While state medical licensure laws ostensibly are intended to promote worthwhile goals, such as the maintenance of high standards in health care delivery, this Article argues that these laws in practice are detrimental to consumers. The Article takes the position that licensure contributes to high medical care costs and stifles competition, innovation and consumer autonomy. It concludes that delicensure would expand the range of health services available to consumers and reduce patient dependency, and that these developments would tend to make medical practice more satisfying to consumers and providers of health care services.

An interdisciplinary medical science publication, established in 1930.

Characteristic features of Ellis-van Creveld syndrome, the dilemmas in its prenatal diagnosis, and the implications in the management of a congenitally malformed baby born to Muslim parents who were second cousins, are described. Following an ultrasound during the third trimester, the parents were told that the baby had a severe congenital malformation called short rib poldydactyly syndrome and would die soon after birth. However, the baby continued to live showing improvement without any significant medical interventions, and the diagnosis of Ellis-van Creveld syndrome was considered in the first week of life when first examined by the primary care physician. A diagnostic workup later confirmed the diagnosis. In the fourth week of life, deterioration set in. Despite all tbe efforts and help from modem medical technology. the baby did not survive and died around nine weeks of age. Both parents and the physicians involved in the care of this infant were faced with difficult dilemmas and decisions in the management of this congenitally malformed baby.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5915/30-3-9828

Improvement of man's genetic endowment by direct ac­tions aimed at striving for the positive propagation of those with a superior genetic profile (an element of which is commonly recognized as a high intelligence quotient) or-conversely-delimitation of those with negative genetic inheritance has always remained a pri­mary concern of the geneticist and the social engineer. Genetic integrity, eugenic advancement, and a strong genetic pool designed to eliminate illness and suffering have been the benchmarks of the "Genetic Movement" and the challenge of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. If the quality of life can in some way be either im­proved or advanced by use of the law, then this policy must be developed and pursued. No longer does the Dostoyevskian quest to give life meaning through suf­fering become an inescapable given. By and through the development and application of new scientific advances in the field of genetics (and especially genetic engi­neering), the real potential exists to prevent, to a very vii Preface viii real extent, most human suffering before it ever mani­fests itself in or through life. Freedom to undertake re­ search in the exciting and fertile frontiers of the "New Biology" and to master the Genetic Code must be nur­tured and maintained. The search for the truth inevi­tably prevents intellectual, social, and economic stag­ nation, as well as-ideally-frees all from anxiety and fright. Yet, there is a very real potential for this quest to confuse and confound.

The authors draw together the disparate scholarly and judicial commentaries on consent to medical treatment to develop a model of the components in the decision-making process regarding consent to or refusal of psychiatric treatment. The components consist of the precondition of voluntariness, the provision of information, the patient's competency and understanding, and, finally, consent or refusal. They offer two models of valid consent: the objective model, which focuses on the congruence or lack of it between the patient and a "reasonable" person, and the subjective model, which focuses entirely on the patient's actual understanding.

Investors are clamoring for companies to include more climate change risk disclosure in their periodic reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Yet public companies in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to investors how climate change affects their businesses. Although there have been several proposals for more voluntary disclosure of these risks and one petition for guidance from the SEC, these proposals are not effecting changes in disclosure practices quickly enough. This Article builds on existing proposals to create guidelines for mandatory climate change risk disclosure in periodic securities filings. The guidelines seek to provide investors with meaningful disclosure, without overburdening the companies making the disclosure. This framework could be used by the SEC in formulating guidance regarding climate change risk disclosure under existing disclosure rules, or in creating new rules mandating the disclosure. Investors are clamoring for companies to include more climate change risk disclosure in their periodic reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Yet public companies in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to investors how climate change affects their businesses. Although there have been several proposals for more voluntary disclosure of these risks and one petition for guidance from the SEC, these proposals are not effecting changes in disclosure practices quickly enough. This Article builds on existing proposals to create guidelines for mandatory climate change risk disclosure in periodic securities filings. The guidelines seek to provide investors with meaningful disclosure, without overburdening the companies making the disclosure. This framework could be used by the SEC in formulating guidance regarding climate change risk disclosure under existing disclosure rules, or in creating new rules mandating the disclosure.

The Kaye Scholer I case has excited much attention and alarm within the legal profession. 2 It is interpreted as greatly expanding the scope of lawyer liability to third parties and heralding much greater regulatory intervention into the relationship between lawyer and client. In some respects this interpretation is accurate. The Kaye Scholer proceeding is at least a "wake up call" to the legal profession, signalling that lawyers should be much more attentive to their legal and ethical obligations in transactional and regulatory matters. However, there is also much misunderstanding about Kaye Scholer, particularly the supposition that it created novel theories of lawyer liability to third parties. The purpose of this analysis is to explain what Kaye Scholer was about, what are the basic concepts of lawyer liability to third parties, and why the practicing bar should heed a "wake up call"||