How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?
Full recordShow full item record
AbstractA previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”.
In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
Financial support from centrA: is acknowledged. Pablo Brañas acknowledges the hospitality of IESA-CSIC during this research. Antonio J. Morales acknowledges financial support from MCYT and FEDER grant number BEC 2002-02852.
TypeDocumento de trabajo