The Origin of the World and the Absolute Fact: Landgrebe and the Limitations of Husserl’s Concept of World
AbstractLudwig Landgrebe’s philosophical inquiries are undoubtedly situated in the wakeof Husserlian phenomenology. However, this conceptual framework is notsimply taken for granted: Landgrebe reenacts Husserl’s fundamental analysis,pursues his thrust, extends his bearings, and widens his aims. Furthermore, thestraightforward assumption of the phenomenological method does not induce himto adopt a narrow form of orthodoxy. As early as 1940, while he takes up the taskof elaborating a phenomenological concept of world, Landgrebe offers a criticalaccount of Husserl’s position, thus rejecting any identification between thetheoretical program inaugurated by Husserl and the letter of his writings: “In thefuture, anyone who proposes to clarify the concept ‘world’ should first becomeacquainted with Husserl’s results, see their presuppositions and their limits, andcome to terms with them.”2 In what follows, I aim to reconstruct the main tenetsof Landgrebe’s attempt at “coming to terms” with the limitations he detects inHusserl’s concept of world and to make clear its enduring relevance forcontemporary discussions. As it will appear, this criticism moves in a doubledirection and involves a commitment to two seemingly competing requirements:that of radicalizing the transcendental-constitutive perspective beyond whatHusserl has accomplished in his writings; and that of providing a theoreticalspace for what resists a transcendental-constitutive account, i.e., for a dimensionof archi-facticity upon which any constitutive inquiry ultimately rests.