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dc.contributor.authorM. LE MENESTREL
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-05T08:53:15Z
dc.date.available2019-11-05T08:53:15Z
dc.date.created2016-03-03 05:34
dc.identifieroai:RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:655-668
dc.identifierRePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:655-668
dc.identifierhttp://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=pdf&id=pii:S0219198906001168
dc.identifierhttp://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=html&id=pii:S0219198906001168
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/3729545
dc.description.abstractThis article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners' Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners' Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.
dc.description.abstractPrisoner's Dilemma, rationality, procedural utility, social norms, ethics, emotions, JEL Classification: A13, JEL Classification: C72
dc.titleA ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY
dc.typeArticle
ge.collectioncodeOAIDATA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:6444334
ge.identifier.permalinkhttps://www.globethics.net/gel/6444334
ge.lastmodificationdate2016-03-21 12:43
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid148650
ge.oai.repositoryid1228
ge.oai.setnameRePEc
ge.oai.setspecRePEc
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttp://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=pdf&id=pii:S0219198906001168
ge.linkhttp://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=html&id=pii:S0219198906001168


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