndicate members appears to be the most important driver of a faster deal arrangement timetable, while better creditor rights protection increase the arrangement timetable, consistently with recontracting risk issues.Date
2011-06-21Type
textIdentifier
oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.192.7652http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.192.7652