Norwegian security policy and the Norwegian armed forces in the 21st century : a case study of KFOR

Abstract

Norwegian Security Policy and the Norwegian Armed Forces in the 21st century

- a case study of KFOR

(Summary)

The subject of the study is Norwegian security policy and the Norwegian Armed Forces as an instrument for international operations, studied within the context of globalisation and substantial internal restructuring. Conducted as a case study of KFOR and by means of an inter-disciplinary approach, the objective is to carve out interesting hypothesis concerning the interaction between political, strategic and institutional.

Directing focus at the formation of national security policy as well as various levels of the Armed Forces, the thesis is related two different fields of scientific endeavour. It is definitively rooted in classical IR theorising on strategy and doctrine (security studies), but complemented with organisational theories traditionally applied to studies of political and administrative institutions. In addition, it should be related research conducted on the conditions for public political participation in Norway and changes in these conditions, most notably through the Power and Democracy research program.

The theoretical approach of the thesis is to contrast theories primarily concerned with material factors with theories more concerned with the role of culture and norms. In terms of IR theory, an emerging body of literature is challenging the hegemony of neo-realism in explaining national security policy formation. In fact, it has surfaced as a complementary approach to the realist-liberalist divide within IR studies in general. By introducing concepts such as norms, identity and culture, writers within culturalist approaches to security policy takes part in a general trend within the social sciences. This trend is mirrored in the institutionalist turn within organisational theory witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s, and the divide between rational and normative institutionalism is, slightly simplified, an institutional level reflection of the divide between neorealism and culturalism.

It should be recognised that this thesis focus on questions not commonly attended neither by Norwegian academics nor in the military professional debate in Norway. Students of international relations concerned with Norwegian involvement in the Balkan conflicts raise question on the moral, purpose and ideology of Norwegian policies in the region. These are concerns that during the last year have re-emerged with renewed strength in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the US and the ensuing war on terrorism. This thesis does not directly concern values and ideology, but rather the process of decision-making and the process of change in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Indirectly, though, it clearly has ideological implications.

It is suggested by the analysis that policy makers need to be aware of the apparent incompatibility of dominating norms constituting the political-strategic culture in Norway with the challenges of the 21st century. KFOR reveals that policy makers seemingly does not know, understand or are satisfactory informed about, neither the capacity of the Armed Forces nor the requirements of complex multinational and multifunctional operations. This raises two fundamental concerns: Firstly, decisions of policy makers based on insufficient knowledge, understanding and information could lead to situations in which the lives of Norwegian soldiers, allied soldiers and/or locals are put at risk. Secondly, it could undermine the public democratic control of the Armed Forces, as the organisation itself in the lack of clear political guidelines could end up substantially defining policy. And as institutional level analysis has demonstrated, this does not necessarily translate into rational mechanisms based on professional knowledge, strategic analysis and top-down implemented plans. Correspondingly, there is a need to look within the Armed Forces. The Norwegian Armed Forces should not be treated in a strictly instrumental manner, as organizations can influence policy by narrowing options and privileging particular responses.

First and foremost the study has presented several arguments supportive of the normative version when concerning the Norwegian Armed Forces as such. There is an undisputable disharmony between the findings and one of the main assumptions of rational theories: the perception of rationality as homogeneous within the organisation. The Norwegian Armed Forces does not constitute a unitary organisation, but rather represent various sub-organisations displaying particularities in patterns of policy formation, organisational behaviour, change and learning.

Another major finding is that the logic of choice throughout the organisation seems more that of appropriateness than rationality . In regards to organisational learning and social learning, for example, the idea of a learning cycle in which conditions for rationality are blocked, seems highly relevant to observations in KFOR. The main finding in terms of organisational theory is therefore that both rational- and normative institutionalism is indispensable for a satisfactory understanding of the performance of military forces in international operations. Yet there is also a need for complementary theories more attentive to social interaction, language and communication