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dc.contributor.authorBaras, Dan
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-09T21:32:29Z
dc.date.available2023-01-09T21:32:29Z
dc.date.created2023-01-05 16:13
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifieroai:philpapers.org/rec/BARHCN-2
dc.identifierhttps://philpapers.org/rec/BARHCN-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/4265393
dc.description.abstractWhile there has been much discussion about what makes some mathematical proofs more explanatory than others, and what are mathematical coincidences, in this article I explore the distinct phenomenon of mathematical facts that call for explanation. The existence of mathematical facts that call for explanation stands in tension with virtually all existing accounts of “calling for explanation”, which imply that necessary facts cannot call for explanation. In this paper I explore what theoretical revisions are needed in order to accommodate this phenomenon. One of the important upshots is that, contrary to the current consensus, low prior probability is not a necessary condition for calling for explanation. In the final section I explain how the results of this inquiry help us make progress in assessing Hartry Field’s style of reliability argument against mathematical Platonism and against robust realism in other domains of necessary facts, such as ethics.
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleHow can necessary facts call for explanation
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
ge.collectioncodeGA
ge.dataimportlabelOAI metadata object
ge.identifier.legacyglobethics:18740035
ge.lastmodificationdate2023-01-05 16:13
ge.lastmodificationuseradmin@novalogix.ch (import)
ge.submissions0
ge.oai.exportid149453
ge.oai.repositoryid4212
ge.oai.streamid2
ge.setnameGlobeEthicsLib
ge.setspecglobeethicslib
ge.linkhttps://philpapers.org/rec/BARHCN-2


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