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dc.contributor.authorSilva, Paul
dc.contributor.authorBernecker, Sven
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-09T21:29:23Z
dc.date.available2023-01-09T21:29:23Z
dc.date.created2022-11-15 00:32
dc.date.issuedforthcoming
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/SILERA-4
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/SILERA-4
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/4265327
dc.description.abstractMark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program owing to self-fulfilling and self-defeating beliefs, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we sketch a reliabilist account of the reasons-for relation (inspired by Alston) and show how it limits the applicability of Schroeder’s arguments.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleEvidence, Reasons, and Knowledge in the Reasons-First Program
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:18690169
ge.lastmodificationdate2022-11-15 00:32
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@novalogix.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149453
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/SILERA-4


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